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Abstra c t 
Chapter One The provisions of the Glen Grey Act of 1894 are summarised. 
The memoirs of contemporaries are discussed and the historical literature 
on the Act from 1913 to the present is surveyed. The likelihood of the 
land tenure provisions of the Act forcing the people of Glen Grey (or the 
people of other districts that came under the operation of the Act) to 
seek employment is noted. It is evident that there is an increasing 
emphasis in the literature on labour concerns rather than on the 
disenfranchising effects and local government provisions of the Act. It 
is often assumed that the labour force generated by the Act was meant for 
the Transvaal gold mines. 
Chapter Two The relevance of the labour needs of the Indwe 
collieries is investigated. These mines lay adjacent to Glen Grey and 
might have been expected to draw their labour thence if the Act had been 
effective. Rhodes, the author of the Act and prime minister of the Cape, 
had bought shares in the collieries for De Beers shortly before the Act 
was passed, which made a possible connection more intriguing. No causal 
link between De Beers' interests and the Act could be demonstrated; nor 
do the collieries seem to have employed many people from Glen Grey. 
Chapter Three Examines the Cape colonists' complaints about 
shortage of labour from 1807 to the eve of the Glen Grey Act, and 
investigates various official measures to promote the labour supply. The 
Glen Grey Act was not the first labour measure passed at the Cape, and it 
seems likely, therefore, that the labour needs of the Cape, rather than 
the Transvaal, were uppermost in the minds of those responsible for the 
Act. 
Chapter Four examines Rhodes's political position in the 1890s 
and shows him to be increasingly dependent on the parliamentary support 
of the Afrikaner Bond to stay in office. Since the Bond was an 
agricultural interest group it seems likely that labour for Cape farms, 
rather than Transvaal gold mines, was what the Act was supposed to 
provide. With that Rhodes could readily agree, since he wanted to promote 
the agricultural development of the Cape. However, the Bond wanted to be 
able to buy land in Glen Grey (and other district in which the Act was 
proclaimed). Rhodes wanted to keep such districts as 'reservoirs of 
labour' so he could not give the Bond all of what they wanted, i.e. Glen 
Grey titles to be alienable. His manoeuvring to keep the Bond supporting 
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the Bill while not making the land readily salable is described. (In the 
end the land was alienable with the consent of the government -- consent 
that a Rhodes ministry would not give, but that another might.) 
Rhodes's desire to obtain the administration of Bechuanaland for 
his Chartered Company, and his need therefore to reassure the Colonial 
Office and humanitarian opinion that he could be trusted to rule over 
blacks, are pointed out as other possible motivations for the Act, which 
Rhodes tried hard. to present as an enlightened piece of legislation. The 
course of the Act through the Cape parliament, and the opposition of Cape 
liberals to the Act, is described. 
Chapter Five The mentalit~ of the Cape colonists as regards 
race, liquor, land tenure and other political issues is described. 
Chapter Six The reaction to the Act of Cape blacks and 
sympathetic whites, British humanitarians and the Colonial Office is 
described. The contemporary concern with reserving land for blacks is 
noted, as well as concern over the morality of economically coerced 
labour. This is in contrast to the modern concentration on labour almost 
to the exclusion of other issues in regard to the Glen Grey Act. The 
unsuccessful efforts of Cape blacks and British humanitarians to have the 
imperial government veto the Act are described. Rhodes's influence over 
the Colonial Office is described. 
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Introduction 
The Glen Grey Act, Act 25 of 1894, is probably the best known measure 
passed by the parliament of the Cape Colony. It has been much written 
about by historians, and assessments of its worth have varied over time. 
It is often mentioned in passing by writers whose topics are much wider. 
An example of this kind of passing reference is to be found in Paul 
Rich's book White power and the liberal conscience, where Rich says 
One of the earliest uses of the concept of 'territorial segregation' 
was by the Cape liberal, Richard Rose-Innes, member of a prominent 
Cape legal family, who linked it to the establishment of 'reservoirs 
of labour'. The model from which this accrued was the Glen Grey Act 
of Rhodes ... 1 
Rich correctly notices the idea of reservoirs of labour, but he is 
mistaken when he draws a close connection between Rhodes and the Cape 
liberals, because it was the liberals (mainly in parliament) who most 
criticised the Glen Grey Act. 
Recent emphasis on the importance of class in South African 
history has been associated with increasing attention to the Glen Grey 
Act as a labour producing measure for the mining interests, especially in 
the Transvaal. These interpretations emphasise Rhodes's dual position as 
joint managing director of Goldfields of South Africa, Ltd, and as prime 
minister of the Cape Colony. Often the actual effect of the Act in 
generating labour is exaggerated. 
The present thesis draws attention to what is in danger of 
being forgotten: that the Glen Grey Act was a measure of the Cape 
parliament, enacted at a time when the main economic interest represented 
there was the agricultural interest, particularly that of the Western 
Province farmers, through the Afrikaner Bond. 2 While Rhodes, a man of 
wide interests and ambitions, was very influential in the Cape, he had to 
take cognisance of the values and interests represented in the Cape 
parliament. In addition he could not ignore the imperial dimension, and 
1 Paul B. Rich White power and the liberal conscience: racial segregation 
and South African liberaliam 1921-60 Johannesburg: Ravan, 1984. Page 4. 
2 Hermann Giliomee 'Western Cape farmers and the beginnings of Afrikaner 
nationalism, 1870-1915' Journal of Southern African Studies 14(1) October 
1987 pp 38-63. 
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in London other considerations than the gold mines' labour supply played 
their part. The Colonial Office had to think not only of the 
administration of the Southern African region, but also of public opinion 
in Britain. 
Once due weight has been given to all these factors, it is 
hoped that the Glen Grey Act will be seen for what it was: primarily a 
Cape Act which reflected the interests and aspirations of the members of 
the Cape parliament and which was affected by the problems Rhodes 
confronted in enacting the measure. ', 
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Chapter One 
A summary of the Glen Grey Act 
and an 
historiographical survey of writing about the Act 
(i) Summary of the provisions of the Act 
(ii) Introduction to the historiographical survey 
(iii) Memoirs of contemporaries 
(iv) Historical opinion in favour of the Glen Grey Act 
(v) Sui Generis: Edgar Brookes. the repentant segregationist 
(vi) Historical opinion against the Glen Grey ·Act 
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(i) Summary of the provisions of the Act 
The Glen Grey Act was introduced into the Cape parliament by Cecil Rhodes 
on 12 July 1894, and had passed through all its stages and received the 
governor's assent by 16 August. A summary of the most important sections 
of the Act follows. 
1 The Act was to apply to the district of Glen Grey and could be 
extended to other districts, of which the inhabitants were mainly black, 
by proclamation. 
2 Land in Glen Grey could only be allotted with the governor's 
permission. [The effect of this was that it would ordinarily be allotted 
only to blacks.) 
3 Glen Grey was to be divided into locations, except for mission 
station land and land already held in freehold or on quitrent. 
4 The locations were to be divided into allotments of four morgen and 
granted to individuals already holding land in the district and to 
approved persons claiming, but not yet in possession of, land. Allotments 
in excess of four morgen could be made to men already holding more than 
four morgen of land. l 
5 Glen Grey titles could not be mortgaged. 
6 The remaining unallotted land was to be commonage, and the 
government was empowered to build roads, railways, dams, and similar 
public works across the commonage if necessary. 
7 Each location was to be under the control of a board of three 
appointed by the governor after consideration of the wishes of the 
inhabitants. Their term of office was a year, during the governor's 
pleasure, and they could be re-appointed. 
8 The governor could fill vacancies on the boards arising from the 
death, illness or imprisonment of members. 
9 Headmen could be eligible for appointment to boards. 
10 The governor could confer on the boards powers vested in local 
authorities by the Villages Management Act, 1881, and similar Acts. 
11 The governor could grant lot-holders half an acre of land as a 
building lot for the construction of a substantial dwelling house.' 
1 In practice this prov1s10n was used to reward loyal collaborators rather 
than to ensure that no one held less land under the Act than he had before. 
J.J. Kelly Act 25, of 1894, as applied and its probable consequences to the 
natives of the district of Glen Grey No publication details. Pp 10-11. (CL 
MS 17102). 
, This would enable the lot-holder to qualify for the franchise, if the 
house was worth ~100. 
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12 The cost of surveys would be borne in the first instance by the 
government. Approved claimants to land had to pay half the cost of 
survey, plus 5 shillings stamp duty , within three months. 
13 The balance of the survey cost had to be paid by holders in four 
equal annual instalments . 
14 The annual quitrent was 15 shillings for a standard four morgen 
lot, and for every morgen beyond five (sic) a further 3 shillings per 
morgen per year. 
15 In the event of quitrent or instalments of survey expenses being 
three months overdue, the movable property of the defaulting lot-holder 
could be sold to recover the money. 
16 In the event of a lot-holder being in default of payment for a 
year, his title deed could be cancelled and his land re-allotted to 
anyone not in possession of land who could pay the arrears . (Twenty-eight 
days notice of the magistrate 's intention to cancel the title deed had to 
be given to the defaulting lot-holder.) 
24 Lot-holders could not bequeath their land by a will. The land had 
to descend according to the law of primogeniture (i.e. to the eldest 
son). An heir who was already a lot-holder could choose whether to take 
up his inheritance or keep his existing lot, but could not hold more than 
one lot at a time. A table of succession was delineated. Failing any male 
heirs, the governor could grant the lot or the proceeds of the sale 
thereof, to female heirs. 
26 Allotted land was deemed to be held in communal tenure for 
franchise purposes . J 
27 The voters' lists of the Tambookieland field-cornetcy in 
Queenstown and the West Waschbank field-cornetcy in Wodehouse were to be 
specially revised by an officer appointed for the purpose. 
28 People not meeting the qualifications were to be removed from the 
roll; people not previously on the roll who now met the qualifications 
were to be added to the roll. 
29 Provision was made for the magistrate to hold a court for finally 
settling the voters' list.' 
33 Every male black person in Glen Grey who in the magistrate's 
opinion was capable of labour had to pay a tax of ten shillings per year, 
but would not have to pay the tax if he had worked outside the distric t 
for three months in the year . He could be permanently exempt by working 
for a total period, consecutive or otherwise, of three years. 
34 The magistrate could exempt for a year at a time anyone who f or 
good rea s on could not leave the distric t, or who with the magistrate's 
prior permission obtained paid employment within the district . Members of 
location boards and the district council were exempt during their terms 
of office . 
J The effect of this provision was that land held under Glen Grey title 
could not be counted towards the property qualification for the vote. 
4 This provided some appeal a~nst the revising officer's decision. 
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35 The tax was to be spent on agricultural and trade schools. 
36 If the tax was three months overdue, the magistrate's messenger of 
the court could sell the defaulter's movable property to raise the money. 
If he had no property, or the sale did not raise all the money due, the 
defaulter could be deemed to be an idle and undesirable person and upon a 
second conviction could be sentenced to prison with hard labour for up to 
twelve months. Payment of the amount due, or showing cause why he should 
be exempt, relieved the accused from these penalties. 
38 The governor was empowered to set up a district council for the 
administration of local affairs. 
39 Six councillors were appointed by the governor. Six were chosen by 
the location board from among their members, with the governor having a 
veto over their choice. 
40 A councillor's term of office was three years, during pleasure. 
with the possibility of re-appointment. 
41 The governor could fill vacancies on the council. 
45 The magistrate was a member of the council, and was to preside at 
its meetings when present. The magistrate did not have to be present for 
meetings to take place. The council elected its own chairman in the 
magistrate's absence. The chairman had a deliberative and a casting vote. 
46 The governor could set a scale of allowances for councillors, who 
could not become contractors with the council, or be financially 
interested in any contract with the council. Contravention of this 
section meant expUlsion from the council. 
47 The council could levy a rate on property owners in Glen Grey not 
holding land under the Act of no more than two pence in the pound. 
48 The council was to levy a rate of not less than five shillings a 
year on lot-holders and male adult blacks capable of labour, except 
persons holding land by ordinary quitrent tenure or in freehold. 
53 Funds raised by the council could be spent on a lengthy list of 
matters appropriate to local government, such as education, roads, 
bridges, the destruction of noxious weeds, the planting of trees and so 
forth. 
59 A labour bureau was to be set up. The council was to receive 
applications from employers wanting labour and arrange for the despatch 
of blacks wanting work. 
60-64 The council was to choose three of its members to form a 
licensing court. 5 A majority of the ·council had to give its approval in 
advance for the court to issue a new liquor licence . The court could not 
renew an existing licence if a two thirds majority of the council had 
resolved against the renewal .beforehand; but was not obliged to renew if 
the council had made no resolution. The court's powers of cancellation 
5 It seems that in practice the council itself acted virtually as the 
licensing court. 
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did not extend to Lady Frere,' but the court could prohibit licensees in 
Lady Frere from selling liquor to blacks. 
Schedule A contained the form of title deeds to be used under the 
Act. Among the most important conditions were the following: the land 
could be forfeited for rebellion, for conviction for the crime of theft 
for which a prison term of not less than twelve months was imposed, and 
failure to occupy the land beneficially. The district council had first 
to be consulted in such cases, and a period of three months' notice had 
to be given of the governor's intention to seize the allotment for non-
beneficial occupa.tion so that defaulters could make good their lapse. 
It should be noted that clauses 64 and 65 of the Bill were not 
included in the Act. These had provided that when a liquor licence was 
cancelled by the licensing court, compensation would have to be paid to 
the owner. The outcry over such a provision (at a time when many people, 
black and white, wanted to protect blacks from the harmful effects of 
liquor) was such that the clauses were eventually dropped. Local councils 
would not be discouraged from cancelling liquor licences by the need to 
pay compensation . 
(ii) Introduction to the historiographical survey 
This chapter deals with comment about the Glen Grey Act to be found in 
the memoirs of contemporaries and with historical writing about the Glen 
Grey Act. It does not include what contemporaries wrote and said at the 
time that the Act was a part of current politics; that is to be found in 
chapters four, five and six. 
Any survey of the literature on the Glen Grey Act will bring to 
light three interesting things: (i) the change in the views of historians 
over time, from early praise to later condemnation; (ii) the extent to 
which later criticism of the Act echoed, often unwittingly, the criticism 
of contemporary observers (this is particularly true of the labour 
provisions of the Act); and (iii) how soon the criticism of 
contemporaries was forgotten by historians. 
The bulk of the historical literature on Glen Grey has been 
divided for present purposes into 'for' and 'against'. These are very 
broad and general categories, and at least one author, Edgar Brookes, has 
proved impossible to classify. Some others are so lukewarm that it is 
difficult to know where to place them. Nevertheless, the distinction has 
, A white town in the Glen Grey district. 
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been drawn, and it seems to illustrate the contention that, generally 
speaking, earlier historians were more favourably disposed towards the 
Act than later ones. 
From the moment when the intended legislation appeared as a 
draft Bill, comment on the Glen Grey Act has been so constant that it is 
difficult to distinguish contemporary controversy from the later debate 
about the historical significance of the Act. Any line of division 
between the two kinds of discussion must appear somewhat arbitrary, but 
for the purposes of the present overview the year 1910 has been selected . 
It was in this year that the first reminiscences about Rhodes appeared, 
written by one who was a participant in Cape politics at the same time: 
Sir Thomas Fuller, leader of the Progressive Party and friend of Olive 
Schreiner. 
Another reason for choosing 1910 was that soon afterwards, in 
1913, the first serious retrospective assessment of the Glen Grey policy 
appeared. It was writ ten by J. H. Hofmeyr (later deputy prime minister of 
the Union of South Africa) in his youthful biography of his uncle Jan 
Hendrik Hofmeyr, Cape politician , leader of the Afrikaner Bond party,7 
and sometime colleague of Cecil Rhodes . 
(iii) Memoirs of contemporaries 
Sir Thomas Fuller was a director of De Beers s and a member of the Cape's 
Legislative Assembly (MLA). He was pro-imperialist and anti-Bond rather 
than liberal . He was the leader of the Progressive Party, which had 
resolved to give Rhodes' s ministry 'fair play ' and ' watch that the 
ascendancy of the Bond party ... did not affect injuriously the progress 
of the country and its imperial interests w9 • 
Fuller drew attention to the land, labour and local government 
7 Hereafter 'Bond'. 
S Thomas Ekins Fuller The Right Honourable Cecil John Rhodes: a 
monograph and a reminiscence London: Longmans, 1910. Page 8. 
9 Fuller Reminiscence pp 164-5. 
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provisions of the Act. Abhorring idleness, he claimed that 'three out of 
four' black men in the Cape Colony were idle, letting their wives work 
for them. While some worked in towns or on farms most did not, He 
therefore supported the labour tax which he said was a tax 'not on labour 
but on laziness,10 that would drive out the lazy young men. He did not, 
however, want whites to monopolise the labour force generated by the Act: 
in parliament Fuller proposed an amendment that working on another man's 
lot in Glen Grey 'should exempt a man from paying the tax. Although Rhodes 
accepted this, a subsequent amendment, according to Fuller, nullified it. 
Fuller, therefore, while accepting the principle of the Bill, thought 
that in its final shape it was "unfair to native interests" and voted 
against its third reading. 11 He noted with satisfaction that the labour 
tax was almost a dead letter. 12 
When he was writing his memoirs Fuller's memory misled him. 
Section 34 of the Act did in fact provide that paid employment within the 
district for three months a year would exempt a worker from the tax 
provided the magistrate gave his permission. Fuller's amendment would 
have facilitated the employment of blacks by blacks because it had not 
required such permission. 1J In addition the proposed further amendment 
to which he objected required that the employer be "any person other than 
a native~.14 This amendment was, however, negatived, so the final 
position was largely as he had wanted it, i.e. labour in the district 
whether for a white or black employer could bring exemption. His reason 
for voting against the Bill is thus unclear. 15 
With regard to "native" policy more generally it should be seen 
that Fuller was not completely unenlightened. He had opposed the so-
called "Strop Bill", which Rhodes had supported twice. This would have 
made legal corporal punishment for domestic and farm workers. 
For Fuller the Glen Grey Act was one of "statesmanship", which 
would by its local government provisions give "a corporate life" to the 
10 ibid P 175. 
11 ibid P 178. 
12 ibid P 179. 
13 DHA 8194 P 460 col 2, 
14 ibid. 
15 What is also puzzling is at what point the requirement of the 
magistrate's prior permission was inserted. 
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localities that had been lacking until then. 16 Fuller approved of the 
alienation of land being prohibited without government permission, as a 
way of protecting blacks from encroachment by whites . 
James Tennant Molteno, later Speaker of the House of Assembly of 
the Cape Colony and the Union of South Africa, and the son of the first 
prime minister of the Cape, was MLA for Namaqualand at the time of 
Rhodes's Act. He was critical of the Glen Grey Act in his memoirs, 
published in 1923, although he, like Fuller and many others , had voted 
for its second reading. He thought that the Glen Grey Bill was meant to 
serve as a rallying point for Rhodes's ministry after a session which 
nfrom the Ministerial point of view .. . was not a sucCess , nI7 The 
cabinet's Scab Bill (to put down the scab insect in sheep which was 
devaluing the Cape's wool clip) had met with considerable opposition from 
Bond MLAs who were supposedly government supporters. 
Molteno believed that Rhodes acted under pressure in regard to 
Glen Grey. He noted that the Glen Grey Bill was introduced late in the 
session and that Rhodes had said after its second reading that he was 
satisfied with the progress so far and would not proceed with the measure 
until the next session. But, ' Later on he [Rhodes] changed his mind and 
thought that by pandering to some of the worst elements in his party he 
could regain some of his lost prestige . ,18 Molteno was opposed to the 
exploitative aspects of the Bill, which he described in a staccato style: 
' Cheap labour, lessened restrictions on the alienation of Native Lands to 
Europeans. ' He disapproved of compensation for cancelled liquor licences, 
but did not recall that it had been struck out of the Bill. He opposed 
the racial discrimination of the Act : 'Rhodes forced through a labour tax 
applied to the native only and withheld from the lazy poor whites." 
Molteno accepted the local government provisions, which he described as 
"common cause n between government and Opposition, and did not remark on 
the franchise provisions . He wrote "The Bill passed, with infinite harm 
to the Native question, but what did the natives count for as long as 
16 Fuller Reminis cence pp 171-4. 
17 James Tennant Molteno The dominion of Afrikanderdom: recollections 
pleasant and otherwise London: Methuen, 1923 . Page 46 . 
18 Molteno Afrikanderdom p 47. Rhodes envisaged the possibility of not 
getting the Bill enacted in the 1894 session, but did not say that it was 
his intention to leave it over until the next session. DHA 1894 P 363 col 
2, and p 392 col 2. 
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Rhodes could achieve a consolidation of his disgruntled followersl,l9 
Victor Sampson, later attorney general in Jameson's cabinet, and 
an unsuccesful Bond-supported candidate for Tembuland in the 1893-4 
general election, mentioned the Glen Grey Act in his Reminiscences. 20 He 
approved of the Act and wanted credit for his part in bringing it about. 
Sampson clearly saw the potential significance of individual tenure to 
labour supply, and had the agricultural interest of the Cape in mind. Zl 
In 1892, while on circuit with the Eastern Districts Court, Sampson had 
hit upon the plan of g1v1ng the natives individual title to land with 
the law of primogeniture to govern the succession, hoping in this way 
to get rid of the evils of communal tenure and force the brothers of 
the heir to go out and seek their living elsewherezz 
In 1893 he wrote to Hofmeyr asking him to persuade Rhodes to turn his 
scheme into law. Sampson acknowledged the contributions of others: 'the 
idea of the Native Parliament came from Robert [sic] Stanford, afterwards 
th~ Chief Magistrate of Tembuland"; 'To Cecil Rhodes belongs the credit 
of the power to carry such a measure through Parliament',Z3 but was 
nevertheless anxious to be recognised as having thought of the 
primogeniture provision himself. 
George A. L. Green, subsequently editor of the Cape Argus until 
1946, was a reporter in the gallery of parliament when the Glen Grey Bill 
was discussed. Newly arrived from Britain, he was then employed by the 
Cape Times. Green commented briefly and favourably on the Act as a 
measure intended to introduce segregation and to benefit blacks. 
The first occasion on which I heard Rhodes speak at length was when 
he moved the second reading of his famous Glen Grey Bill --a measure 
which he intended as the prologue of a great experiment to ensure the 
advancement of the natives and obviate racial friction in the future. Z4 
19 ibid pp 47-8. 
zo Victor Sampson My rem1n1scences London: Longmans, 1926. Page 84. 
Zl Ruth Edgecombe 'The Glen Grey Act: local origins of an abortive 
'Bill for Africa" in J.A. Benyon et al. (eds) Studies in local history: 
essays in honour of Professor Winifred Maxwell Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press, 1976. Page 90. 
zz Sampson Remininscences p 84. 
n ibid. 
24 George A. L. Green An editor looks back: South African and other 
memories Cape Town: Juta, 1947. Page 38. (Green went on to describe Rhodes's 
manner of public speaking, which he found much less impressive than other 
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Sir James Rose Innes. later chief justice of the Union of South 
Africa. was attorney general in Rhodes's first cabinet. but was in 
Opposition by the time of the Glen Grey Act. Innes had reservations about 
the Act. He pointed out that the possibility of being able to buy land 
from blacks was what recommended the policy of individual tenure to many 
whites. including government supporters. "Repeated attempts to dispossess 
the Glen Grey natives having failed. an agitation was commenced for the 
issue of unconditional subdivided title."25 Rhodes's policy, however, 
was that the land should be inalienable without government consent, a 
point on which the Opposition agreed with the prime minister . Innes 
described some of the other features of the Act as follows: 
There was a purge of the voters' roll, which was an excrescence, and 
a labour tax. which was a blot upon the measure .... ·labour· meant 
labour for other people. No toil. however strenuous, upon a Native's 
own land, was dignified enough to satisfy the tax collector. 26 
He tried to improve the Bill in committee, but Rhodes reneged on an 
und€rtaking to consider favourably certain Opposition amendments intended 
to bring the Bill in line with Rhodes's speeches, which, Innes wrote, 
"were more liberal than his bill." Innes saw the "dictatorial and 
impatient" sides of Rhodes for the first time. He also saw that Rhodes 
was the prisoner of his own hard-line back benchers, who wanted a 
repressive measure. Rhodes insisted on an all night sitting, 'in those 
days an unheard-of proceeding" to ram the Bill through. Innes considered 
his own position carefully. He felt betrayed by Rhodes and although in 
principle in favour of individual tenure he voted against the third 
reading, particularly because of the insufficient protection against 
alienation . 
Nevertheless, in later years Innes thought that the Act was a 
success. Shorn of the labour tax, and with greater protection for black 
owners because the land was no longer executable for debt, it was in his 
view an improved measure. 
Sir Walter Stanford. later undersecretary for native affairs in 
the Cape Colony. was a magistrate in the Transkei at the time of the Act. 
observers.) 
25 James Rose Innes Autobiograohv Edited by B.A. Tindall. Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press. 1949. Page 104. 
26 Innes AutObiography p 105. 
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He was primarily interested in the local government provisions of the 
Act . He described a tour through the Transkei that Rhodes made before the 
session of 1894 with the Glen Grey policy obviously in mind . Stanford did 
not speculate about possible ulterior motives behind the law, but he did 
describe Rhodes's skilful management of the people, black and white, whom 
he met, and whom he attempted to persuade of the merits of his policy: 
[H)e would search for opinions or views on the Glen Grey system in 
its various applications. To the missionaries he put the gain to them 
in stabilizing the payment of teachers in their schools . . .• To 
magistrates he put the opportunities which would come for development 
of their districts. To commercial men better roads and greater 
circulation of money were points he made at once . To the native 
headmen and councillors he urged the value of the opportunity to them 
of developing their country educationally and the advantages of 
better means of communication, thus enabling them readily to bring 
their produce to the best markets . He also impressed upon them that 
the Council system was the beginning of local self-government for 
them on new lines adapted to their changing conditions of life . 27 
Stanford's account of Rhodes's progress was glowing, although a small 
irony shows him alert to black caution over the measure: 
everywhere one heard individuals explaining to each other what Mr. 
Rhodes had said to them and retailing the very sound advice which in 
return had been given him. The natives were more reticent as is their 
way, besides which they were the people who had to find the money . 28 
The recollections of contemporary observers mentioned above 
reflect both criticism and praise of the Act. They foreshadow, on the one 
hand, much of the subsequent criticism of the Act: cheap labour, and 
segregation. On the other they also anticipate the approval later writers 
have shown: individual tenure as a good thing, local government as 
worthy, the whole Act a sound piece of 'Native' administration . 
(iv) Historical opinion in favour of the Glen Grey Act 
Many historians who approve of the Act fail to see the economic interests 
27 Walter Stanford The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford, volume two 
1885-1929, edited by J.W. Macquarrie. Cape Town: the Van Riebeeck Society, 
1962. Pages 166-7. 
28 Stanford Reminiscences p 167. 
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which motivated and were served by the Glen Grey Act. To many the Act was 
simply a piece of ~native administration". An illusion of perpetual 
trusteeship underlies much of this discussion and often those who write 
approvingly of the Glen Grey Act see nothing wrong in blacks being forced 
by legislation to work for whites. 
J. H. Hofmeyr's biography of his uncle The life of Jan Hendrik 
Hofmeyr (Onze Jan),29 while interesting, has serious faults. It sets out 
to be a work of filial piety: its object was 'to lay a tribute at the 
grave of one, whom an admiring country has acclaimed as perhaps its 
greatest sonnJO, not to provide a critical account of Onze Jan's career. 
It cites few references to support the claims made, and is immensely 
condescending towards people of colour. 
For the younger Hofmeyr the Glen Grey district was 'fruitful" 
but in his prejudiced view the 'natives' were 'living in sloth and 
idleness, and deriving their livelihood from the pleasant and profitable 
occupation of stealing the stock of neighbouring farmers". The measure 
was intended to counteract the overpopulation of the district by forcing 
the surplus population onto the labour market. 
The younger Hofmeyr (hereafter J. H.) believed his uncle was the 
author of the Glen Grey measure. As well as making an explicit claim he 
provides indirect support for the contention: the Act reflected Onze 
Jan's views in inhibiting the sale of land held on Glen Grey tenure, and 
in withdrawing from Glen Grey quitrent erf-holders the right to qualify 
for the franchise. Not all Onze Jan's followers applauded these views. 
'The greater part' of the members of the Bond favoured full individual 
title which would include the right to mortgage and sell, because this 
could be expected to facilitate the white purchase of the land. 
Hofmeyr was more prepared than his followers to give some 
protection against the land being bought by whites, but he did not accept 
the proposal, even more generous to black interests, of a cheaper form of 
tenure (tickets of occupation) and protection against loss of land by 
sale or indebtedness together with the continuance of the franchise. 
29 J. H. Hofmeyr with F. W. Reitz The life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze 
Jan) Cape Town: Van de Sandt de Villiers, 1913. 
30 Hofmeyr Hofmeyr p vi. 
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Hofmeyr would reserve the land to blacks, but he was opposed to their 
having the franchise. 
Onze Jan's difficulty was that his followers might not agree to 
"native" land being potentially inalienable. For that reason he was for 
the most part silent on the matter, except for a speech towards the end 
of 1893 in which he made a compromise proposal, "in order to educate his 
followers up to his view", that the land should be inalienable for a 
period of eight years. 31 
J. H. claimed that the credit for the Gl en Grey policy was due 
to his uncle. The elder Hofmeyr apparently wrote a draft of the Bill 
before going to the imperial conference at Ottawa, which caused his 
absence from the 1894 parliamentary session. Rhodes came under pressure 
during that session from some of the Bondsmen over a certa-in clause in 
the measure. The author did not say which clause: perhaps this was the 
opposition that Onze Jan had feared over the reservation of the land . 
Rhodes disarmed his critics by producing the draft from his drawer and 
saying "There you have it all, in Mr. Hofmeyr's own handwriting ... 32 
J. H. provided no reference for this anecdote. He had written to 
the man who had been the permanent secretary at the Prime Minister's 
Office at the time, W. H. Milton who by 1913 had been knighted and was 
administrator of Rhodesia. The younger Hofmeyr's letter reads in part as 
follows: 
I have been informed that the Bill was actually drafted by Mr Hofmeyr 
and that this draft was shown by Mr Rhodes himself to a gentleman 
still living. Your Excellency will no doubt be aware of all the 
circumstances ... and [I] am therefore writing to ask whether Your 
Excellency ... could let me know in how far Mr Hofmeyr was actually 
responsible for the Bill. That it was evolved in consultation between 
him and Mr Rhodes is at least certain. 33 
Milton's reply, if he replied, has not been traced and may not 
survive. 34 His testimony would have been most interesting, since it is 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid P 467. 
33 SAL MSB 247 Hofmeyr to Milton 27 June 1913. 
34 In my fruitless search for relevant Milton papers the following 
people did their best to help me. Their assistance is gratefully 
acknowledged: Professor Michael Roberts of the Department of History of the 
University of Zimbabwe, who searched that university's historical 
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the contention of this thesis that the Glen Grey Act was a measure 
intended primarily to provide labour for the fanners of the Western Cape 
rather than the gold mines of the Transvaal. This is not a novel view, 
but the recent emphasis on mining capital as a determining factor in 
South African history requires that the alternatives be stated. Hofmeyr, 
as the leader of the Bond, the political movement of the Cape Afrikaner 
farmers, would be concerned with the Cape farmers' need for labour rather 
than the productivity of gold mines in the Transvaal. While it is 
impossible to prove that the Bill was actually drafted by Hofmeyr, the 
coincidence between his ideas and the contents of the Act is plain. 
A generally chronological arrangement has been adopted in this 
chapter, but where the same author has written more than once, all his or 
her work is treated together at the date of earliest publication. Hence 
we now turn to the year 1931, when J. H. wrote a book called South Africa 
for a series on the modern world under the general editorship of the 
historian H. A. L. Fisher. He had by then changed his views on the 
purpose of the Glen Grey Act -- or may have been dressing them up for a 
British audience. As he saw matters in 1931 there were two main ideas 
underlying the Act: 
The one was that means must be found to avert the danger which was 
beginning to be realized, of the breaking down of the authority of 
the chiefs, and the consequent disappearance of the traditional 
machinery of native local government, with nothing to come in its 
place. 
The second main aim of this legislation was the encouragement of 
native agricultural development by the improvement of the system of 
land tenure35 
There was no mention here of 'forcing the overgrowth into the labour 
market'. This is all disingenuous; Hofmeyr must have been aware that the 
undermining of the chiefs' power had been an object of Cape 'native' 
policy for decades. As for encouraging black agriculture, the Glen Grey 
manuscripts collection; the staff of the National Archives of Zimbabwe who 
were most helpful, but whose collection of Milton papers does not include 
anything relative to the Glen Grey Act; Mrs Dorothy Ivey, presently of the 
School of Librarianship of the University of Cape Town, who has done 
research of her own into Milton's career; the staff of the Cory Library, 
Rhodes University, who ran a computer data base search on the National 
Register of Manuscripts (NAREM); and Professor Chris Hummel of the 
Department of History, Rhodes University. 
35 J.H. Hofmeyr South Africa London: Ernest Benn, 1931. Page 165. 
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policy undermined the profit-seeking peasants by limiting the sizes of 
their allotments to a trifling four morgen -- although three agricultural 
schools had been set up in the Transkei under the Act by 1911. 36 Hofmeyr 
went on to say, without any explanation, that 'Logically enough it was 
enacted that this special form of tenure would not qualify for the 
exercise of the franchise.,,37 He described the Bunga (the Transkeian 
Territories General Council -- the apex of the system of location boards 
and district councils) in positive terms, and praised the Glen Grey Act 
as its ultimate origin. Hofmeyr's later book, then, casts no light on the 
objectives of the Glen Grey policy. In fact it is positively misleading, 
although it is of interest for what it shows about the changing ideas of 
a portion "of the white ruling caste about its own role. 
J. H. was to return to the Glen Grey Act a third time, in one of 
the chapters he wrote for the South African volume of the Cambridge 
History of the British Empire published in 1936. He again describes the 
Act as a fruit of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance, but fails to mention the 
labour tax. He notes the "improved' land tenure and partial self 
government. The Act is described as part of a policy of differentiation 
between the races that was beginning to replace the Cape policy of 
assimilation. The denial of the franchise was a 'logical consequence' of 
this policy of differentiation. 38 
In the meantime other writers had referred to the Glen Grey Act. 
Basil Williams, for example, an early biographer of Rhodes, pointed out 
in 1921 that Rhodes had agreed with the Bond and 'foreshadowed, much to 
their delight, his own Glen Grey policy' when he criticised the Cape 
franchise in the debate on the 1887 Registration of Voters Bill on the 
grounds of, as Williams puts it, its 'liberality' to 'uneducated 
natives.,39 The 1887 Act had excluded land held under communal tenure 
from the franchise qualification. Williams sees Rhodes as moving from 
36 East London and Frontier Red Book 1911 East London: Standard 
Printing Company, 1911. Pages 555-7. There were two industrial and three 
agricultural schools set up by the Transkeian Territories General Council 
by 1911, and the Council also gave grants-in-aid to other educational 
institutions. 
37 Hofmeyr South Africa p 165. 
38 J.H. Hofmeyr 'The problem of co-operation, 1886-1895: railways, 
customs and the native question' in A.P. Newton and E.A. Benians (eds) The 
Cambridge history of the British Empire volume viii South Africa. Rhodesia 
and the protectorates Cambridge: the University Press, 1936. Page 546. 
39 Basil Williams Cecil Rhodes London: Constable, 1921. Page 140. 
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early crude opinions about keeping the ~ natives ~ as a subject race to a 
later, more enlightened position of uplifting them40 -- from 'juvenile 
ideas of 'oriental despotism' W to helping them "make a better use of 
their human minds ". 
In Williams's view Rhodes thought that whites had, by virtue of 
their higher civilisation, responsibilities towards blacks. 4! He was in 
favour of practical rather than academic education for them because the 
former produced 'Kaffir parsons' and newspaper editors -- 'both objects 
of his intense dislike ,.42 Training blacks along Rhodes's lines would 
make them useful and docile labour for white employers; it did not occur 
to Williams to doubt that whites had the right to regard blacks as cheap 
labour (no doubt with kind treatment) and nothing else. Nor did it occur 
to him that blacks might have other aspirations, although he says that to 
do Rhodes justice he would have forced English loafers to work as readily 
as he tried to force blacks to work. 43 
Williams's approval of the Glen Grey Act rests on some 
misunderstandings. He sees the local government provisions of the Act as 
a quid pro quo for the loss of the franchise, but takes at face value 
Rhodes's claim that the "natives" were "not interested in the politics of 
the country'; in fact we know that blacks took a keen interest in Cape 
parliamentary politics. 44 Williams makes the common mistake of assuming 
that the labour tax was not meant to apply to land-holders. 45 He claims 
that in parliament "no great objections' were found to the Bill's 
principle, which may be true, but he overlooks the strenuous opposition 
offered to some very important details of the measure . He is aware that 
the labour tax was largely a dead letter, but thinks that the 'natives 
entered into the spirit of ownership and took up plots eagerly , 46 when 
in fact the people strenuously objected to the new tenure. In short 
Williams is rather naive in his assessment of the Act, and largely 
uncritical of Rhodes's policy. 
40 Williams Rhodes pp 209-10. 
4! ibid 203-5. 
42 ibid P 210 . 
43 ibid 210. 
44 Stanley Trapido ' African divisional politics in the Cape Colony, 
1884 to 1910' Journal of African History 9(1) 1968 pp 79-98; Andre Odendaal 
Vukani Bantul the beginnings of black protest politics in South Africa to 
1912 Cape Town: David Philip, 1984 . 
45 Williams Rhodes p 211. 
46 ibid P 213. 
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of these measures: the Registration of Voters Act of 1887 and the 
Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892. Walker, however, follows Williams in 
seeing Rhodes's ideas on "native" affairs as having matured from his 
earlier ideas of "Indian despotism" to a kind of moderate position (with 
Hofmeyr) between those whites who wanted to have both the land and the 
labour of the blacks, and "others like Sauer who held that the native 
must be protected in the possession of the land and yet be allowed to 
acquire the franchise. 1149 
Walker provides a brief summary of the Act, and points out that 
its principles were not new, as Rhodes had readily conceded. Walker notes 
that the expense of survey deters blacks "to this day" from adopting 
individual tenure. 50 Many Bondsmen were opposed to the land not being 
readily saleable, but were "reassured when the vote was withheld from 
such tenants and a labour tax was prescribed for all non-landholding men 
who did not go out to work for three months in the year."51 Sauer and 
his colleagues in the Opposition resisted these two points, says Walker, 
but approved of the local councils. Walker concludes by pointing out that 
the money raised by the rates and taxes under the Act was spent locally, 
and that the Act was not as widely applied as Rhodes had expected. 
Walker's point about the expense of the survey is well taken, 
but he does not probe further and see that the Glen Grey policy had 
effected no real change. The cost of the survey in the districts that 
came under the Act had been very high in proportion to the value of the 
land . He correctly identifies the withholding of the vote and the labour 
tax as being likely to please the Bond (although they were attractive to 
Rhodes as well) and he sees that the Bond opposed restrictions on the 
alienability of the land. In all his writing on the subject Walker 
consistently under-rates the extent of the parliamentary opposition to 
the council system. (It should be noted that the Opposition was in favour 
of a local government measure, but wanted the councils to be elected, not 
appointed.) 
In the 1957 edition of his history, called A history of Southern 
Africa, Walker made no changes in his discussion of Glen Grey. He 
438. 
49 Eric Walker A history of South Africa London: Longmans, 1928. Page 
50 Walker History of SA (1928) P 438. 
51 ibid P 439 . 
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Eric Walker, an influential historian in t he 1920s and 30s, 
wrote biographi es of two of Rhodes's contemporaries (Lord de Villiers, 
1914 and W. P . Schreiner, 1937) as well as a general history of South 
Africa (1928, revised 1957) . 
In his life of Lord de Villiers, chief justice of the Cape 
Colony and later of the Union of South Africa, Walker adverts only 
briefly to the Glen Grey Act. He describes it as a Bill 
which gave the natives in the overcrowded Glen Grey area individual 
tenure of land inalienable without the Governor ' s consent. The 
franchise, which this tenure would otherwise have conferred, was 
withheld . Instead, the natives were to be trained politically through 
village and district councils. The opposition had desired to give the 
natives the vote. The rank and file of the Bond, on the other hand , 
had wanted to give them individual tenure with all its liabilities, 
frankly with the idea of throwing the territory open to European 
exploitation. 47 
Walker ' s summary is accurate. He sees the councils as an alternative to 
the franchise, with an implication of political segregation [see Ferguson 
pp19-20 below], and he demonstrates an awareness of the Bond's land 
hunger . 
"- ' d " A few pages later Walker writes that 1·~2Sl. es many excellent 
provisions' the Glen Grey Bill contained the labour tax, which he says 
(not quite correctly) was never enforced, and which he describes as 
"dangerous'. Walker feels that there was "something to be said' for the 
tax, but does not elucidate . Presumably he believed that many young black 
men were idle and needed to be nudged into working. But he qualifies his 
faint praise for the tax by pointing out that it might have led to forced 
labour of the kind then being exacted by the Chartered Company in 
Rhodesia. He says that the tax was to be levied on "all men' , which is 
correct. 48 It is commonly said to have been levied only on the landless. 
In the first edition of his History of South Africa (1928) 
Walker points out that since 1879 there had been laws passed in the Cape 
which discriminated against blacks in a way that had not been done since 
the Fiftieth Ordinance of 1828, and mentions Rhodes's involvement in some 
47 Eric Walker Lord de Villiers and his times : South Africa 1842-1914 
London : Constable, 1925 . Page 256 . 
48 Walker De Villiers p 258. 
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inserted a new passage nearby in which he described the racist thinking 
behind the abolition of plural voting in the Cape Town constituency, 
ostensibly because it was an anomaly to allow the practice in Cape Town 
and not elsewhere, but actually to prevent the election of a particular 
individual to whom Rhodes and the Bond objected on racial grounds. So 
Walker, while approving of the Cape constitution, was aware that the 
tradition of non-racialism in politics was under threat. 
W. P. Schreiner: a South African (1937) contains much the same 
argument about Glen Grey, but includes an error about the creation of the 
ministry of agriculture: Walker says that this ministry was set up in 
1894 to see that the Scab Act was carried out. 52 In fact there had been 
a permanent official in the Cape's Colonial Office responsible for 
agriculture since 1887 with the title of secretary of agriculture. 53 In 
1892 agriculture had been put into John X. Merriman's portfolio as 
commissioner of crown lands and public works. 54 A separate ministry of 
agriculture, with the responsible minister (styled "secretary") in the 
cabinet was set up in September 1893. 55 Its purpose was not to enforce 
the scab law, which had not yet been enacted, but to placate the Bond. It 
should be noted that the Scab Act was not popular with many Bond members, 
despite its positive effects on the value of the colony's wool clip. 
Walker has confused the events of two different years. 
W.T. Ferguson in his 1932 M.A. thesis sees the policy as one in 
the common interests of white farmers and black peasants. 56 Ferguson is 
approving of the Act: he notes that white farms were short of labour in 
the 1890s, while there was overcrowding in the reserves. In Ferguson's 
view Rhodes Saw that this would lead to the impoverishment of the people 
in the reserves, and found individual tenure to be the answer: a number 
of blacks would be secured in their rights to land "and a surplus would 
52 Eric A. Walker W. P. Schreiner: a South African London: Oxford 
University Press, 1937. Page 57. 
53 P. Venter Thesis on Cape administration. 1806-1910 [No title page) 
Microfilm, Cory Library, Rhodes University. 19491 Pages 60-1. 
54 Phyllis Lewsen John X. Merriman: paradoxical South African statesman 
Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 1982. Pages 154-6. 
55 Minster of Agriculture Act, 14 of 1893, in W. G. Eybers (ed.) Select 
constitutional documents illustrating South African history 1795-1910 New 
York: Routledge, 1918. Pages 74-5. 
56 W.T. Ferguson The native policy of Cecil John Rhodes in the Eastern 
Province M.A. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1932. 
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remain wherewith to supply the Colonial labour market. ,,57 Individual 
tenure, Ferguson says, would give blacks a greater interest in their land 
and encourage them to make improvements on it. Cape liberals thought it 
would civilise the blacks, and the Bond thought it would throw the land 
open to white purchase. While Rhodes wanted to reserve the land to the 
blacks in perpetuity, he compromised with the Bond by making the right to 
sell dependent on the governor's permission, which might someday be 
forthcoming. 58 
Ferguson thinks it likely that Rhodes wanted segregation and an 
end to the black vote. 5' In Ferguson's view the new land tenure had two 
objectives: (i) to break down tribalism and replace it with 
individualism; and (ii) to force the majority of blacks to abandon the 
land and take up permanent employment . Ferguson thus falls into the 
"complete proletarianisation" school of thought on the Glen Grey Act, 
along with Diane Cooper and Russell Ally, rather than the "migrant 
labour" school, exemplified by Marion Lacey. [See section (v) below for 
all these writers.] 
The Glen Grey Act was mentioned in a study of the economic 
development of the British Empire by L.C.A. and C.M. Knowles in 1936. The 
authors saw Rhodes as a despotic but benevolent paternalist who, in their 
view had a realistic grasp of likely trends. They quote Rhodes's words 
from the debate on the Bill that "nine-tenths" of the black population 
would have to work as manual labourers in the future. They say that he 
was aware that the whites would supervise and do the brain-work, but 
claim that Rhodes "realized the obligations of the white man to the black 
and [he] found that those obligations had been but ill-observed. "60 
Such a benevolent paternalism cannot be found in the Glen Grey 
policy. The brief treatment given to the Glen Grey Act by the authors in 
the course of a lengthy work probably accounts for their superficial 
understanding of the measure. 
57 Ferguson Native policy pp 43-4. 
58 ibid P 44. 
5' ibid P 55. 
60 L.C .A. Knowles and C.M. Knowles The economic development of the 
British overseas empire volume three The Union of South Africa London: 
George Routledge, 1936. Page 321. 
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Another approving thesis, presented in 1939 by M. S. Griffiths, 
also considers the question of land tenure in its relation to labour. 61 
Griffiths says of the labour tax 
It carried the Bill, and, as was intended, it won for Rhodes the 
support of the farmers, but it elicited such fierce opposition from 
the natives themselves, and from those chiefly interested in their 
welfare, that it threatened even the excellent features of the 
remaining 66 clauses. 62 
For Griffiths the labour was required 'in this country',6J i.e. the 
Cape, not the Transvaal. He notes correctly that an attempt was made to 
collect the labour tax, but that it 'ultimately fell away through the 
difficulty in enforcing it' and remarks also that 'in most areas the idle 
natives seemed to be few. ft64 Griffiths's work is one of administrative 
history, so the interests that the Act was intended to serve do not 
receive any further attention, but the thesis is perceptive within its 
limi ta tions. 
.-C. W. de Kiewiet, a protege of the historian W. M. Macmillan, 
published his History of South Africa: social and economic in 1941, in 
which he praises the Act. He describes it as 'the most forward move in 
fifty years' and commends the protection of black land against white 
encroachment. 65 For de Kiewiet the policy 'held out the promise of a 
gentle but sure transition from an unenlightened and squalid tribal 
existence to an active and progressive individualism. n66 De Kiewiet 
finds the land clauses to be the most important part of the Act, and that 
the improvement of black agriculture was intended. He notes that the Act 
was not a complete success, mainly because there was not enough land 
allocated to make it work. He is aware of the labour tax, which he 
concludes shows that the Transkei was not meant under the policy to 
become self-sufficient in food, but would always have had to 'export' 
labour. The implication seems to be migratory labour. De Kiewiet's 
interest in black agriculture seems to have misled him as to the purpose 
61 M.S. Griffiths The development of native policy in the Transkei and 
in Glen Grey between 1870 and 1900 M.A. thesis, Rhodes University College 
[1], University of South Africa, 1939 [1] . See e.g. pages 114 and 118. 
62 Griffiths Development p 120. 
6J ibid P 120. 
64 ibid P 123. 
65 C.W. de Kiewiet A history of South Africa: social and economic 
London: Oxford University Press, 1941, reprinted 1968. Page 142. 
66 De Kiewiet South Africa p 199. 
22 
of the Act : to advance white agriculture in particular, and white 
enterprises in general, through the provision of black labour. 
W.J.G. Mears in his doctoral thesis of 1947 is mildly approving 
of the Act, although he is aware that the purpose of the individual 
tenure was to create "a landless class which, it was expected, would earn 
a living working for Europeans. n67 
Mears makes two important errors. He states that men ploughing 
more than four morgen at the time the Act came into effect were allotted 
all the land they had been working,68 which Ally has demonstrated was 
not the case. 69 Mears also says that the labour tax did not apply to 
landholders ,70 which a close examination of the text of the Act 
disproves. 71 
He is correct in noting that the unpopularity of the labour tax 
made the people of other districts unwilling to accept the extension of 
the Act,72 and in saying that "the labour tax broke down almost at 
once. "7J Mears, however, has little to say about the larger aims of the 
measure. 
A University of Cape Town M.A. thesis of 1951 by Stanley Jenkins 
on Rhodes's premiership presents land tenure as the crucial part of the 
measure . 74 Jenkins notes that the allotments were insufficient to feed 
more than one family, and so a man ' s children would be forced to seek 
work, but does not remark further. He sees little wrong in the labour 
provisions of the Act, although he is critical of the liquor provisions 
67 W.J.G. Mears A study in native administration. The Transkeian 
Territories 1894-1943 D.Litt. thesis, University of South Africa, 1947. Page 
268. 
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of the Bill (that were removed at the committee stage): "if it is 
possible to justify Rhodes's action in regard to the labour tax, no such 
justification is possible for his handling of the liquor provisions of 
the Bill.,75 
(v) Sui Generis: Edgar Brookes the repentant segregationist 
Edgar H. Brookes, a well-known South African liberal, wrote two different 
versions of the same book fifty years apart, and so radically altered his 
opinions that it is impossible to put him in either the 'for' or the 
"against" category. His early work The history of native policy in South 
Africa (1924) was explicitly segregationist, albeit of the liberal 
segregationist school which sought to protect blacks by segregation. In 
1974 he published a substantially revised version under the title White 
rule in South Africa in which he describes his retraction of his 
segregationist views and attempts to write a history of white rule 
without arguing for a policy of which he no longer approved. 
In the earlier work Brookes praises the Cape's Transkeian 
policy. His reasons for doing so are not clear because it is not easy to 
see exactly what was the content of this policy. Detribalisation, 
"civilisation", and individual tenure of land all playa part, but what 
else there might have been is not clear. Brookes does not seem to have 
expected the complete cultural assimilation of Africans to be the goal of 
Cape policy, and seems to think that some preservation of distinctions 
between white and black was necessary. What Brookes appreciates is what 
he saw as the Cape's sympathetic administration: he did not, in 1924, 
defend the Cape franchise. 
Brookes writes: 
The essence of the [Sir George] Grey policy -- to civilise and not 
merely to preserve peace and the status guo -- was a feature of 
Transkeian life from the first. But the faults of the Grey policy 
were avoided; and there was no attempt to treat the Natives as being 
identical with Europeans. The Transkeian Magistrates were too 
practical to deal in legal fictions, and too kindly to wish to extend 
liquor and the vote to their people. From the very first they tried 
75 Jenkins Administration p 95. 
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to teach them to govern themselves rather than to assist in governing 
Europeans . Their material progress was fostered and ensured. The 
Government at Cape Town, taught by the bitter lesson of Basutoland, 
refrained from oppressive legislation. 76 
Cape "native" policy, Brookes says, was progressive and under it the 
people of the Transkei became "the most prosperous, the most advanced and 
(with the exception of the tribal Natal Native) perhaps the most 
contented Native in South Africa today. ,,77 
Brookes locates the Glen Grey policy in the tradition of Cape 
"native" policy, and points out that much of the Glen Grey policy was 
foreshadowed by Captain Matthew Blyth, the first chief magistrate of the 
Transkei, in a memorandum of 1882. 78 Brookes also emphasises the value 
of continuity of policy, achieved by leaving things mainly in the hands 
of the permanent officials of the Native Affairs Department. He gives J. 
W. Sauer, secretary of native affairs 1881-4, credit for starting both 
this practice and the tradition of "continuous public consultation with 
the Natives".79 (Sauer was a minister in Rhodes's first cabinet from 
1890-3 and then a leading member of the Opposition to Rhodes . ) Brookes's 
view of the Glen Grey policy and its relation to "native" affairs more 
generally may be best conveyed by his own words: 
It may be convenient for panegyrists and other garblers of history to 
credit Cecil John Rhodes with the Glen Grey policy and to suggest to 
us that it sprang full-grown from his brain as Pallas Athene from the 
head of Zeus. Sober and accurate history must step in with regret and 
destroy this legend, in the interests of the just fame of the great 
Administrators who really deserve the credit -- in particular Charles 
Brownlee, Matthew Blyth, H. G. (later Sir Henry) Elliott and W. E. 
(later Sir Walter) Stanford. 8o 
When he discusses the Act itself, Brookes praises its "improved 
form of land tenure" and "partial self-government, intended to have an 
educative effect and lead up to better things." He notices that "quit-
rent furnished a useful revenue, and the necessity for its payment an 
incentive to work' without criticism. He has the highest praise for the 
76 Edgar H. Brookes The history of native policy in South Africa from 
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Act in general, and the tenure and council systems in particular. 81 
He accords praise to the advances in education and the public 
works paid for by the councils 82 before dealing with some black 
criticisms of the policy . He admits that the magistrates might have 
unduly revised the decisions of the general council, particularly in 
financial matters, and concedes that since the councils were only 
advisory their success could be over_rated. 83 
Brookes notes that the introduction of the Act produced a 
resistance and a resentment that alarmed the magistrates of Tsomo and 
Idutywa in 1895, but he notes too that the agitation died down. 84 He 
was, in short, aware that the policy had been unpopular, but he was 
confident that since the grassroots opposition had been shortlived, the 
policy must ultimately be succesful, and worth extending. 
Brookes describes Rhodes's skill in bringing in the Act : 
'Nine-tenths of the House were in favour of either the Labour Tax or 
the Quit-rent Tenure, though probably those whole-heartedly in favour 
of both could have been counted on the fingers of one hand, and so 
the Bill had a comparatively easy passage. 85 
He does not suggest in more detail what Rhodes might have been trying to 
achieve by the measure. He notes that the labour tax was unpopular, and 
felt by blacks to be 'harsh and oppressive' but does not concede that it 
~ SO; he considers the repeal of the tax wise in the circumstances. 86 
He gives a lengthy analysis of the land tenure provisions of the Act, but 
does not consider the economic viability of the four morgen lots, or the 
cost of the survey in relation to the value of the land . 
To sum up Brookes in 1924 one cannot avoid saying that he is 
complacently oblivious to the oppressive features of the Glen Grey 
policy, and, while well-meaning, was wedded to white supremacy as it was 
then understood: blacks were to be segregated and excluded from the 
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rights of citizenship while benefiting from enlightened tutelage. His 
later views are different, although not without some lingering 
paternalism. 
In 1974 Brookes was anxious to distance himself from the policy 
of apartheid, since his earlier (recanted) approval of segregation might 
have been construed as support for the policy of the National Party. Yet 
it is surprising "how little of his book he really changed, as a 
comparison of pages 107-17 of The history of native policy with pages 78-
84 of White rule will bear out. While much was cut out, and some matter 
added, for the most part alterations merely brought the racial 
terminology up to date . ("Native', quite inoffensive in 1924, was deemed 
derogatory by 1974 and replaced by "African' throughout.) 
When dealing with the Glen Grey Act Brookes admits that it 
withheld the franchise from most blacks in the Transkei and "a system of 
partial self-government replaced it, which may fairly be claimed to be 
the the precursor of the autonomy of the Transkeian 'homeland' at the 
present day.,87 He regrets that '[i]n many (though not all) ways the 
Transkeian system led to the policy of 'Bantu authorities' in the 
'homelands ' which is so controversial at the present day. ,88 While 
appalled at the trend of legislation after 1948, and aware of the Glen 
Grey Act in the network of causation in South African history, Brookes 
was reluctant to abandon his favourable view of what Cape "native' policy 
had once been. 
(vi) Historical opinion against the Glen Grey Act 
Wiggins, writing in 1929, departs from the approval of the Glen Grey Act 
found in most writing until then . 89 Wiggins sees the Act as a labour 
measure intended to benefit Western Province farmers. She is not blinded 
by ideology about ' native administration". She points out that the white 
87 Edgar H. Brookes White rule in South Africa 1830-1910 : varieties in 
governmental policies affecting Africans Pietermaritzburg: University of 
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farmers of the Eastern Province were generally well supplied with labour, 
while those in the Western Province complained of an "expensive" and 
"irregular" supply, and one that was adversely affected by "industrial 
development, such as railways or dock construction. "90 The gold mines 
also drew labour away from the Cape Colony. The Cape government responded 
to this problem by appointing a commission of enquiry, which sat in the 
years 1893-4. 
Wiggins argues that the Cape policy was to undermine the tribal 
system with a view to forcing the people onto the labour market, and she 
is suspicious of colonists' claims that blacks lived in idleness. This 
demonstrates a refreshingly critical view for her day, when the attitudes 
of colonists were often unquestioningly reproduced by historians. She 
writes: 
The main conclusion [of the labour commission], naturally enough, was 
that the natives would only become effective wage earners when they 
had been taken out of their tribal system, and the main objection to 
their tribal system was that it provided the natives with land so 
that they could live in 'idleness.' Any measures to deter this should 
be tried, and individual tenure was advocated. 91 
She notes further: 'Individual tenure for natives had long been a 
favourite panacea in matters of native policy.,92 Wiggins points out 
that whereas the old communal tenure had been elastic and able to 
accomodate population growth, individual tenure was deliberately intended 
not to make such allowances: 
What was to happen to natives as they attained the status of 
manhood, when normally some piece of land would have been found for 
them? 
This was a question which had been fully anticipated by the 
framers of the Act. These young men, it was intended, would have to 
go out to work . It was in this way that it was hoped that the Act 
would contribute towards a solution of the labour problem. 93 
Wiggins is unable to provide references for many of her 
contentions, but her argument is most convincing, and is in agreement 
with later writers such as Ally. 
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Sheila van der Horst, in Native labour in South Africa (1941) 
saw the Glen Grey Act as a labour measure of limited success. She 
anticipates Colin Bundy [see pp 36-7] by putting the Act in the context 
of the Private Locations Ac t of 1892, another labour measure. This law 
had encouraged white landowners to drive off their farms blacks not in 
their employ by imposing a tax on such tenants (called 'squatters' in the 
parlance of the day), who were then expected to become labourers for 
other white farmers. 
Van der Horst notes that the labour commission of 1893-4 had 
found much opinion in favour of individual tenure as a means of forcing 
black men into labour by 'preventing all who had no title from occupying 
land' . She notes also that the commission was not sanguine about this 
having the desired effect, as events were to prove. 
She quotes Rhodes's remark from the debate on the Glen Grey Bill 
that 'in order to assist the western farmer' the expected black workers 
from the eastern districts would be put to work on the railways. This 
would force 'coloured' labourers who had left agriculture for the 
railways to return to farm work, as the farmers wanted. So van der Horst 
sees the Act as a labour measure for the Cape rather than the Transvaal, 
and particularly in the interests of agriculture. 
She points out the effect of increasing the need of blacks for a 
cash income, not only through the labour tax but also through the 
quitrent and the district rate: this was expected to make blacks work for 
white employers for pay. 
Van der Horst's treatment is brief but pithy. She does not decry 
the intentions of the framers of the Act, she simply states what it was 
they seem to have wanted. She is under no illusions about 'civilisation' 
or the wisdom of a benign "native policy' and simply provides a cold 
blooded analysis of the Glen Grey Act as labour legislation. Hers is 
perhaps the most penetrating of any analysis of any up to the date of 
publica tion of her work . 94 
T. R. H. Davenport's criticism of the Glen Grey Act has 
94 Sheila van der Horst Native labour in South Africa London: Oxford 
University Press, 1942, reprinted London: Frank Cass, 1971 . Pages 148-52 . 
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increased over the years. Writing in 1966 on the Afrikaner Bond, he takes 
at face value the finding of the 1892 Glen Grey Commission that a 
majority of the people there were in favour of individual tenure. He 
represents as the view of the people that their land should be inalien-
able for a period of three or four years,95 when in fact that was the 
view of the commission: a majority of the people had wanted a permanent 
prohibition against sale. However he correctly notes that for "many 
Bondsmen Glen Grey was a coveted region. "96 He mentions, 
passing, the expected effect of individual tenure on labour 
but only 
supply.97 
in 
Davenport emphasises and criticises the disenfranchising effect 
of the law; but he is relieved that a white land grab was not, after all, 
permitted; and he notes (not quite correctly) that the labour tax was 
never collected. Even the labour tax could have been worse: "this part of 
the 'Bill for Africa' has since had rather stiffer parallels in other 
parts of the continent." 98 Davenport's view of the Act in 1966 was not 
very penetrating and he admits that at the time he saw "nothing sinister" 
in.the measure. 9' 
By the third edition of his modern history of South Africa in 
1987 Davenport was more aware of the Glen Grey Act as a labour measure. 
It "had something to do with the extension of local government to African 
communities on Cape Colonial lines, but rather more to do with the 
utilisation of black labour. ,,100 He criticises the disenfranchising 
effects of the Glen Grey Act and the 1892 Franchise and Ballot Act lOI 
and suggests that the Glen Grey policy was useful in drawing labour out 
of the Transkei for the Cape,I02 but he probably overstates the Act's 
efficacy. Davenport notes that Glen Grey was overcrowded and suggests 
that this overcrowding would have made it fairly easy for labour to be 
forced out of the district. He suggests that Rhodes intended by means of 
his law to draw out labour for the nearby Indwe coal mines in which he 
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had bought a share for De Beers . 
Davenport makes the c ommon mistake of assuming that the labour 
tax was meant to apply only to the non-landholding men in Glen Grey. In 
fact it was meant to apply to all men whether lot-holders or not . 
Likewise the district rate applied to all, and not only to land-
holders. l03 
Stanley Trapido and W. D. Hammond-Tooke both published articles 
in 1968, Trapido on African divisional politics in the Cape, and Hammond-
Tooke on the Transkeian council system . Trapido mentions the Act only 
peripherally, as something to which black voters were opposed in the 1903 
general election. ,04 Hammond-Tooke follows Davenport's 1966 assessment 
in concentrating on the franchise and local government aspects of the 
Glen Grey Act . He notices the labour tax but since his interest is to 
assess the working of the councils he does so only in passing. ,05 
John Marlowe, in a biography of Rhodes published in 1972 and 
called Cecil Rhodes: the anatomy of empire, says that the Glen Grey Act 
was part of Rhodes's attempt to get Cape 'native' policy in line with 
that of Natal and the republics. l06 Of Rhodes's policy more generally 
he writes the following succint and accurate outline: 
The main lines of his domestic policy consisted of ... a policy of 
agricultural protection and improvement designed particularly to 
appeal to Dutch farmers, and a railway tariff policy designed to 
channel the trade of the inland republics through the Cape. '07 
For Marlowe the labour tax was 'an attempt to provide more and 
cheaper labour for the Cape farmer and mine manager', but only an attempt 
because it was 'not applied' and later repealed. lOB The Glen Grey Act 
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was "the origin of the Bantustan policy later adopted by the Republi c of 
South Africa . 11109 
Marlowe's book is popular and doe s not contain many s tartling 
insights, but it is generally accurate and it is interesting that he does 
not need to look outside the Cape for an explanation of the Glen Grey 
Act. Perhaps a foreigner, somewhat detached from South Africa, is better 
able to avoid the' 'Witwatersrand-centric ' approach to our history . 
A rather better life of Rhodes, though lacking any references to 
sources, is John Flint ' s 1974 publication. He correctly puts a discussion 
of Rhodes's policy in the context of the development of agriculture in 
the Cape, and the political power of the agricultural interest . llo He 
notes that much of Rhodes's parliamentary support was drawn from the 
Afrikaner Bond, "a farmers' party " .11 1 
Rhodes's problem, in Flint's view, was that to leave Glen Grey 
(ov,ercrowded, overgrazed and 'a haven for unemployed Africans') to itself 
was to "invite chaos and violence nl12 • Glen Grey was just one such 
district. However, Rhodes found that 
to stabilize African society, to grant Africans secure title to their 
lands, and to improve their educational facilities and their economy 
threatened slowly and steadily to increase the number of African 
voters lll 
For Flint, Rhodes's Act was intended to secure the political supremacy of 
whites, and the segregation of blacks, who were to be migrant labourers. 
Hence Flint's equation of Glen Grey with apartheid . 
T. J. Keegan, writing in 1975, provides a thorough treatment of 
the policy as experienced on the ground, but deals only briefly with the 
question of motivation. He suggests that the idea behind individual 
tenure may have been to create a ' buffer-class of commercial 
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peasants, . 114 He points out that by limiting the number of lots many 
people would be forced onto a labour market quickened by the 'di scovery 
of mineral wealth and the consequent upsurge in commercial farming".115 
He notes that workers were already leaving the reserves on a large scale. 
He points out the desire of some whites for land in Glen Grey,116 and 
raises the possibility of whites wanting to quash African competition in 
agriculture . 
Ruth Edgecombe has written about the Glen Grey Act in her Ph.D. 
thesis on the Aborigines ' Protection Society l11 and in a later article. 
The later work is subtitled 'Local origins of an abortive 'Bill for 
Africa' " and this captures the core of her argument: Cape interests, and 
not metropolitan or even Transvaal interets, determined this policy . 
Edgecombe describes how men such as Victor Sampson [see section 
(iii) above] expected individual tenure to solve the labour problem by 
restricting the use of land among blacks to title holders only, thus 
forcing the rest out to work. He expected it to provide 'cheap labour all 
over the colony'.IIB Sampson also hoped to see black-owned land coming 
onto the market to be bought by whites. He communicated these ideas to 
Jan Hofmeyr in the hope that Rhodes's government might be persuaded to 
take action along the lines suggested. 
Edgecombe points out that the African vote usually went against 
the Bond . 119 Individual tenure carried the vote, so the franchise had 
to be "doctored", in Sampson's words, as far as blacks were concerned: 
simply raising the franchise would exclude too many of the poorer white 
v oters. Here we have the views of a fairly senior member of the Bond 
(Sampson was a candidate for parliament on the Bond ticket in 1894) 
expressed in the years 1891-3. They bear an extraordinary similarity to 
the contents of the Glen Grey Act of 1894. 
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For Edgecombe the Glen Grey Act was a compromise between the 
Bond view and the views of men such as Innes, Merriman and Sauer who 
wanted individual title, but with restrictions on sale. In her opinion 
the. land tenure is important because it bears on the labour supply, and 
the party political implications of the franchise are also important: she 
draws our attention to one T. J. Botha, a member of the Bond who in the 
1880s had brought a court action to have the voters' roll in Glen Grey 
revised, because he alleged there were many unqualified black voters on 
it. He lost his case, but subsequent petitions on similar lines led to 
the House of Assembly appointing a select committee on the voters' 
roll.120 
Eddie Webster, writing in 1978, has ascribed to the Glen Grey 
Act an importance and an effect far beyond its due. 121 He writes that 
the emergence of a labouring class for the mines through the operation of 
the market alone would have taken far too long. Extra-economic methods 
were needed, to wit 'the legislative power of the state and the creation 
of monopolistic recruiting organisations.,122 The Glen Grey Act was one 
of three central laws, the other two being the pass law of the South 
African Republic of 1896, and the Land Act of 1913. What Webster appears 
to ignore is the testimony of contemporaries l23 and historians l24 that 
the Glen Grey Act had little effect in increasing the supply of labour to 
the gold mines, or anywhere else: Glen Grey was already a labour 
exporting district. 
The Glen Grey Act was thoroughly analysed by Diane Cooper in 
1979. 125 Cooper's work, while seriously flawed, is interesting and 
deserves fairly lengthy consideration here . She notes that at the time of 
writing much academic work had concentrated on the South African state's 
120 Ruth Edgecombe "The Glen Grey Act: local origins of an abortive 
'Bill for Africa" in J.A. Benyon et al. (eds, Studies in local historv: 
essays in honour of Professor Winifred Maxwell Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press, 1976. Page 93. 
121 Eddie Webster 'Background to the supply and control of labour in 
the gold mines' in Eddie Webster (ed., Essays in Southern African labour 
history Johannesburg: Ravan, 1978. 
122 Webster 'Bachground' p 10. 
123 DHA 1894 P 388 col 1. " ... of the 7,000 adult males in Glen Grey 
5,000 were out at work'. 
124 W.T. Ferguson The native policy of Cecil John Rhodes in the Eastern 
Province M.A. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1932. Pages 59-60. 
125 Diane Cooper The Gl en Grey policy of 1894: an attempt at 
'dissolution' B.A.(Hons, dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1979. 
34 
policy of maintaining the reserves as a source of cheap migrant labour 
for the gold mines. She makes the now generally accepted point that 
migrant labour was cheap because the reserves provided for the 
subsistence of the workers' families (and the workers themselves for part 
of the year) so that the wages paid to those workers could be low. 
Cooper distinguishes two kinds of policy aimed at securing 
labour. One was the policy of 'conservation' which would preserve some 
aspects of tribal life. The other was the policy of 'dissolution' which 
aimed at entirely eliminating pre-capitalist modes of productiQ~. In her 
view the gold mining industry at the end of the nineteenth century 
favoured a policy of dissolution, and it was this end that the Glen Grey 
Act was designed to serve. Only after that policy had failed was it 
replaced in the twentieth century by one of maintaining the reserves. 
What Cooper emphasises is the correspondence between the 
thinking of the Chamber of Mines and the provisions of the Glen Grey Act. 
In .the 1890s the Chamber considered that one way of obtaining labour was 
individual tenure which would "separate a large number of African 
peasants from the means of production and force thetnto labour on the 
mines. ,,126 
Since both individual tenure and a special tax were included in 
the Glen Grey policy, Cooper believes that Chamber of Mines thinking 
influenced it. The Chamber was able to do this because whil~ the 
interests of the Cape's ruling class had prevailed in the colony before 
gold mining began, once goldmining capital was imported into South Africa 
it was "hegemonic". 
She recognises that there was a shortage of agricultural labour 
at the Cape. For Cooper there was a "contradiction" between Cape 
agriculture and Transvaal mining : they were competing for the same pool 
of labour. The mines, with their better organisation for recruiting and 
(for a time at least) higher wages, had the advantage over the farms in 
attracting labour.127 But these competing "fractions of capital II 
reached "agreement" over the Glen Grey policy; agriculture expected to 
benefit "indirectly" from an oversupply of labour, with the "excess" 
126 ibid P 35. 
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going to work on the farms. 128 For all this she provides no references . 
She goes on to discuss the political organisation of the 
agricultural interest in the Cape. 'The Bond quite clearly came to 
represent predominantly the large-scale capitalising farmers. It was this 
section of agriculture which brought its interests [sic, influence) to 
bear on the Cape government . ,129 In that respect she is quite correct. 
Cooper asserts that mining capital enjoyed hegemony over the 
Cape. 'It is clear that a close connection between mining capital and the 
Cape government existed on both a general and individual level.,130 She 
attempts to prove this connection by pointing out that mining capital was 
largely British and 'shared common ties with British imperialism.' She 
continues: 'Although the Cape had been granted self-government, it 
remained a colony of Britain. The governing party in the Cape parliament, 
the Unionist Party , was strongly pro-British imperialism.,131 (In fact 
there was no Unionist Party in the Cape legislature until 1907. 132 The 
gov,erning party at the time was the Afrikaner Bond and a few adherents of 
Rhodes. The pro-British party was the Progressive Party, which at the 
time of 
Jameson 
Glen Grey was in opposition, 
13% ... 
cabinet of 1904 . ) 
and did not come to power until the 
In Cooper's view Rhodes was another link in the imperialist 
chain, and 'Other Cape government officials such as Rose-Innes, Brownlee 
and Stanford expressed their belief in the superiority of everything 
British ... ' This 'representation of British imperialism on ideological 
and parliamentary political level is a manifestation of its influence on 
all levels of Cape society. ,133 Cooper goes on to cite what she regards 
as evidence for the hegemony of British mining capital over the Cape 
Colony. The Cape government had helped in a small way with mine labour in 
1893 . The Labour Commission complained that Cape interests were being 
subordinated to those of the Transvaal by the cheap tariff for the 
carriage of workers to the Transvaal by the Cape Government Railways, 
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which was a cause of labour shortage in the colony. Rhodes had become 
prime minister in 1890 and was "a major shareholder' in Consolidated 
Goldfields; Lionel Phillips, president of the Chamber of Mines from 1892 
to 1895, was implicated 'in the Jameson Raids [Sic].,13' 
Cooper correctly tells us that the 'native question' was really 
a number of issues combined. These were labour supply, overcrowding in 
the reserves, the. question of whether the franchise should be extended or 
narrowed, and the que stion of how the colonial state was to achieve 
political control over its African subjects. 13S 
Cooper fails to consider the more immediate circumstances that 
produced the Act. She does not consider Rhodes's need for a policy in the 
Cape that would help him to get the free hand that he wanted in the North 
and Bechuanaland. She completely misunderstands the balance of power in 
the Cape parliament. The Glen Grey Bill had to be approved by the 
legislators of the Cape. A malign force called 'imperialism' did not 
somehow coerce or fool those men into voting against their own 
interests -- whatever Rhodes's position at Goldfields was, whatever the 
constitutional position of the colony was, however metropolitan capital 
may have been placed. These disagreements notwithstanding, Cooper has 
argued plausibly that the policy was intended to undermine completely the 
traditional economy of the reserves and convert the great majority of the 
men in them into wage labourers. 
Colin Bundy in The rise and fall of the South African peasantry 
describes the Act as one of a number of measures (such as the Private 
Locations Act, Act 33 of 1892) that tended to undermine the independent 
black peasantry of the Cape with a view to forcing them to become 
labourers on white farms. He suggests that one reason why earlier writers 
such as de Kiewiet look on the Glen Grey Act and the Transkeian 
administration favourably was that they tended to consider only the 
succesful peasants whose views were aired in the Transkeian Territories 
General Council. 13' The a c tivities of that body provide evidence of 
agricultural innovation and prosperity, but in Bundy's view this was 
13' 
13S 
13. 
London: 
ibid P 41 
ibid P 50 
Colin Bundy ~T~h~e~~r~i~s=e~a~n~d~~f~a~I~I~o~f~t~h~e~~S~o~u~t~h~A~f~r~i~c~a~n~p~e~a~s~a~n~t~rLY 
Heinemann, 1979 . Pages 132-3. 
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confined to a small class of well-to-do peasants who were often also 
functionaries under the Glen Grey Act. 
For Bundy, Glen Grey was a Cape farmers' policy. "The proposed 
size of agricultural holdings as well as the principle of 'one man 
one lot' seems designed to prevent the emergence of black farmers so 
succesful that they might compete with white farmers. "137 
Bundy says that under the Act the reserves "would continue to 
feed the black population and thus free the capitalist sector from that 
responsibility."13S This is certainly one view of the question, 
although the "complete proletarianisation" thesis has much to commend it 
too. (By 'complete proletarianisation" is meant the complete separation 
of blacks from the land, so that they were forced to rely solely on wage 
labour to earn a living. This is contrasted with the partial 
proletarianisation of migrant labourers, who still had a partial 
livelihood in the reserves, and were not solely dependent on their 
131 A 
wag.es. ) 
To sum up, Bundy puts the Glen Grey policy firmly in a Cape 
colonial and agricultural context, and treats its labour aspects as 
central. He is not much concerned about whether proletarian or migrant 
labour was intended, and his discussion of the administrative aspect of 
the law deals only with its serving the interests of a small, succesful. 
co-opted peasant class that continued to prosper while the mass of their 
fellows sank into poverty. 
D. M. Schreuder's book on the scramble for Southern Africa 
contains a brief reference to the Glen Grey Act: 
The farming interests of the western Cape never ceased complaining of 
the slow supply and high cost of African labour, as the evidence to 
numerous colonial commissions on the subject reports .... Never was 
this better vocalised than in Cecil Rhodes' highly revealing, if 
somewhat crude speech, on the Glen Grey Act of 1894 . 139 
137 Bundy Peasantry 135. 
138 ibid. I3g A a.JJ,. ~ 1'1'- 41-47 . 
139 D.M. Schreuder T&e scramble for Southern Africa, 1877-1895: the 
politics of partition reappraised Cambridge: the University Press, 1980. 
Pages 198-9. 
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While not going into detail Schreuder clearly sees the measure as one for 
the Western Province farmers. 
One of the more prominent radical historians to discuss the Glen 
Grey Act has been Marion Lacey in her book Working for boroko.140 It 
may be a little unfair to take her to task over Glen Grey when her book 
is mainly about the Hertzog era, but her stateme~ts on Glen Grey are so 
emphatic that they must be examined. 
Lacey presents the now familiar argument about the mines' labour 
supply and the partial subsistence base in the reserves that this 
required. The South African Party (SAP) was for Lacey the political arm 
of mining capital, and pursued a policy on the African reserves 
accordingly. This policy had its origins in the Glen Grey Act: "This SAP 
reserve policy related to extant Natal and Cape practices and in 
particular the Cape Glen Grey system first framed by the arch-capitalist 
Cecil Rhodes to boost the mines' labour supply . "141 
In Lacey's view both mines and farms required labour, but they 
diverged on how to obtain it. While the mine owners wanted the reserves 
as a partial subsistence base, the farmers thought that the reserves were 
havens for deserters or potential workers, and wanted them restricted so 
that workers would be forced out to labour on the farms. l42 She states: 
Until 1924 the interests of mining capital had held sway and the 
decision had been taken to extend the reserves so that they could be 
maintained as cheap labour reservoirs for migrant workers. Contrary 
to traditional interpretations this ... was a policy based on the 
Glen Grey system which Cecil Rhodes, the mining magnate, inaugurated 
in the Cape during his premiership in 1894. 143 
In a footnote to the above remark Lacey says "The Glen Grey system itself 
was based on earlier land and administrative experiments in the Cape and 
also on Shepstone's policy in Natal. "144 
Lacey sees the Rhodes policy as succ~ful: 'Of all the various 
140 Marion Lacey Working for boroko: the origins of a coercive labour 
system in South Africa Johannesburg: Ravan, 1981. 
141 Lacey Boroko pp 13-4. 
142 ibid P 13. 
143 ibid 4. 
144 ibid P 310 n 8. 
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methods designed to perpetuate the migrant labour system, the Glen Grey 
system inaugurated by Cecil Rhodes in the Cape proved most 
efficient. ,145 She does not notice that the Glen Grey Act added little 
to the existing trend of migratory labour . Nor does she note that the 
individual tenure system was little applied and was abandoned even as an 
ultimate goal of policy in the early 1920s .146 
Lacey cannot make up her mind on the position of the Afrikaner 
Bond . At one point she quotes Davenport to say that by making the 
surveyed lands inalienable Rhodes 
cut across the interests of the Bond ... [representing farmers,][sic] 
and incorporated the views of the Opposition regarding the 
desirability of retaining the reserves for Native occupation. 147 
But further on she says: 'He ruled in league with the Bond and this 
prevented Rhodes from taking steps that would [adversely] affect farming 
interests. ,,148 
Lacey notes correctly that another strand in the thread of 
causation was the matter of reconciling Cape "native" policy with that of 
Natal in the interests of federation. 149 But this is her only 
concession to factors other than the mines' labour supply. 
For Lacey the Glen Grey Act was for the benefit of mine owners, 
not farmers; it promoted migratory labour rather than complete 
proletarianisation; and it was a success, not a failure. (She notes that 
"Rhodes aimed to curb the growth of an assimilated African elite -- in 
keeping with mining capital's need for an unskilled and exploitable 
workforce." Of the local government provisions she says "So succ~ful was 
this administrative scheme of Rhodes that it became the model for post-
Union governments. 11150) 
Jill Nattrass, in her book The South African economy: its growth 
145 ibid P 14. 
146 Russell Thomas Ally The development of the system of individual 
tenure for Africans, with special reference to the Glen Grey Act, c 1894-
1922 M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1985. Pp 259-60. 
147 Lacey Boroko p 15. 
148 ibid P 315 n 19. (Refers to p 16 of the main text.) 
149 ibid P 56. 
150 ibid P 56 (both quotes) . 
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and change, claims that the Glen Grey Act improved the labour supply of 
the gold mines, and that 'mining capitalists lobbied for measures such as 
the Glen Grey Act, . 151 She provides no reference to support either 
claim. Her discussion of the measure is really incidental to her 
treatment of the goldmining economy . It is interesting more for the 
"Witwatersrand-centric" assumptions it reveals than for any information 
brought to light. 
William Beinart does not deal with the Act at any length in The 
political economy of Pondoland. Beyond mentioning it as a compromise 
between various factions in Cape politics,152 he characterises it as a 
labour measure. He points out that a government 'native' labour bureau 
was to be established in terms of the law, and mentions the labour tax. 
He notes too that the tax was dropped (testimony to the Act's 
ineffectiveness) and says that 'the effects of natural disasters, land 
shortage and the operation of the market proved enough to mobilise labour 
in the next decade. ,153 Beinart does not suggest for which interests 
lab.our was mobilised . 
Phyllis Lewsen discusses the Glen Grey Act as an episode in the 
career of John X. Merriman, Cape politician and a possible contender for 
the post of first prime minister of the Union of South Africa. Lewsen is 
concerned with the denial of the franchise, the labour tax, the 
inadequate size of the allotments, the cost of their transfer, and the 
(defeated) liquor compensation clause. She does not suggest for what 
enterprises the labour might have been intended. 154 
Donald Denoon and Balam Nyeko in the second edition of Southern 
Africa since 1800 see the Act as a compromise between white farmers, 
liberals and the diamond mining interest. The liberals are rather 
inelegantly tacked on to their argument which runs as follows: the 
Kimberley mines had labour as long as fire-arms were for sale. Once the 
sale of guns was controlled, the possibility was that the labour flow 
might stop. The Glen Grey question presented De Beers with a good 
151 Jill Nattrass The South African economy: its growth and change Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press, 1981. Page 137 . 
152 William Beinart The political economy of Pondoland 1860-1930 
Johannesburg: Ravan, 1982. Page 43. 
153 Beinart Pondoland p 43. 
154 Phyllis Lewsen John X. Merriman: paradoxical South African 
statesman Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 1982 . Pages 170-2 and 266. 
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opportunity: white farmers wanted to clear the Thembu out and grab the 
land, while white liberals wanted individual tenure for blacks . Rhodes's 
compromise was individual tenure without the franchise. 
The logic of the Glen Grey Act was to settle a limited number of 
African families on the land, and to make the others available as 
seasonal migrant workers either for farmers in the agricultural and 
pastoral regions, or for De Beers at Kimberley.155 
De Beers and white farmers both sought cheap African labour -- and 
the Glen Grey legislation was a satisfactory compromise between the 
needs of both kinds of employer .156 
No references are provided for these claims. The diamond mining 
aspect makes sense in the light of the position of the Cape at the time, 
but the argument about fire-arms s·urely belongs to an earlier era, the 
time of the Peace Preservation Act of 1878. The sale of rifles had little 
effect on De Beers's labour in the 1890s . 
Russell Ally, in an M.A. thesis presented to Rhodes University, 
argues that complete proletarianisation, rather than migrant labour, was 
what the Glen Grey Act aimed at. 157 However he opts out of a detailed 
investigation of the motives behind the policy: 
Given the limited objectives of this thesis it would be presumptuous 
on the part of the writer to attempt to make any definitive claims as 
to where the 'true" meaning of the Glen Grey policy is to be 
found. 158 . 
He does suggest some possible explanations of how an illiberal measure 
such as this could have been put onto the statute book. The first is that 
Cape liberalism was declining as Afrikaner nationalism, represented by 
the Bond, grew strong. At the same time many liberal white voters 
abandoned the liberal cause for the Bond because they were scared of 
eventual black domination. 
His second explanation follows Trapido: the mineral revolution 
had changed the Cape economy. The economic interest of the liberals no 
• 
ISS Donald Denoon and Balam Nyeko Southern Africa since 1800 London: 
Longmans, 2nd ed., 1984. Page 91. 
156 Denoon Southern Africa p 92. 
157 Ally Development p 40. 
158 ibid P 47. 
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longer lay in having a black middle class or a prosperous black 
peasantry. What was needed now were workers, hence the decline of 
liberalism. 
Ally does not regard the . two above explanations as mutually 
exclusive . He thus goes on to point out that while the Act had many 
oppressive provisions, it had some liberal aspect as well. Provisions 
which may be reg~rded as illiberal were: the foisting of individual 
tenure of the people of Glen Grey, while denying them the franchise that 
such tenure should provide; making the lots too small to allow for 
production for the market; and the prohibition against accumulation of 
land. 159 On the other hand individual tenure was associated with 
civilisation and progress. The protection afforded by the governor's 
approval being required for the sale of land may be seen as a 'liberal' 
feature of the Act. 
Ally finds Rhodes to be of central importance. Rhodes wanted 
capitalism to triumph in southern Africa. For this to happen the people's 
way of life had to change: they had to become labourers. If we ask 
'labourers for whom?' Ally replies "probably for the Cape farmers.' When 
Cape farmers were short of labour there is no reason to suppose that the 
Cape legislature would enact a measure to provide for the Transvaal. He 
concludes that the Act shows the operation of 
a declining but not yet moribund 'Cape liberalism', an awakening 
not yet triumphant 'Afrikaner nationalism"; but perhaps of most 
significance, a strident but not yet fully developed capitalism. 
but 
160 
Allan Jeeves, in the context of goldmining labour, describes the 
Glen Grey Act as a failure, particularly the labour tax . 161 He points 
out subsequently that labour bureaux were not set up in terms of the Act 
as intended, but only came later. 162 
Robert Rotberg deals with the Glen Grey Act in his lengthy 
159 Al though it might be argued that if blacks were allowed to buy each 
other's land on a large scale, even more might be forced onto the labour 
market. 
160 Ally Development p 61. 
161 Alan H. Jeeves Migrant labour in South Africa's mining economy: the 
struggle for the gold mines' labour supply Johannesburg: Wi twa tersrand 
University Press, 1985. Page 16. 
162 Jeeves Migrant labour p 107 . 
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biography of Rhodes, The founder. He places the policy in the context of 
black-white relations in Rhodes's second ministry. Rhodes was a white 
supremacist . He and Hofmeyr had already dealt with "the problem of 
political control N by raising the franchise qualifications. Next came the 
need to secure the labour of blacks "for the mines and farms " , and to 
regulate the relations between black and white more generally.163 Glen 
Grey provided a test case. 
In the legislation dealing with such a case, the franchise had 
to be withheld from individual tenure or the effects of the Franchise and 
Ballot Act might be undone. The land could not be sold or white purchase 
would "thrust vast numbers of landless black families onto the 
Colony";164 the effect of whites intermingling with blacks would 
exacerbate the poor white problem. 165 Since labour was the main object 
of the Act, education in the reserves should be appropriate to labourers, 
and not, in Rhodes's words, "Kafir parsons" .166 
Beyond the phrase quoted above ("mines and farms") Rotberg does 
not suggest exactly where the labour from Glen Grey was intended to go. 
But he points out elsewhere that Rhodes was solicitous of the economic 
interests of the Bond . 167 
* * * * * 
Many writers over the years have given attention to the Glen Grey Act, 
some concentrating on the Act itself, others alluding to it in the course 
of a more general work. There have been discussions of its origins and of 
the role of individual personalities . There has also been a shift of 
emphasis and assessment. Early writers gave it more praise than 
criticism; more recently , criticism has been emphasised . Equally , recent 
writer have followed the precedent of Van der Horst in stressing the 
importance of the Act as a labour measure. The recent emphasis on mining 
163 Robert Rotberg The founder: Cecil Rhodes and the pursuit of power 
Johannesburg: Southern, 1988. Pp 466 and 467. 
164 Rotberg Founder p 468. 
165 ibid P 470. 
166 ibid p 47l. 
167 I bid pp 119-29 and 354-6. 
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capital in South Africa, especially goldmining capital, has led some 
historians to lose sight of an essential feature of the Act: that it was 
B measure passed by the Cape parliament, where the farming interest of 
the Afrikaner Bond were dominant. 
Given the trend of scholarly debate, the possibility of mining 
interests within the Cape Colony being influential in bringing about the 
Act prompted an investigation of the Indwe collieries, which are adjacent 
to Glen Grey. An account of this investigation follows. 
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Chapter Two 
The relevance of the labour needs of a specific enterprise: 
the Indwe Railway, Collieries and Land Company . 
(i) Introduction 
(ii) Wars and upheavals in the region 
(iii) Early history of coal extraction at Indwe 
(iv) The Indwe Railway, Collieries and Land Company 
(v) Conclusion 
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(i) Introduction 
Consideration of the Glen Grey Act as a labour measure led the present 
writer to examine the Indwe Railway, Collieries and Land Company (IRC). 
There were two reasons for this: firstly because De Beers Consolidated 
Mines, Ltd., of which Cecil Rhodes was then cha~rman, owned a share in 
the Indwe mine,! and secondly because the Indwe collieries lie adjacent 
to the district of Glen Grey. It seemed possible that the Glen Grey Act, 
coming as it did .shortly before De Beers completed negotiations over the 
setting up of a joint stock company to exploit the coal beds of Indwe, 
might have been passed with the collieries in mind. In Davenport's words: 
The Glen Grey Act] was a mUlti-purpose law to whose making there were 
many contributors. Glen Grey was a problem area. It was 
overpopulated. Rhodes, who purchased the nearby Indwe coal-mines for 
De Beers in 1894, seems to have been mainly concerned to draw out 
surplus labour from the area. 2 
In the event it cannot be demonstrated that the Glen Grey 
legislation was enacted with any thought to the labour supply of the IRC. 
Nor can it be shown that the Act was of much use to the Indwe Company, 
which complained continually of a shortage of labour. But the 
investigation of such a co-incidence had to be made. It has been argued 
that with the departure of Innes, Merriman and Sauer from Rhodes's 
cabinet, and their going into Opposition, Rhodes had to rely more heavily 
on the Bond, who wanted greater emphasis placed on the internal economic 
development of the colony, and that helping a new colonial industry like 
the Indwe coal mine was a useful gesture towards the Bond . 3 This view is 
interesting, but no substantiating evidence has been found. 
The little town of Indwe is about seventy kilometres north-east 
! Colin Newbury 'Out of the pit: the capital accumulation of Cecil 
Rhodes' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 10(1) October 1982 
pp 25-49. Page 32 . Newbury is not quite correct when he says that de 
Beers bought the Indwe coal mine; in fact it put up only L75 000 of the 
initial capital of L159 000. 
2 T.R . H. Davenport South Africa: ~ modern history Johannesburg: 
Macmillan, 3rd ed. 1987. Page 181. 
3 Alan Mabin 'Land as a crucial element in social relations? The Indwe 
area, 1880-1920' Unpublished paper, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, 
History Seminar, 9 February 1988. Pages 6-7. I am grateful to Dr Alan 
Mabin of the Department of Town and Regional Planning, the University of 
the Witwatersrand, for giving me a copy of this paper. 
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of Queenstown in the eastern Cape Province, and half a kilometre west of 
the Indwe River,' near the Stormberg Mountains. Tho town's raison d'etre 
was the nearby coal mine. Indwe has been described by Mabin as perhaps 
"the first classic 'company town' in South Africa, owned, laid out and 
controlled by the company which possessed the mines.,5 The settlement 
prospered as the Indwe Company prospered, and went into economic 
depression when the company did. The company that owned the mine was 
liquidated in 1918, but coal mining was begun again at Indwe in 1988. 6 
(ii) Wars and upheavals in the region 
Indwe's hinterland was an area of turbulence. There had been considerable 
upheavals of population after the cattle killing of 1857, and few blacks 
had ancestral claims to the land on which they came to be living after 
that event.? The land in the rest of the Wodehouse Division was largely 
surveyed by the 1870s, but the land along the Indwe River was not. It was 
crown land, on which Africans were living, perhaps without legally 
recognised title to the ground. 
The failure of the 1877-8 harvest sparked the existing tension 
on the frontier into the Ngqika-Gcaleka War. The end of the war saw more 
'mass removals of the African population of the eastern Cape and southern 
Transkei".8 
In 1880 the Thembu 'rebellion' occurred. Since the Thembu at 
that point were outside the colony's frontier, rebellion is not an apt 
term. By the end of 1880 colonial forces had driven several thousand 
people out of northern Thembuland, both Emigrant Thembuland and 
Thembuland Proper. All these events contributed to the ease with which 
land could be acquired by whites, and to the general upheaval and 
dispersal of the black population of the area. 
• Mabin 'Land' p 1. 
5 ibid P 2. 
6 Eastern Province Herald 19 October 1988 'Indwe colliery in action next 
week". 
7 Mabin 'Land' p 2 . 
8 ibid P 3. 
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(iii) Early history of coal mining at Indwe 
It was known that there were coal deposits in the Stormberg region as 
early as the 18S0s. 9 The first mines were the Cyphergat mines near 
Molteno , and mining began on a small scale near the Indwe River in 
1877 . '0 It was i~ that year that Bradfield and Brothers, attorneys at 
the little nearby town of Dordrecht, wrote to the commissioner of crown 
lands and public works to claim a LSOO reward for a client of theirs, a 
Mr Ferguson. They claimed that this sum was owed to Ferguson in terms of 
a government notice which offered to reward the discoverer of a viable 
coal mine in the colony. The government replied that the mine was not 
viable, as the reward offer required, because it was located far from a 
railway by which the coal could have been transported. A sum of LSO was 
offered, which Ferguson declined to accept. The relevant documents take 
the story of the reward no further, so it may be assumed to have ended 
there, with Mr Ferguson disconsolate . 
This little incident is not in itself important, but it high 
lights the problem that Indwe coal had from the start: the mine was not 
commercially viable without a railway to take the coal away. 
A group of Dordrecht merchants and their associates!! took out 
mineral leases on an area near the Indwe River after the end of the 
Ngqika-Gcaleka War, but little was done to develop them. Nevertheless the 
government was interested in Indwe . It hoped that colonial coal might be 
cheaper than Welsh coal, and Indwe coal was tested in 1879-80 in engines 
of the Cape Government Railways (CGR). Official reaction was positive, 
and the possibility of the government building a railway line to Indwe 
was considered . 12 
It was decided that the government would not build the line . 
Instead, the government would contract with the coal owners to build a 
railway to Indwe. Accordingly the Imvani and Indwe Railway and Coal Mines 
9 Cape of Good Hope Blue Book 1859 . Cited in Mabin "Land" p 2 n 8 . 
10 Mabin "Land" p 3. See also AVP A 37- ' 78 . 
11 The syndicate consisted at the end of the year 1882 of James W. Weir, 
E. J. Byrne and W. A. Johnson. AVP G 53-'91 P 1 . Tb.ere had been ' former 
owners ' of whom Ferguson must have been one , but no more details have 
been traced . AVP G 33-'88 P 4. 
!2 AVP A 59-'80 and A 103-'80. 
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Act, Act 3 of 1882, was passed by the Cape legislature, empowering the 
government to enter into a contract with private persons for the building 
of a railway . A contract was duly signed on 27 December 1882 with the 
owners of the Indwe mine, James W. Weir , E. J. Byrne and W. A. Johnson. 
The plan was that the Indwe proprietors would be the principal 
contractors with government, and would sub-contract the actual work of 
building the line. They were to be paid L25 000 on completion of the 
line, and to be granted 25 000 morgen of crown land on quitrent tenure . 
They were also to receive one thousand acres of coal-bearing land of 
their own choice from crown land adjacent to the Indwe River . 13 
Before the railway line was built, a process of forced removals 
began to clear the land to be granted to the company of its black 
inhabitants. The removals were only stopped because the capital to build 
the line had not been secured, and it appeared that the contract might be 
about to fall through . 14 The line was supposed to have been built by 
December 1887, but was not. The principal contractors explained that the 
building of their line was bound up with the course of a junction line 
between the Midland and the Eastern Systems of the CGR. Since the course 
of that line had not been fixed it was impossible to proceed with theirs. 
The contractors plainly felt out of their depth, and wanted the contract 
set aside and the government to take over the building of the line. 15 
(At this point Johnson retired and the syndicate was joined by John 
Linden Bradfield of Dordrecht, a man who later became a Member of the 
Legislative Council (MLC).) 
In their uncertainty the coal owners also wanted the government 
to buy them out, or to guarantee them a fixed price per ton of coal. The 
Indwe proprietors wanted L100 000 for the mine, but the Sprigg government 
would not offer more than L50 000. Negotiations were broken off on 11 
June 1889 . '6 
The government did, however, terminate the railway contract as 
requested earlier -- without paying the contractors the Sum of L3 000 
that they had incurred as the cost of surveying the proposed railway 
13 AVP G 53-'91 P 8. 
14 Mabin "Land" p 5. 
15 AVP G 53-' 91 P 1I. 
16 AVP G 46-'89 P 13. 
50 
line . They later sued the government unsuccessfully for this money . 17 
Turning from the Indwe proprietors' dealings with government to 
the state of affairs on the ground at Indwe, some facts can be gleaned 
from a report of 1888 made at the request of Friedrich Schermbrucker, the 
commissioner of crown lands and public works (CCL) in the second Sprigg 
ministry. The report, written by a railway official, was commissioned to 
help the government decide whether to buy the colliery or not. It appears 
that the Indwe mine was already supplying coal to the Cape Government 
Railways (CGR) in 'considerable' but unspecified amounts. But that coal 
was transported by bullock cart, and a railway line was suggested as 
being more efficient. ls Output was estimated at 200 hundred tons per 
day. The official remarked on the labour at the mine as follows: 
The labour employed is the native of the country, principally 
Kaffirs, young men and boys, who are learning the use of the pick, 
and are stated to be becoming efficient miners by Mr Rae, the manager 
of the mine. 19 
The work was let out to 'Kafir headmen for 3s. 6d. per ton, who employ 
their own [black) miners'. The report goes on to say: 
The Indwe Mine is situated in the midst of a settled native 
population -- ensuring labour at hand, many of whom are young men --
in training at the mine for regular mining. This in the future will 
provide an experienced native mining population to the advantage of 
colonial mining operations. 2o 
One of the Indwe proprietors, J. W. Weir wrote in an appendix to the same 
report that 
Probably in no part of the world can m1n1ng operations be carried on 
so cheaply. No shaft sinking; no pumping; no noxious gases . The 
preliminary expenditure of capital in opening the mines need be very 
small, and there is abundance of labour of the best class for mining 
available. 21 
17 Indwe Railway, Collieries and Land Company (Limited) v The Colonial 
Government in Supreme court reports: decisions of the supreme court of 
the Cape of Good Hope volume 14, 1897, P 228. 
IS AVP G 33-' 88 P 4-5. 
19 ibid P 4. 
20 ibid P 33. 
21 ibid P 33. 
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This optimistic assessment by Weir was to prove mistaken . There may have 
been an 'abundance of labour" for the small scale operations of the 
1880s, but for the larger venture of 1894 onwards there was not 
sufficient . 
Once the Rhodes ministry came into office in July 1890 the coal 
owners again approached the government, hoping for a more sympathetic 
hearing. The CGR wanted to buy Indwe coal for its engines. 22 Rhodes, as 
managing director of De Beers, wanted cheap coal for the machinery at the 
mines,23 and as prime minister was interested in the economic 
development of the Cape Colony. The Rhodes ministry was prepared to enter 
into an agreement for the building of a railway and the ' exploiting of the 
coal deposit, but there was disagreement over the price that the CGR 
would pay for the coal . The Indwe proprietors wanted 12s . 6d. per ton, or 
a guaranteed royalty of Is . 6d. per ton above the cost of extraction, the 
same demand they had made to the Sprigg government . This was reasonable, 
they said, because all possible eventualities had to be covered, one of 
which might be a failure to get a 'supply of native labour for large 
output ' . In any event it would take time to expose a sufficient surface 
of the coal face before large scale extraction could take place . 24 
James Sivewright, the commissioner of crown lands and public 
works (CCL) in Rhodes's first cabinet, regarded 12s. 6d . as 'an unfair 
and unreasonable price·;25 and he was not prepared to pay eighteen pence 
a ton royalty regardless of the cost of production . He relied on the 
estimate of production costs of 4s. 6d. a ton made by the Indwe 
proprietors' own engineer. 2• The Indwe proprietors were either 
exceptionally greedy or genuinely intimidated by the size of the venture 
they were undertaking. 27 No agreement was reached on these issues, and 
the correspondence was broken off in February 1891. 28 
22 AVP G 52-' 91 P 50 . 
23 Moonyean H. Buys 'The Indwe Railway, Collieries and Land Company 
Limited 1894-1918' Unpublished historical resume for DBA on the records 
of the IRe (contains inventory) . Page 1. 
24 AVP G 53-'91 P 23 . 
25 ibid P 33. 
26 AVP G 53-' 91 P 31. 
27 AVP G53-91 P 23 . • ... we were indisposed at this time to enter into 
such a large business and undertake such a heavy responsibility as the 
contract would involve. We felt this more especially in a business like 
coal mining on a large scale, of the risks and contingencies of which we 
had no adequate experience" . 
28 AVP G 53-' 91 P 31-33. 
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Matters were complicated when , in 1891, John X. Merriman, the 
treasurer in Rhodes's first ministry, threatened to take back the crown 
lands which the Indwe proprietors had been allotted in 1882 as payment 
for building the railway line, and which they had been allowed to keep, 
despite not having even begun to build the line . z, The negotiations were 
resumed and in 1893 an agreement was reached between the government and 
Weir, Byrne and Bradfield that the partnership would build a line within 
five years on the same terms as provided for by the 1882 Act, i.e. 
payment of L50 000, a grant of 25 000 morgen of land, and a further 1 000 
acres of coal-bearing land. 3D The Indwe partners then negotiated with De 
Beers to set up a joint-stock company (the IRC) in which De Beers was to 
hold shares, and to which De Beers would provide expert mining assistance 
and help in raising the necessary capital . De Beers also provided 
administrative assistance. 3! Rhodes's role in all this must have been 
important, but the records are too scanty to know exactly what he did. 
(iv) The Indwe Railway, Collieries and Land Company 
The IRC was incorporated at Kimberley on 27 November 1894. It had a 
nominal capital of L300 000 of which L159 700 was subscribed at the 
formation of the company . The issued capital rose to L237 875 in a few 
years. The final agreement reached with De Beers was that they would take 
75 000 shares at one pound each on the condition that 'the Company when 
formed bind itself to supply De Beers with such coal as they may elect to 
take at a price not exceeding 15s. per ton at Sterkstroom.,32 (De Beers 
needed a regular cheap supply of fuel to power the winding machines that 
hauled the blue ground out of its mines,33 and so was happy to buy a 
stake in a coal mine.) Another important stipulation was that 
The De Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited, shall, so long as they 
remain the registered proprietors of not less than Fifty Thousand 
(50,000) Shares in the Company, have the right of nominating and 
appointing two persons as Directors of the Company.34 
29 Mabin 'Land' p 6. 
30 AVP SC(A) 12-'93 pp l.l.-VH. 
3! Buys 'Indwe Railway' p 6. 
32 DBA S4/IRC 6 cited in Buys 'Indwe Railway' p 1. 
33 Robert Turrell Capital and labour Qn the Kimber1e~ diamond fields 
1871-1890 Cambridge: the University Press, 1987. Page 12 . 
3. Buys 'Indwe Railway' p 2. 
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The directors so appointed were Francis Oats and Gardner F . Williams. The 
other six founding directors were 
Edmund John Byrne (chairman) 
John Linden Bradfield, MLC 
James Wilson Weir 
Colonel F . Schermbrucker, MLA 
Henry Robinow 
Lieutenant-Colonel David Harris 
Robinow and Harris also had De Beers connections,35 so De Beers had four 
of their own men on a board of eight. It is interesting to note that 
Schermbrucker, the former CCL who had shown a tentative interest in 
buying Indwe for the government, was on the board of the company 
although nothing further has been brought to light about his role. 
As the full name of the Indwe company suggests, its activities 
extended beyond the collieries. It had a substantial landed property, 
from which many of the black inhabitants were initially forced off so 
that the land could be rented to white tenants. 36 (This proved to be a 
mistake in the long run becaue of the potential labour lost in that way. 
The company always had some black tenants or sub-tenants who held their 
land on condition that they worked in the mines, but these were never 
enough.) The IRC also laid out plantations of trees, intending to use 
their own forests to provide props for the mines . 37 The railway, which 
it continued to run until 1902 when it was sold to the government, was 
busy and successful. 
The company's first objective was to build the long-delayed line 
from Indwe to Sterkstroom. The first directors' report, for the year 
ending 31 March 1896, told shareholders that the completed railway had 
been handed over by the contractors in January 1896, but not in a 
condition for heavy traffic . 38 Some re-ballasting and widening of 
cuttings had to be done, but this was not crucial as it took six months 
to get the mine going, owing to a delay in obtaining labour. (This was 
the first of many complaints about labour shortage.) The directors 
intended to set aside an unspecified portion of land as a mining 
35 ibid. 
36 Mabin "Land" pp 7-8 . 
37 DBA S4/IRC vol 2 p 83 d. 
38 DBA S4/IRC box 7 Director s ' Report 31 March 1896 . 
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location; tenure of land in this location would depend on service in the 
mine. The directors concluded their report by saying that they were 
"laying down the lines for a permanent reliable supply of trained Native 
miners ". 
The report for the year ended 31 March 1897 (in fact presented 
to a general meeting of 5 August 1897 and covering events up to the end 
of July) said that no dividend would be paid for the year under review. 
Output had not increased as rapidly as expected owing to the difficulty 
of obtaining "sufficient suitable labour ". The directors conceded that 
the work in the mines was hard and required skill; it was more difficult, 
they said, than Transvaal coal mining. The directors had been locating on 
company property "natives" who bound themselves to work for the company, 
and it was hoped by January 1898 to have enough labour to put out 100 000 
to 120 000 tons per annum. 
The mine manager's report for the same period showed that in 
April, May and June, the months of labour shortage, "the Kafirs were 
attending to their mealie crops" . The supply of labour was better in July 
and was expected to improve. The labourers located on the IRe's farms had 
' been of some service", but there were not yet enough of them. To cope 
with the shortfall the manager proposed to pay the miners on completion 
of thirty days work rather than monthly, and to 'procure two hundred 
... 
Basutos wh~we shall engage for five months'. In his closing remarks the 
manager noted chillingly that 
Should the Rinderpest sweep through the Native Territories (as there 
seems to be every likelihood) then in my opinion not only will the 
labour question be solved, but wages will be reduced. 
This emphasis on the Transkeian Territories shows that the bulk 
of Indwe's workers came from there, although some did come from Glen 
Grey . 39 It has not proved possible to ascertain how many, but from the 
paucity of references to Glen Grey in the IRe's records it seems that the 
proportion was low. 
On 5 October 1897 a board meeting discussed correspondence with 
39 Mabin cites Glen Grey, Xalanga, Qumbu and Tsolo as some of the 
districts from which the IRe supplemented its labour supply 'in the first 
two or three years of mining " . Mabin "Land" p 11. 
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De Beers asking that company to accept 3 500 tons of coal per month until 
the end of the year, a smaller quantity than De Beers had requested. The 
IRC was not able to supply the full amount, and wanted a 'temporary 
accommodation" to enable it to meet the needs of other customers . 40 
On 3 November 1897 the board resolved to reduce the rent in its 
locations from L5 to L3 per annum with retrospective effect from 1 
July.41 The entry in the minutes says no more than that, but it may be 
inferred that the company was choosing to forego some of its rent in 
order to attract workers to live on its land . 
In January 1898 the board decided to pay L8 per month to a 
labour agent. 42 The records do not show who this person was or where he 
worked. It was also resolved to communicate with the chief magistrates of 
Basutoland, Pondoland and the Transkei about labour. 43 A protest was 
sent to the liquor licensing court at Dordrecht over the increase in the 
number of licences at Indwe . 44 Clearly the detrimental effect of alcohol 
on their labour force was occupying the board's collective mind . 
The report for the year ended 31 March 1898 was issued at the 
end of August . The mine manager noted that ' for the first few months our 
operations were restricted on account of the scarcity of boys, though 
latterly we were much better off,.45 His earlier proposal to get Basuto 
miners had been carried out because he wrote that at the end of 1897 he 
'got two or three large batches of boys down from Basutoland' , but they 
did not stay more than two or three months, although they were good 
workers . Since then , wrote the manager, 'we have always had twenty or 
thirty Basutos in the mines'. 
The manager made it clear that Indwe's labour supply fluctuated 
seasonally with the agricultural calendar of the Transkeian Territories. 
He wrote 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
The Rinderpest which carried off nearly all the natives' cattle had 
not the effect which we anticipated; the boys did not go out to work 
DBA S4/IRC vol 1 p 151 a . 
DBA S4/IRC vol 1 p 155 e. 
DBA S4/IRC vol 1 P 159 c. 
DBA S4/IRC vol 1 P 159 e. 
DBA S4/IRC vol 1 P 159 f. 
DBA S4/IRC box 7 Directors' Report 31 March 1898 p 4 . 
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in numbers ... Since the ploughing season was finished however we 
have been much better off for boys . 46 
From remarks about "our mines" having "a good name in the Transkei lt it 
seems clear that a significant portion of the IRC's labour came from 
there rather than from cisKeian Glen Grey . 
From the year ended 31 March 1899 two dividends a year of five 
per cent each became usual. 47 This proves that despite the labour 
problems the Indwe Company was profitable, but it should be borne in mind 
that it derived income from its railway and its landholdings as well. 48 
On the subject of labour in the year ended March 1899 the mine manager 
wrote 
though the output has increased considerably, yet hardly at any 
period has there been a sufficient supply of native labour. At the 
present time our mines are developed for 4 500 tons per week (234,000 
per annum) yet we have never put out more than 3,200 tons per week . 
... Certainly the boys whom we have located on our Contract farms are 
a great help, but they are only 180 in number, whereas we require 
from 1200 to 1500 to keep us going. 49 
Mabin writes that by 1899 the company employed sixty whites and 1 100 
blacks. 50 (By 1911 the number of black employees was down to about 
500. 51 ) But in 1899 the IRC was experimenting with machinery for cutting 
coal and the tone of the company's report was optimistic. 
The effect of the South African War on the company was 
disruptive but not catastrophic. For the half year to 30 September 1899 
things were going well, but the war meant that "the earning powers of the 
Company, in respect of both Railway and Mines, were suddenly curtailed, 
and eventually entirely stopped, whilst the expenditure had to run 
on,.52 The military authorities had taken over the company's rolling 
stock until March 1900. 
46 ibid. 
47 DBA 54/IRC box 7 Annual Report 31 March 1899 p 2. 5ee also 54/IRC vol 
1 P 189 f. 
48 Mabin "Land' p 
49 DBA 54/IRC box 
.50 Mabin "Land" p 
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The labour supply in April and May 1899 had been insufficient, 
the manager wrote, but better in July, August and September because of 
the poor mealie crop. In the beginning of October the IRC "benefitted 
considerably by the exodus of natives from the Rand for a short time, but 
many of our own boys went home on account of the unsettled state of the 
surrounding districts". 53 
During September 1900 the Indwe company had a significant 
shortage at its Green Mine. 54 The mine manager gave reasons which bear 
out the company's dependence on the Transkei for its labour, and show how 
race relations affected the workers' willingness to stay: 
Many natives went home on receipt of the news that rain had fallen in 
some part of the [Transkeian) territories, others got afraid of the 
smallpox (of which we had two cases) and cleared out, whilst I think 
that the treatment accorded them by the white miners was anything but 
fair. A change was made in the compound management, with the result 
that the labour supply is now much better. 55 
The change in the compound management seems to have been the dismissal of 
a manager named Vice and his replacement with one J. J. Webb. 
The war continued to affect the supply of both black and white 
labour. The pay, rations and easier work offered by the military 
authorities was more than Indwe could compete with. The chairman, Weir, 
reported in 1901 that since October 1900 the company had been without "50 
per cent. of the labour necessary" to the extent that some of its 
contract obligations had not been met. 56 Neverthe l ess a dividend of five 
per cent was declared for the half year to September 1900, and another 
for the half year to March 1901. 57 To ease the labour difficulty the 
board proposed to settle black workers with their families, rather than 
white farmers, on some of its land. 58 
Competition with the eGR for labour was reported in July 1901. 
An agreement was reached that the railways would not recruit within a 
53 ibid P 16. 
54 The IRC' s mines were called Green, Byrne, Dugmore, Guba and, 
patriotically, Milner. 
~ DBA S4/IRC vol 1 p 223 e. 
56 DBA S4/IRC box 7 Annual Report 31 March 1901, attachment p 1. 
57 DBA S4/IRC box 7 Annual Report 31 March 1901 p 4. 
58 DBA S4/IRC box 7 Annual Report 31 March 1901, attachment p 2. 
58 
five mile radius of the mines. But the more serious problem of recruiting 
"throughout the territories" would continue to be affected by the army's 
needs. 59 
In 1901-02 the company's empl oyees were sent into the Transkei 
on at least three recruiting drives with limited success. Labour ntouts ll 
were operating in the district and drawing workers away from the IRC.60 
The opinion that the war was the root cause of current labour problems 
was repeatedly expressed. 61 
The annual report for the year ended 31 March 1902 gave share 
holders the happy news that the IRC's railway had been sold to the Cape 
government, and this made possible a complete capital repayment of twenty 
shillings in the pound . This capital repayment would not affect 'the 
prospect of a 10% annual dividend, even under the disastrous effects of 
guerilla war'. 62 
In January 1903 the Indwe company agreed to supply the 
government with 3 000 tons of coal per month at 20s. per ton, but 
'Considering the conditions of the labour supply the Company had declined 
to enter into a binding contract,.63 In the same month a labour agent 
was appointed, at a salary of L20 per month, to procure Basuto workers. 
The report for 1903 announced the usual dividends , 
notwithstanding that labour problems did not end with the war. Every 
effort 'throughout Kaffirland and way into Basutoland' met with litle 
success and the company could only supply the CGR with 2 000 tons a 
month, compared with the 6 000 to 8 000 that the railways could have 
taken. 64 The same report told shareholders that De Seers, the IRC's 
largest customer, might soon get its coal from other sources. 
The 1904 annual report refers to the difficulty of obtaining 
enough labour to fill the company's contracts despite wages being twenty 
per cent higher than before the war. The usual dividends were 
59 DBA S4/IRC vol 1 P 247 d. 60 DBA S4/IRC vol 1 p 253 e; p 277 C. 
61 DBA S4/IRC vol 1 P 281 b. 62 DBA S4/IRC box 7 Annual Report 31 March 1902 p 3. 
63 DBA S4/IRC vol 1 P 287 c. 
64 DBA S4/IRC box 7 Annual report 31 March 1903 p 3. 
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nevertheless declared. 
In June 1904 the shortage of labour prompted the board to 
telegraph to several magistrates that 200 workers were required 
immediately. Replies were received from eight magistrates in the 
Transkei. Labour was available, "but good crops make the natives 
indisposed to turn out to work 'l • 65 
A board meeting of 14 June 1905 recorded that De Beers had 
decided not to take any more coal "after the end of the present year".66 
Natal coal was found to be more competitive. At the general meeting on 22 
June 1905 it was reported that government was also taking less coal. 67 
From 1905 onwards the IRC also felt the effects of the Witwatersrand's 
competition for labour . 68 
The report for 1906 told of reduced demand, and laying off fifty 
white workers. The company's sales were now confined to the CGR and 
private customers in nearby towns, De Beers having taken its business 
elsewhere as expected . 69 
For the first time the company had more coal to sell than its 
customers wanted to buy. They offered CGR 120 000 tons for 1906, but the 
railways would only take 54 000 . 70 In December 1907 it was remarked at a 
board meeting that no directors' fees had been paid for the last two 
years. 7! The salary of the local managing director at Indwe was reduced 
from L750 to L500 a year for the year 1908, after which it was not 
intended to keep him on. 72 
Although . there are board minutes of some labour shortage after 
1906, by the 1909 annual report the falling off in output was entirely 
due to reduced demand . 73 
65 DBA S4/IRC vol 2 P 91 e . 
66 DBA S4/IRC vol 2 P 157 a-b. 
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By 1912 the fall in the pr i ce of coal in South Africa at large 
meant that the company could no longer be ce rtain of making a profi t on 
its coal bus iness . In that year a provisional decision to liquidate the 
firm was made. 74 The company ca rried on , payi~g reduced dividend s , until 
1917, when the South African Ra ilway s refused to take any more coa l from 
them . This was the death blow t o the mine. 75 I~ was put into liquidation 
and its landed property sold off to the government for the purpo se of 
intensive white settlement. This meant that, once again . the existing 
black tenants were ousted. 
(v) Conclusion 
The relevance of this little company h istory for the Glen Grey Act is 
tantalising rather than clear. The prosperity of the enterprise depended 
on the demand for its coal and the supply of labour, and De Beers clearly 
created the demand on which the company for a time prospered. References 
to the importance of "native " labour are frequent, but no evidence has 
been found to suggest that Indw~ demand for labour was a specific and / 
explicit cause of the Act, while there are indications that the 
enterprise drew its labour from the Transkei rather than the Glen Grey 
district . The implication that Rhodes enacted the Glen Grey measure 
because he (or De Beers) had a financial interest in Indwe 76 remains 
unproven, and, perhaps unprovable. 
(Please turn to p.62) 
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Chapter Three 
Perceptions of the need for labour 
in the Cape Colony 
before the Glen Grey Act , 1807-1894 
63 
The question of labour supply was of conce rn to the public authorities of 
the Cape from the earliest times. While a brief sketch of labour supply 
matters from the second British occupation of the Cape is presente d here, 
this chapter is concerned largely with the position during the 
re sponsible government period, i.e. after 1872 . 
Newspapers, government publications and legislative assembly 
debates of the nineteenth century Cape Colony provide a clear record of 
continual complaint by colonists about the shortage of labour . This is 
especially true of those in the western Cape, and particularly of 
farmers . It has not proved possible to discern whether this was (i) 
always a genuine shortage of labour, or (ii) whether colonial farmers 
simply felt that they could do with more labour, or (iii) if there was 
merely a shortage of labour at the wages offered. Similarly, no attempt 
has been made to distinguish between a shortage of labour caused by an 
increase in the demand for labour, and a shortage caused by a falling-off 
in the supply. The fact that is dealt with here is that, rightly or 
wrongly and whatever the reasons may have been, the Cape colonists often 
thought themselves to be short of labour, and they made vigorous 
complaints about that state of affairs, often compelling government to 
act to alleviate their situation. 
The relevance of the above observations to the Glen Grey Act is 
that the Act came at a time when farmers, particularly in the Western 
Province, were complaining of labour shortage. The Glen Grey policy 
should be viewed against the background of the previous complaints of 
shortage, and the previous measures taken to deal with them. It will then 
be seen for what it is, i.e. a Cape labour measure. 
* * * * * 
Susan Newton-King has described the position of the Cape's labour market 
in the period 1807-28 . She notes that "at least by the end of the second 
decade of the nineteenth century, the colony was facing a generalised 
labour shortage which was more serious in Cape Town and the western 
64 
districts than elsewhere."l She could have said the same of almost any 
period between 1820 and 1894. 
The major cause of labour shortage in the early nineteenth 
century was the abolition of the slave trade in the British Empire 2 in 
1807. This shortage led the colonial authorities to tighten control over 
the free blacks of the colony, mainly Khoisan or "Hottentots", by means 
of the regulations of 1809 promulgated by the governor, Lord Caledon, and 
known as the Caledon (or Hottentot) Code. While this code afforded some 
paper protection to Khoisan from abuse by their employers, it also laid 
down very strict control over their freedom of movement. As Newton-King 
puts it: "it was now legal to compel any Khoisan not in government 
service to serve the colonists, for without a pass he could not legally 
be anywhere at all,.3 This stringent control over Khoisan continued 
until Ordinance 50 of 1828 repealed the regulations and put the free 
blacks in the colony on a legal par with the whites. 
Newton-King argues that the Albany settlement of 1820 
exacerbated the labour shortage by introducing nearly 5 000 settlers, 
many of whom wanted not to be labourers themselves, but to employ labour. 
She describes various unsuccesful schemes to introduce further white 
labour into the colony. In the end the colonists had to rely on black, 
particularly Xhosa, labour. 
There had long been an official policy of "non-intercourse" 
between black and white across the colonial border. This was the policy 
of the Dutch East India Company until the end of its rule, and was taken 
over by the British authorities. 4 In fact the policy could not be 
enforced. Certain exceptions were officially made 'for purposes of trade, 
for missionary endeavour, [and] to admit supplies of Native labour."s 
The British authorities may have been reluctant to admit Xhosa into the 
colony, but they had to make some exceptions to the general rule against 
1 Susan Newton-King "The labour market of the Cape Colony, 1807-28" in 
Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds) Economy and society in pre-
industrial South Africa London: Longmans, 1980. Page 171. 
2 Newton-King "Labour market" pp 172 and 177-8. 
3 Newton-King "Labour market" p 177. 
4 Sheila van der Horst Native labour in South Africa London: Oxford 
University Press, 1942, reprinted London: Frank Cass, 1971. Pages 4-5. 
S Van der Horst Native labour p 5. 
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it, and the prohibition was in many cases evaded. 6 
The passing of Ordinance 49 of 1828 made it legal for blacks 
from outside the colony to enter in search of work . The authorities 
thereby abandoned a policy of "segregation".7 The time for such a move 
had come, because despite the fears about security that many colonists 
had, black labour had been increasingly employed on the farms throughout 
the period of fr~ntier wars." The change of official policy did not 
imply laissez faire. Those coming into the colony to work had to bear 
passes, and could be "press-ganged for up to twelve months" if found 
without them. 9 Peires notes that in the period shortly after the 1828 
legislation "Sheep farmers were so desperate for labour that they were 
prepared to tolerate Xhosa workers bringing their families and their 
ca t tIe wi th them. " 10 
Newton-King states that Ordinance 50 of the same year, which 
ended legal discrimination on grounds of colour between free blacks and 
colonists, and abolished the pass system for blacks born within the 
colony, was not motivated solely by humanitarian concerns. The ordinance 
had the effect of making the movement of labour about the colony easier, 
and making the Khoisan more tractable by alleviating their conditions of 
service. Free labour, well-treated, would be more productive than semi-
servile labour subject to harsh controls. 11 
Peires notes that for succ~ful commercial farming in Albany "an 
abundance of cheap labour was required. During the 1830s, this simply did 
not exist." The situation was made more acute by the change from cattle 
to woolled sheep, which required not merely herding but shearing as well. 
Some labour was obtained by allowing blacks from outside the colony 
(known then by the contradictory soubriquet of "native foreigners " ) to 
squat as labour tenants . 12 
6 Newton- King "Labour market " p 175. 
7 Van der Horst Native labour uses the word p 12. See also Newton-
King "Labour market" p 192. 
8 Van der Horst Native labour p 14. 
9 Newton-King "Labour market" p 196. 
10 J . B. Peires The House of Phalo: a history of the Xhosa people in 
the days of their independence Johannesburg: Ravan, 1981. Page 105. 
11 Newton-King "Labour market" pp 197-8. 
12 Peires House of Phalo p 120. 
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The emancipation of slaves throughout the British Empire came in 
1834. This added to the shortage of labour in the colony. It may have 
been as a response to this new problem that in the aftermath of the Sixth 
Frontier War, 1834-5, the Mfengu (Fingoes) were introduced into the Cape 
Colony by the governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, as a supply of labour for 
the colonists. There is some controversy among recent historians about 
the origins of the Mfengu and the nature of the Mfecane which brought 
them to the Cape: The present writer is unable to venture any judgement 
on this debate, but if the findings of the new research are correct the 
importance of labour and the struggle of the white colonists to obtain 
labour in the period up to about 1840 is even greater than has been 
previously thought. 13 
The devastation after the War of the Axe (the Seventh Frontier 
War, 1846-7) led impoverished Xhosa to enter the colony in search of 
work. The authorities indentured Xhosa as they came into the colony and 
sent them to the western Cape. 14 Nevertheless the labour shortage was 
not. over: twenty out of twenty-one districts responding to a government 
questionnaire in 1848 reported a scarcity of unskilled labour, and ten of 
these a 'great dearth'.15 In 1854 a member of the Legislative Assembly 
for Beaufort West said in parliament that wool farmers could not get 
fleeces washed because they did not have enough labour; in the same year 
the Graaff-Reinet Herald complained of the shortage of labour, Some 
legislators wanted white immigration to solve the problem, others 
favoured the introduction of Chinese workers. A select committee on 
frontier defence suggested that "tribes, chieftaincies or congregations 
of natives' be broken up: some of the blacks thus treated should be 
located by individual tenure as whites were; the rest were to be 
apprenticed, or to take service, or leave the colony .16 
13 Alan Charles Webster Ayliff, Whiteside and the Fingo 
'emancipation' of 1835: a reappraisal B.A. (Hans) research essay, Rhodes 
University, 1988. [Cory Library Ms 17 405). For a general introduction to 
the revision of the Mfecane see John Wright 'Political mythology and the 
making of Natal's Mfecane' Canadian Journal of African Studies 23(2) 1989 
pp 272-91. 
14 Peires House of Phalo pp 167-8. 
15 J. B. Peires The dead will arise: Nongaawuse and the great Xhosa 
cattle-killing movement of 1856-7 Johannesburg: Ravan; Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press; London: James Curry, 1989. Page 
246. 
16 Peires Dead will arise p 247. 
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A large number of Africans came into the colony seeking 
employment after the millenarian cattle-killing movement of 1856-7 had 
rendered them destitute . The Cape of Good Hope government publications 
(AVP) available in Cory Library on the subject are not complete or very 
informative . 17 What can be gleaned is that during the cattle-killing 
colonial officials set up a system to facilitate the flow of labour from 
British Kaffraria to the Cape Colony. Under these arrangements 
magistrates in BrItish Kaffraria were to keep a register of blacks 
seeking employment. A central register of workseekers was kept in the 
office of the resident magistrate of King Williamstown, and farmers or 
other employers in the Cape could apply to that office or to the 
magistrate nearest to any tribe, stating the kind of labour required, 
wages, length of service and whether wives and families could accompany 
the workers. In the first three months of 1857 the number of adult men 
indentured for service in the colony under the scheme was 1 528. Adult 
women numbered 1 266, boys 1 126 and girls 1 173, for a total of 5 093. 
These figures unfortunately cannot be compared with those of normal years 
because they were compiled once only at the request of the Legislative 
Council.'8 It is interesting that under these arrangements the labourers 
were sent to central and eastern divisions of the colony: Albany, 
Victoria, Beaufort, Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth, Queenstown, Somerset East, 
Cradock, Graaff-Reinet, Albert, Grahamstown and Bathurst. 19 The west was 
only to get its share later. Nevertheless these statistics reveal a 
concern with, and an attempt to do something about, labour and 
particularly agricultural labour. 
Peires has given a harrowing description of the cattle- killing 
and the cynical exploitation of that tragedy by Governor Sir George Grey 
and his officials to provide labour for the colony. The hungry were 
despatched to the colony to work. Only such of the Xhosa as were willing 
to labour received any official famine relief, and not even all of those 
did . Grey's policy in fact consciously ensured that some would starve and 
not be helped. This can be seen from the official rebuff given to the 
Kaffir Relief Committee of King Williamstown which was set up to provide 
17 AVP G11-'S7 "Correspondence on the Kaffir Employment Bill" is not 
in the Cory Library collection. Its existence has been ascertained from 
Reuben Musiker and Naomi Musiker (eds) Guide to Cape of Good Hope 
official publications: 1854-1910 Boston: G.K . Hall, 1976. 
18 AVP G39-'57 pp 2-3 . 
19 AVP G39-' 57 P 2. 
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unofficial relief to the destitute and which made some criticism of the 
inadequate official programme of relief. The hapless committee did not 
mean to tread on official toes, and pointed out that their work was 
supplementary to that of the government: their beneficiaries would join 
the government labour scheme as soon as they were fit enough to do so, 
and would receive no further help from the committee. Nevertheless Grey 
resented the implied (and some explicit) criticism of his policy, and 
hounded the committee until it disbanded . 2o 
In August 1857 a form of agreement was drawn up by the attorney-
general of British Kaffraria for Xhosa applying for employment in the 
colony under the official labour scheme . By this contract they agreed to 
go anywhere in the colony that they might be sent, to perform any work 
allotted to them, and to accept wages determined by officials, all for a 
period of up to five years . 21 The movement of Xhosa into the colony, and 
their employment within it, was regulated by the Kaffir Pass Act of 1857 
and the Kaffir Employment Acts of 1857 and ' 58. 22 
Peires states that a total of 29 142 Xhosa had registered for 
service in the colony by the end of 1857, and believes that an equal 
number may have come in un- registered. 23 The labour shortage of the 
colony had been relieved by exploiting a tragedy, but the solution was 
not a permanent one. (While the colonists' demand for labour was great, 
there was an admixture of caution in their attitudes as well: a select 
committee of 1859 was appointed to investigate 'providing additional 
guarantees for the security of the public against any evils likely to 
arise from the continued presence' of blacks in the colony . 2') 
The next official notice of labour recorded in extant government 
publications took place early in the reponsible government era. This was 
a select committee of 1873, which investigated complaints from the Al bert 
district about 'native' labour and stock theft. 25 In 1875 there was 
correspondence on the possibility of importing labour "from the territory 
beyond the Transvaal,.26 
20 Peires Dead will arise pp 241-67. 
21 ibid P 249. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid p 267. 
2' AVP SC(A)4-'59 P iii. 25 AVP SC(A)10-'73. Not in Cory Library. See footnote 17. 
26 AVP A16-'75. Not in the Cory Library. See footnote 17. 
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Labour was again an issue by the 1870s because the depression of 
the 1860s was over, and the diamond boom was by then stimulating demand, 
, 
particularly for agricultural produce. In 1876 a report was published on 
the related questions of immigration and labour supply for the year 1875 . 
This emanated from the Department of Crown Lands and Public Works, of 
which the acerbic John X. Merriman was the minister at the time. These 
rather cutting remarks must surely be his own words: 
in the Cape the Government is called on to "Survey mankind from China 
to Peru," in the hope of creating and maintaining a class of cheap 
labourers, who will thankfully accept the position of helots, and not 
be troubled with the inconvenient ambition of bettering their 
condi tion. 27 
"Inconvenient ambition" was a reference to the farmers' insistence that 
labourers imported into the colony should not aspire to becoming farmers 
on their own account, since that would simultaneously deprive the 
existing farmers of their labour, and provide competition. Merriman noted 
in passing something that was to be an enduring concern of his: cheap 
labour did not necessarily make a prosperous country. He was a keen 
supporter of the lower middle class or the "decent working man". 
This report touched on the unsuccessful attempt of some labour 
agents to provide workers 'from the interior" for the public works and 
also for private employers. 28 On the other hand , African labour from the 
Transkei (not yet annexed to the Cape Colony) was proving satisfactory on 
the railway lines of the eastern and central Cape. Again the pattern of 
relative abundance of labour in the east and relative shortage in the 
west can be observed; Merriman noted that 
On the Western [railway) line it is to be regretted that the supply 
of labour from the source above indicated [Transkei] has been small, 
owing, probably, to the distance from the Frontier and the sea 
voyage. 29 
Looking to other possible sources, Merriman noted that Chinese 
labour could not be introduced into the colony for less than t25 or L30 
per worker, which seemed more than the government or private employers 
were likely to pay. The treaty obligations of the imperial government to 
27 AVP G8- '76 P 1. 
28 ibid pp 1-2. 
29 ibid p 2. 
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China meant that 'certain official formalities' had to be complied with, 
which made Chinese labour less attractive. 3o 
In the 1870s the Cape Colony employed an immigration agent in 
London to facilitate European immigration into the colony. This official 
was Thomas Fuller, the same man whose reminiscences of Rhodes have been 
quoted above [see pp 6-8). On the subject of European labour, his annexed 
report noted that· 
upwards of 1,349 artizans and railway labourers have been shipped 
during the year for the services of the Government, and 447 under the 
Aided Emigration regulations for private persons. This number 
includes men, women and children. 3 ! 
It can be seen that the Cape government in 1876 considered many possible 
sources of labour, and many possible means of persuading people to 
labour. Merriman in summing up pointed out that the diamond fields' 
demand for labour was part of the problem. He hoped that blacks would 
acquire 'European wants', and then enter the labour market to earn the 
wages 'to supply the wants thus created.' The possibilities of individual 
tenure for blacks were canvassed as well: 
The gradual introduction of individual tenure of land among the 
natives, in the place of the location system, will, no doubt, deprive 
numbers of natives of the means of leading a lazy, lounging life, at 
the expense of their more industrious fellows, and will also, by 
affording the possessors of plots of land the power to improve their 
properties for their own good, form an inducement to others to obtain 
the means of purchase. 32 
That was in 1876. By 1879 Merriman was to be much more sceptical of the 
utility of individual tenure for providing labour. 
The year 1879 saw a further ventilation of the labour question. 
In the Legislative Council, Marthinius Neethling, MLC for the Western 
Districts, moved that it was desirable particularly in the agricultural 
interest that "proper labour" be supplied. He wanted the government to be 
asked to obtain labour both within and beyond the borders of the colony, 
and said that a magistrate should be appointed among the Xhosa to induce 
30 ibid pp 2-3. 
3! ibid P 4. 
32 ibid P 3. 
them to take service: Zanzibar seemed to him another possible source. He 
said that land was lying idle from a want of hands to cultivate it . He 
was not opposed to the importing of Europeans, but they must be 
artisans 33 (i.e . not farm labourers) . Edward Hardwick , MLC for the 
Eastern Province, seconded the motion but feared that the propo sal would 
fail owing to 'the repugnance of the Kafir to work". The treasurer of the 
colony, J . Miller, said that the government was not opposed to the 
introduction of labour; it had been hoped that the Xhosa brought in after 
the [Ninth Frontier) war would have settled down, but despite being good 
servants they had become homesick and left . Miller suggested that the 
farmers' associations appoint their own agents in "the native country". 
Magistrates and others in government service would do what they could to 
help. Neethling withdrew his motion. 
The brief report of this debate reveals that it was agricultural 
labour that was wanted. Hardwick's contribution reveals an assumption 
common among white colonists : blacks were lazy, particularly if they were 
not. working for whites. The corollary of that assumption was that blacks 
could legitimately be forced to work for whites. 
In the same session parliament passed the Native Locations, Land 
and Commonages Act, Act 40 of 1879. Thi s empowered the government to 
survey crown lands, divide them into locations and issue individual title 
deeds to the occupier. The Locations Act has been described by Colin 
Bundy as a measure intended by means of individual tenure and the 
consequent landlessness of those not receiving title deeds, to produce 
labour for the Cape Colony . 34 
In the debate on the Locations Act, Thomas Fuller, by now back 
from London and an MLA, said that the Bill would lead to a 'social 
revolution" and went "to the root of the native question". Merriman, 
departing from his opinion of 1876 that individual tenure would 
contribute to solving the labour problem, said that the Bill was 
'important' but also pointed out that ' there were numerous titles that 
had not been taken up " .35 The Locations Act was clearly similar in many 
ways to the Glen Grey Act, and criticism of the later mea sure was ba sed 
33 GTJ 28 July 1879, reporting a debate of 16 July. 
34 Colin Bundy The rise and fall of the South African peasantry 
London: Heinemann, 1979. Pages 78-9. 
35 GTJ 6 August 1879 , reporting an Assembly debate of 25 July . 
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on the unhappy experience of the earlier . 
Also in 1879, a debate in the House of Assembly led to the 
appointment of a select committee to enquire into lithe best means to be 
adopted for supplying the Labour Market, especially in the Western 
Districts,.3" The mover, P. A. Myburgh. MLA for Stellenbosch, said that 
if nothing was done it would be serious for the farmers. 
Saul Solomon, a member for Cape Town and a prominent liberal, 
proposed instead a labour commission, because a select committee would 
not have time to consider the matter adequately before the end of the 
session. He was not at all sure that the labour supply was as inadequate 
as it was made out to be. On the question of the importation of labour he 
felt that there were enough blacks in the colony already, and asked why 
the farmers did not import European labour under the aided immigration 
scheme. A resolution of 1877 for the importing of Indians or Chinese had 
failed because farmers did not combine to take it up. The regulations of 
the imperial government over Indian labour, and the Chinese government 
over Chinese labour, would be too stringent for labour from these sources 
to be suitable. Chinese once here would as soon as possible be masters 
and not men; Solomon quoted the example of the Australian colony of 
Queensland as a place that having once imported Chinese labour now 
preferred to keep such workers out. 
Solomon went on to quote the reports of civil commissioners to 
show that there was no shortage of labour except where farmers refused to 
employ blacks (as opposed to 'coloureds'), such as at Riversdale . The 
rate of pay noted in the Blue Books, he said, suggested no shortage of 
labour; pay was lower than it had been in 1876. There had been difficulty 
in finding employment for Korannas brought down from the northern border. 
As a Westerner [i.e. one from the western Cape) Solomon did not want 
'barbarism and savagery' to flow in from the east. It was unfair to flood 
the market to force wages down. 
Philippus Watermeyer, MLA for Colesberg. disagreed. He said that 
he had to ' pay through the nose' for labour. ' Everyone' was lazy, Blacks 
would not work, and the rates of pay must be brought down by introducing 
other workers to compete, 
3" SC(A) 26-'79 p iii. Committee appointed 11 August 1879. 
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Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, the leader of the Afrikaner Bond, said that 
wKafir labour was uncertain". The workers were inclined to go home, hence 
the reluctance of farmers to employ them. 
Merriman said that farmers were better off than they had been 
"ten years ago". Cheap labour did not produce cheap goods. Australian and 
New Zealand wheat undersold Cape wheat in the colony, but labour in 
Australasia was paid more than at the Cape. 
Myburgh, speaking again, accused Solomon of being the farmers' 
enemy: Solomon had said that he did not want more blacks in the colony, 
but at other times "the greatest scoundrel" would have Solomon's support 
if he were black, Myburgh maintained. 
The motion for the appointment of a select committee (rather 
than a more thorough commission) was carried after "further 
discussion" ,37 
The debate outlined above reveals much about colonial attitudes. 
The liberals as represented by Saul Solomon were confused: on the one 
hand they wanted equality of rights between white and black. On the other 
they wanted to keep the Cape white . They feared for the position of "the 
white man" if the numbers of blacks rose too high . Perhaps they feared 
for the survival of liberal values altogether if there were too much 
racial friction. [See pp 129-31] 
The select committee appointed on the motion discussed above 
interviewed twelve farmers, a Cape Town merchant who was also a farmer, a 
brewer with unspecified other interests, a citizen of the Transvaal, 
Thomas Fuller (an expert witness in view of his immigration experience), 
a white trader in the Transkei, a missionary who was also an MLA, and a 
"coloured" man who was a labour agent. The preponderance of farmers among 
the witnesses represents the bias of the committee's instructions: to 
investigate farm labour. In the time available to it (less than a month) 
the committee made a fairly thorough investigation. 
Johannes Vermaak, an MLC from the Burghersdorp area (he sat for 
the North-Eastern Province), gave evidence to the committee. He was a 
37 GTJ 6 August 1879. 
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sheep farmer and agriculturist, and when asked if he had difficulty 
getting labour replied "We who live near the the border have not so much 
difficulty".38 One A. Van der Byl, an agriculturist and sheep farmer in 
the Bredasdorp area (in the Western province, near Cape Agulhas) when 
asked about labour said "1 cannot complain; because I give them free 
living in a cottage , and that ensures me as much labour as I want . ,,39 
This farmer also allowed his workers to cultivate land on his farm, and 
to keep the entire proceeds of that cultivation. 4o 
The evidence of the above two farmers exemplifies the position: 
labour could be obtained quite readily in areas close to the Transkei, 
and a farmer with a private location on his land, even as far west as 
Bredasdorp, could be sure of labour. 
On the other hand one J. A. Lochner, a farmer from Malmesbury 
said that "The want [of labour) in our district is so great that I can 
hardly describe it.,,41 A man who farmed corn, wine and cattle near Paarl 
was asked "Can you get plenty of labour?" and replied "Not so much as I 
used [to).,,42 Another farmer, asked if he had difficulty getting labour, 
said "Yes; and it gets worse every year. n43 
The committee reported that there was "a serious want of labour 
in some of the western districts of this country" . 44 They thought that 
the completion of the public works might alleviate the problem, but still 
recommended that agricultural labourers be imported. They felt that there 
was no need to look outside Africa for labour, thus ruling out Chinese 
and Indians. They recommended as most suitable "Mozambiques, Delagoa Bay 
Natives , Mantatess, and Berg Damaras", and suggested a trial of workers 
from each of these "tribes" . 45 They suggested that employers wanting 
labour should pay half the travel costs and other expenses of 
importation, and sign a standard contract drawn up by government. At the 
end of the contract period the labourers should be conveyed to the 
38 
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p iii. 
45 "Tribes" is in scare quotes because some of these terms do not 
refer to genuine ethnic groups, but are merely colonial ascriptions . 
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seaport nearest their home at government expense. Once again the aided 
immigration scheme was recommended to farmers.~6 
The committee in short recommended nothing new. It is 
interesting to notice that they had in mind migrant labour, but not 
seasonally migrant : the workers were to come for a term of years and then 
leave. This was presumably because of the distances involved. In any 
event, little came of the committee's report. The recommended importation 
of Damaras from German South-West Africa seemed promiSing. Arrangements 
were under way, and about 400 workers had been applied for by employers, 
but the scheme was prevented at the last minute by the German imperial 
government . 47 
Another government document from 1879 shows that, as has been 
observed above, war was a great help to employers. In the wake of the 
Ninth Frontier War, the Department of Native Affairs undertook to send 
labour at government expense from the frontier districts. The secretary 
of native affairs reported that 1 242 men, 1 164 women, and 1 472 
children, for a total of 3 878 souls (all black people) had been 
"introduced into the Western Districts during and after the late Galeka 
and Gaika war" at a cost to government of L29 607. 48 
Also in 1879, the Legislative Council resolved 
in the interests of the Agriculturists and other employers of Labour 
in this Colony, as well as in the interests of the Native Tribes upon 
and beyond our Borders, to encourage in every way such Natives to 
engage in Agricultural and other Labour49 
and asked officials and missionaries for their views on how best to 
achieve this end. The ensuing correspondence was only published in 1881. 
A wide variety of suggestions was made , some of which reflect the 
ambiguity in the wording of the resolution: did the Legislative Council 
have in mind persuading blacks to work for white farmers, or persuading 
blacks to become farmers themseves? It seems likely that the former is 
what the Council meant, but not all their correspondents thought so. 
46 AVP SC(A) 26-'79 pp iii-iv . 
47 DHA 1892 P 217 col 2. 
48 AVP A43-'79 P 1 . 
49 AVP C8-'81 P 1. 
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The governor's agent in Basutoland thought that wages would have 
to be raised before more Sotho would go out to work. The civil 
commissioner of Queenstown thought that blacks should be left as peasant 
producers; he construed the resolution to mean encouragement to blacks to 
work their own land, and suggested agricultural shows and prizes. The 
chief magistrate of Tembuland. thought tha t blacks were essentially "lazy" 
and "sensual" but that they could learn by example. He thought that they 
were better off left in their own territories . 
Several other magistrates thought that peasant agriculture was 
the subject of the resolution, and responded with suggestions of 
irrigation and agricultural societies. The Rev. Charles Taberer. 
missionary at Keiskamma Hoek, was not sure whether the Legislative 
Council meant that blacks were to be "servants to European farmers" or to 
farm "on their own behalf". Either way he recommended individual tenure, 
the land to be sold (not rented) to the highest bidder . The chief 
magistrate of the Transkei, Matthew Blyth, recommended individual tenure 
as a means of improving black agriculture. Let Africans buy land, he 
said, "and a class of native farmers and small landowners will speedily 
arise". He thought it "wrong in principle" that blacks should 'be simply 
hewers of wood and drawers of water". 
It is interesting to note (a) that many Native Affairs 
Department officials were genuinely concerned with the welfare of their 
"wards' and (b) that individual tenure was seen as a means of encouraging 
both black and white agriculture, the former by giving fixity of tenure 
and the latter by creating a class of landless labourers. The same policy 
could be advocated from very different points of view. 
In 1890, in response to petitions from farmers in the Western 
Province, the House of Assembly appointed a select committee on labour. 
The committee's findings were much the same as those of the Labour 
Commission of 1893-4 . The labour shortage was found to be in the western 
districts; the competition of railways and harbours had much to do with 
the problem. Farmers complained of mission schools that kept "coloured" 
children at school during harvest seasons. This committee, like the 
Labour Commission, was dubious about the effects of legislation on the 
problem; certainly stopping the public works was not the solution. If 
black workers could be induced to come down from the eastern districts to 
replace the farmers' "coloured' labour, that would solve the problem. No 
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recommendations for legislation were made. 5o 
A Legislative Council select committee of 1892 was less 
pessimistic. It noted that the "scarcity of labour is by no means 
universal" and that the districts with a scarcity Ware with one or two 
exceptions at a distance from locations or the frontier".51 The 
committee noted the competition of the railways but thought it 
undesirable to in'terfere, though they did ask that railway contractors 
not employ known farm workers. Good masters had abundant labour, the 
committee said, while their neighbours 'not of that character" did not. 
The committee thought that wages should rise, although they 
noted that some farmers had no difficulty getting labour at the customary 
10 shillings a month since farm labour was often preferred to mine 
labour. Whatever the wages "the contract must be faithfully kept', a 
polite warning to some unscrupulous employers. 
It had been suggested to the committee that the locations be 
abolished to compel blacks to work, but the committee's recommendation 
was that they should rather be regulated "to prevent their being the 
resort of 10afers".52 Without the locations some districts would have 
had no labour at all. 
The committee recommended that locations near villages should 
have water supplied by the municipalities. Alcohol for blacks should be 
prohibited, perhaps by licensees being compelled to sell no liquor to 
black employees without their masters' permission. A government labour 
office was proposed. (No discussion of individual tenure was entered 
into. ) 
The Council select committee of 1892 found much the same 
position as its predecessors had, and as the 1893-4 Commission would. 
Apart from the question of land tenure, the committee noted the 
competition of mines and public works; the non-availability of "coloured" 
children at crucial seasons because of their attendance at school; the 
problem of liquor; the question of wages and the character of employers. 
50 AVP SC(A)12-'90 pp iii-iv. 
51 AVP SC(C)2-'92 P v. 
52 ibid P vii. 
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It also found, of course, that the Western PrDvince suffered mDre from a 
labour shortage than the east . The Dnly departure from earlier findings 
was that the 1892 committee fDund the acuteness (but nDt the location) Df 
the labour shDrtage tD be less prDnDunced than Dthers did. 
The LabDur CDmmission Df 1893-4 was appointed fDIlDwing a debate 
in the HDuse Df Assembly at which mentiDn was made Df the return tD a 
circular sent Dut by Drder Df the Legislative CDuncil in 1891 that 
'infDrmation with regard tD the Native LabDur Supply Df the CDIDny be 
obtained , .53 This circular was sent tD magistrates in all the districts 
of the colDny, and they were required tD give their Dpinion of the 
shortage Dr Dtherwise Df labDur. Thirty-three out Df seventy-six -
districts had reported at least SDme scarcity Df labDur. 54 The CDuncil 
select cDmmittee of 1892 discussed abDve was also mentiDned. FrDm this it 
can be seen that labDur was the subject Df intense interest at the Cape 
in the 1890s. 
The LabDur CDmmissiDn was a large scale affair . It sat at 
intervals fDr fifteen mDnths, travelled tD fifty-four places in the 
cDIDny and tDDk evidence from 622 witnesses. 55 It fDund that 'a want Df 
available farm labDur is acutely and increasingly felt in the Western 
Circle, WDrcester, Malmesbury, and Piquetberg' and said that several 
thDusand workers cDuld be absDrbed in that area. 56 The commissiDn IDDked 
upon Tembuland. Griqualand East and Herschel as the main SDurces Df 
labDur for the cDIDny. 
The labDur shDrtage had a number Df causes , but the main Dne was 
fDund tD be 'the cDnditiDns Df life and pDpulatiDn in SDuth Africa." The 
necessities Df life were easily obtainable, and Africans had few wants 
beYDnd thDse necessities, SD they wDuld nDt wDrk fDr wages. 57 
The cDmmissiDn fDund that agriculture had been extended to meet 
the demand Df the centres Df pDpulatiDn that had sprung up with the 
develDpment of mining, and SD the demand fDr labour had increased beYDnd 
the supply. Farmers cDuld not cDmpete with the wages paid by the mines, 
53 AVP C1-'92 P 1. 
54 ibid p 3; alsD DHA 1892 P 216 call. 
55 AVP G39-'93 P ii. 
56 ibid P 111. 
57 ibid P v. 
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public works and urban employers. Irregular habits of work were another 
part of the problem, as was the attraction of life in town locations that 
were inadequately regulated, in the view of the commission. Reduced 
railway rates of half a penny a mile for the carriage of workers to the 
Transvaal exacerbated the situation. The commission also found some 
"Vocations diverting labour', by which they meant that black peasants or 
'coloured" market gardeners, carriers and tradesmen who worked for 
themselves or employed labour thereby reduced the labour available to 
white farmers .58 
The commission noted that the "Native Territories" were 
exporting labour, but deprecated the fact that so many of the workers 
were going to the Transvaal: government statistics showed that 10 465 men 
had left Tembuland and the Transkei in 1893 to work in the colony, and a 
further 7 522 had left to work in the Transvaal. 59 The fact that the 
commission regretted so many workers going to the Transvaal, and the 
concern about the competition posed by towns, mines and public works, 
make it unlikely that the subsequent Glen Grey Act was intended to draft 
labour to the Transvaal. 
Some reasons why workers from the territories did not go to the 
colony were found to be fear of losing their allotments, and fear that 
accumulating cattle might lead to charges of witchcraft, both of which 
seem unlikely. On the other hand, reports of ill-treatment on farms, and 
the possibility of being fined on the journey home for having scabby 
sheep (part of their wages, seem more likely deterrents, which the 
commission noted. 60 
In regard to wages the commission found that "The amount is not 
generally a subject of complaint" because although ten shillings a month 
was the usual cash wage, with the customary additional payment in kind 
"the total often comes up to considerably above three pounds a month" .61 
While it appears from the debate on the motion to appoint the commission 
that a majority of the MLAs would have agreed with the notion that real 
wages in agriculture were good, some at least did not: Arthur Douglass, 
the member for Grahamstown, said 
58 ibid pp vi-viii. 
59 ibid pp viii-ix. 
60 AVP G39-'93 pp ix-x. 
61 ibid P xii. 
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the rate of wages was from 55. to las. per month and rations, and, as 
they knew, rations consisted for the most part of mealies. Stock 
farmers sometimes gave meat; but they did it in self defence and it 
was no use the han. member for Richmond coming there and saying that 
the Kafir was exceptional in that he was idle. 62 
But mo st colonists clung to their illusions that farm wages were good. 
Liquor was felt to have a very harmful effect on many black 
workers. Prohibition was not recommended, as it 'would tend to injure the 
industry of the west on which a great portion of the population depends'. 
The commission proposed instead that licensing courts be empowered to 
make the issue of liquor licences conditional on liquor not being sold to 
'any specified class or classes of the community,.63 
Another remedial measure proposed by the commission was the 
setting up of a government labour bureau to match up the demand for , and 
the supply of, labour. This was to find expression in the Glen Grey 
Act. 64 
Immigration of Asian workers, or African workers from outside 
the colony, was not recommended. 65 The commission found that there was 
little demand in the colony for the immigration of European farm labour, 
and accordingly felt it was best left alone. The complaint was that such 
people soon became independent farmers, and so added little to the supply 
of labour . The immigration of women domestic servants was not objected 
to. 66 
Private locations on farms were objected to by many witnesses 
who felt that the farmer with a private location on his land in that way 
monopolised the labour. Amendments to the Native Locations Act, Act 33 of 
1892 , were recommended to reduce the number of male black persons living 
on farm land which was deemed to constitute a private location (from 
seven to three) .67 
It was found that the Masters and Servants Acts were not 
62 DHA 1892 P 220 col 1. 63 AVP G39-'93 P xiv. 
64 ibid P xvi. 
65 ibid pp xviii-xx. 
66 ibid P xx-xxii. 
67 ibid pp xxiv-xxv . 
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understood by many of the workers and farmers affected by them . There 
were many calls from witnesses for these to be made more stringent, which 
the commission did not recommend; it suggested that they be simplified 
(so that non-lawyers could understand them) and consolidated into a 
single ACt. 68 
On the all-important question of land tenure, the commission 
found that 
Suggestions are made in different quarters as to a royal road to 
obtain a labour supply by furnishing all the natives in the Eastern 
and Transkeian territories with individual titles , and preventing all 
who have no titles from occupying land. 69 
But, the commission said, "the matter is not to be settled off-hand in a 
day, or is likely to have the instant effect on the supply of labour that 
some expect. , 70 The report noted that blacks were not prepared to go to 
the expense of having surveyed lots; titles had not been taken up in many 
cases where locations had already been surveyed; and boundaries of 
surveyed lots were often disregarded by the inhabitants. All these 
objections were to be proved correct . 71 The commission was hesitant 
about the matter of individual tenure. It observed that it would 
'generally speaking" be advantageous for individual blacks to have ' some 
fixity of tenure' to prevent overcrowding, but made no specific 
recommendations because of disagreement among its members; at the same 
time 'all [the commissioners] are agreed that its effect can only be a 
very gradual one on the supply of labour . " 
It might be argued that since the commission reported 
equivocally on individual tenure this document did not contribute to the 
Glen Grey Act. The point made here is not so much that the commission was 
equivocal, but that it revealed that there was considerable opinion in 
favour of individual tenure as a means of providing labour . That opinion 
prevailed in spite of the commission. 
68 ibid P xxvi. 
69 ibid p xviii . 
70 ibid. 
71 Russell Ally The develoment of the svstem of individual tenure 
for Africans. with special reference to the Glen Grey Act. c 1894 to 1922 
M.A . thesis, Rhodes University, 1985 . Pp 191-208 and 218-226 . 
82 
On the other hand the commission was in favour of land in 
locations being inherited by primogeniture, another important part of the 
Glen Grey Act, and one that the commission suggested because 'The effect 
of this would be that those who did not inherit the allotment would have 
to seek employment,.72 
The commission recommended that land on individual tenure should 
be transferred without the expense of formal conveyancing;73 this was 
not included in the Glen Grey Act. 
The commission made two recommendations that seemed 'advisable 
in connection with the labour question". One was that "additional direct 
taxation' be levied on blacks to pay for education. The other was that 
some portion of the hut tax should be remitted 'upon his shewing he had 
been a certain time absent from his home in employment. ,74 This 
recommendation was to find modified expression in the Glen Grey Act in 
the form of the labour tax. 
On the question of whites being able to buy land from blacks 
once the latter had been given title deeds the commission said 
The natives, where they have received titles, have not, so far as the 
Kaffir race is concerned, shown so much disposition to part with them 
as some expected would be the case; there have been hardly any 
instances as yet, while many Fingoes and other have, on the other 
hand, bought land largely.75 
So the desire of ·the Bond's members to acquire land in Glen Grey was 
likely to be frustrated, the commission found. Nevertheless the Bond 
fought for the titles to be alienable to whites. Rhodes, while saying 
that his government would never permit such sales, was forced to draw up 
the Glen Grey Act in such a way that a later government could give such 
permission. [See pp 101-3) 
* * * * * 
72 AVP G39-'93 P xxix. 73 ibid P xxix. 7. ibid P xxix. 75 ibid . 
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The committees discussed above with the evidence they had elicited and 
the recommendations they had formulated are part of the background to the 
Glen Grey Act. They draw attention to the labour needs of the Cape 
Colony, especially those of the farmers in the western districts. It 
seems a reasonable inference that the Glen Grey policy was intended to 
address some of the problems to which attention had been drawn. That the 
measure had the support of the Afrikaner Bond, whose members were western 
farmers, is itself testimony to the kind of problem it sought to address. 
Chapter Four 
The passage of the Glen Grey Act 
(i) The Glen Grey question before 1894 
(ii) Rhodes's political position in 1894 
(iii) Rhodes's haste over the Glen Grey 8ill 
(iv) The opposition to the 8ill: the Cape 
'liberals' in and out of Parliament 
(v) The debate on the Act 
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(i) The Glen Grey question before 1894 
The issue of the Glen Grey district had been before parliament for some 
time before 1894. In 1889 a petition had been presented to the 
Legislative Council from "residents in Glen Grey , Wodehouse and Queen's 
Town praying that the Tambookies [i . e. the Themba] be removed from Glen 
Grey"' -- presumably so that whites could acquire the land. Even more 
significantly, Jotham Joubert, MLA for Albert and a Bondsman, moved in 
the Assembly the same year that "the natives residing on the Glen Grey 
crown lands be removed, and that such lands, together with such 
unoccupied land in said territory, be put up for public auction.'" The 
motion was not carried, and received some stinging criticism. Rhodes had 
a leave of absence from parliament for the entire session of 1889, the 
year before he became premier, but the fact that Glen Grey was discussed 
demonstrates that the issue, and in particular the desire of some of the 
whites to grab the land of the district, was already a factor . In 1891 
the, same Joubert moved 
for a return [i.e . government statement] of all waste lands in the 
Glen Grey district, including those that had been allotted to the 
Indwe-Imvani Company ... and which had reverted to Government by 
effluxion of time, stating the approximate extent , whether occupied 
or unoccupied, and what Government intends to do with it . 3 
In the event the Indwe Railway, Collieries and Land Company did complete 
the railway line and so retained its land in Glen Grey . But Joubert ' s --
and hence the Bond's land hunger is demonstrated by this resolution. 
The Glen Grey Commission was appointed by letters of 14 and 21 
April 1892 and 'reported on 27 May the same year4 • There was an abortive 
attempt to deal with the question in the session of 1893 . Its failure was 
due in part to the liberal wing of Rhodes's cabinet being able to secure 
a postponement . 5 In short, a pattern of continuing interest in Glen Grey 
can be discerned in the years before 1894. 
, MLC 1889 P 24 . The number of signatories was 33 or 38 - - the printing 
is unclear. 
2 DHA 1889 P 232 col 1 (2 July 1889). 
V&P 1891 p 218 23 June 1891 . 
4 AVP A3-'92 P 1 for appointment, p 6 for report. 
5 Phyllis Lewsen John X: Merriman: paradoxical South African statesman 
Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 1982. Page 170. 
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* * * * * 
In moving his 1889 proposal Joubert cited the difficulties that white 
farmers were having because their veld was becoming over-grazed . He said 
that the government received nothing from Glen Grey except the hut-tax, 
while white farmers who had been granted land in Tembu1and 'had got on 
well enough, though the land was not to be compared in fertility with 
that in Glen Grey,6. His implication was that government revenue would 
be increased if his proposal were carried out. (It is also worth noting 
that Joubert regarded Glen Grey as a fertile, and therefore a desirable, 
district.) Joubert's motion, as mentioned above, was not passed. In the 
debate on the motion John Wood, M1A for Grahamstown, said that he 'did 
not think the House would for a single moment entertain so monstrous a 
proposition.,7 Sir Gordon Sprigg, the prime minister at the ' time, said 
'If the resolution was carried it simply meant war. (Hear, hear. ),,8 
Marthinus du Plesis, M1A for Queenstown, said that the proposal was 
justified by the fact that the Glen Grey people had been rebels [in 
1878].9 William Hockly, M1A for Somerset East, said 'if the House 
sanctioned the motion it would deserve the censure of the whole civilised 
world ." O Even John Frost, the other M1A for Queenstown, and later to be 
secretary of native affairs and secretary of agriculture in Rhodes's 
cabinet, said 'it was a very unwise thing on the part of the hon. member 
for Albert to bring forward such a motion.' There was nowhere for the 
people to be moved to." Frost was no negrophilist, but he felt that 
facts had to be faced. His concluding remark is interesting: 'The best 
thing the Government could do would be to give these people title to the 
land.,'2 Frost as secretary of native affairs in 1893 was to introduce 
an unsuccesful motion on the lines of the Glen Grey Act. 
Also in 1889 Marthinus du Plessis, the M1A for Queenstown who 
had seconded Joubert's motion, asked if the government would auction the 
25 , 000 morgen of land formerly promised to the Indwe Railway Company . 
6 DHA 1889 P 232 col 2. 
DHA 1889 P 232 col 2. 
8 DHA 1889 P 233 col 1. 9 DHA 1889 P 233 col 2. 
10 DHA 1889 P 233 col 2. 
11 DHA 1889 P 233 col 2. 12 DHA 1889 P 233 col 2. 
87 
Colonel Schermbrucker, commissioner of crown lands and public works in 
the second Sprigg ministry. said that the a mining engineer's report was 
optimistic about finding a good supply of coal on government land there. 
Schermbrucker had instructed that the area be fully investigated. 13 Du 
Plessis asked the same question the following year, and Schermbrucker 
replied that the land had not in fact been transferred to the Indwe 
Company, as the promised railway line had not been built. The coal 
industry, he said, would be discussed later and the government would then 
be in a position to say whether the farms would be disposed Of.14 These 
questions and their answers demonstrate the uncertainty surrounding the 
Indwe collieries question, and the Bond's land hunger -- and persistence. 
As mentioned above, in 1891 Joubert moved for a return of all 
waste lands in Glen Grey, including the Indwe Company farms. The Bond's 
desire for a thorough investigation of the potential of Glen Grey is 
demonstrated by a telegram of 5 May 1891 sent from the SNA to the civil 
commissioner (CC) of Wodehouse instructing him to ascertain the extent of 
land occupied by "natives" in Glen Grey; the approximate number of huts 
and persons on such land; the extent of vacant land; and "Whether it is 
advisable and practicable to move natives from one part of the district 
to another part, so as to leave land now occupied available for other 
purposes. "15 Those "other purposes" may be assumed to be occupation by 
whites. 
The CC's reply was most discouraging, and so it was ignored. He 
wrote that blacks occupied 269 242 morgen of land but much of that was 
rocky and of no agricultural use, although it could be grazed. About 40 
000 blacks lived in the district, 35 000 of them on black-owned land, and 
5 000 on white farms. As regards the labour question his next remark is 
interesting: "In addition to those enumerated for census purposes, I have 
reasons for supposing that there are generally a large number of natives 
employed in the colony and elsewhere, but who really belong to the 
district." That is clear evidence that Glen Grey was already sending its 
sons out to work even before the Act was passed. 
The CC found there was practically no vacant land, and that it 
13 DHA 1889 P 266 col 2; for Galloway's report see AVP G50-'89. 
14 DHA 1890 P 8 col 2. (3 June 1890. Rhodes's ministry came in on 17 
July. ) 
15 AVP A1- '93 P 53. 
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was "neither desirable nor is it practicable to move natives from one 
portion of the district to another.' The blacks had been in possession of 
their land for a long time, and owned large herds and flocks. Their 
industry was apparent from the fact that available land was cultivated to 
the fullest extent. He finished by saying 'any attempt to dispossess the 
natives of the land would cause irritation and discontent . ,,16 The 
government was not deterred by this advice. Instead, it set up the Glen 
Grey Commission to give it advice that it wanted to hear . 
A three-man commission, including John Frost, was appointed by 
the secretary of native affairs, P. H. Faure, on 14 May 1892 to enquire 
into 
1 The nature of tenure of Glen Grey lands 
2 The extent and natural features of the ground, and its suitability 
for pastoral or agricultural purposes 
3 The number of male residents and the number of huts they occupy 
4 The possibility of reducing the extent of the locations by 
combining two or more into one, and the extent of the ground thus 
,made vacant 
5 The best way of disposing of the vacant land 
6 The desirability of giving individual title to those who want it, 
and what to do about those who do not l7 
The commission took evidence from a range of witnesses, black and white. 
One of the latter was du Plessis, the MLA mentioned above, who said 
my opinion is that the loyal natives who were loyal in name only be 
located on one portion of the ground and give them free title, and 
all rebels, Hottentots, Basutos and other nationalities who came in 
after the war, should be removed out of the Glen Grey Location, and 
the vacated land sold to the public. 18 
His resentment at the 1877-8 frontier war and 'rebellion' convinced Du 
Plessis in his own mind that his desire to take over black land was 
reasonable. Other white witnesses had similar views. Joseph Sutherland, a 
farmer and Bond member in the Wodehouse division lo who handed in four 
memorials [i.e. petitions] signed by a total of 416 people 2o had the 
following exchange with the commission: 
16 AVP A1-'93 pp 53-4 for the last two paragraphs. 
17 AVP A3-'92 P 1. 
18 AVP A1-'93 P 51. 
10 AVP A1-'93 P 16. 
20 AVP A1-'93 P 15. 
89 
[Commissioner] Do you wish to disturb the loyal natives1 
[Sutherland] We don't wish to disturb them, but want a certain 
portion of the ground allotted to them. In addition to the prayer of 
the memorialists it is the [sic, their] request that the natives who 
remain shall have individual titles allotted to them. 
[C] Do you wish that all the people who joined the rebellion should 
be removed from the Location1 
- Yes, together with all Basutos, Bastards and Fingoes who joined in 
the rebellion or not, as we consider they have no right. 
[C] Do you know of any vacant land in this district? 
- No, all the ' vacant lands are filled with rebels,2l 
In Sutherland's view lands that were occupied by 'rebels' were ipso facto 
'vacant" and available for white purchase. Here it can be seen that the 
individual title strategy was espoused not just by MLAs but by rank and 
file Bond members as well. His evidence was followed by that of Jacobus 
Oosthuizen, another farmer who said 'I agree with that stated by Mr. 
Sutherland with reference to the natives being removed and the land put 
up to public auction.' 
The commission was told by William Jenner, the RM of Glen Grey, 
that there was no vacant land available in the district,22 Jenner was 
not sympathetic to the cause of the blacks of Glen Grey, but he was a 
competent enough official to see that there was no spare land. 
The opinion of the black witnesses was divided on the question 
of individual title; clearly some genuinely wanted it. A meeting at the 
Agnes Location in Glen Grey in 1892 passed a resolution to the effect 
that they were 'surprised and grieved to hear that the Government has 
lately decided to restrict for the present the issue of individual titles 
in Glen Grey,.23 Those wanting titles were either the more prosperous of 
the peasants, or they were afraid that if they did not accept the new 
tenure they might have their land taken from them. The resolution 
mentioned went on to say 'it is generally well known that attempts have 
been made and are still being made to deprive the Glen Grey natives of 
the lands they occupy,24 
Johannes Mahonga, a wealthy peasant farmer who had been part of 
a deputation to Cape Town to ask for individual titles, told the 
21 AVP A1-'93 P 16. 
22 AVP A1-'93 P 33. 
23 AVP A1a-'93 p 3. 
M AVP A1a-93 p 3. 
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commission that the people his deputation represented wanted individual 
titles, although he did not claim that they represented all the people of 
the locations from which they came. He said that a 'school Kaffir' could 
live on thirty morgen, but a 'Red Kaffir" would be 'entitled' to between 
eight and fifteen morgen, the reason for the disparity being that the red 
man grew only mealies and corn, 'whereas the school Kaffir would grow all 
sorts of things.n25 
Not all the whites believed that the Glen Grey people wanted the 
new tenure. William Wakeford, a farmer, said 'The majority of people in 
this district are not willing to take titles.,2. A delegation of Glen 
Grey people had indicated in 1892 that they wanted a title vested in an 
elected council acting as a trustee on behalf of the people. 27 That 
would have the effect of reserving the land to blacks without opening up 
the possibility of whites buying it. The vesting of the title deeds in 
the tribe was known as 'tribal title'. The following exchange is typical 
of the evidence of black witnesses: 
[Commissioner] What are the wishes of the people you represent? 
[David Malassi, a headman] Most of the Tembus want a Tribal title, 
that is the great question. 
[C] In the event of the Government refusing a Tribal title, would 
your people accept Individual title? 
- If the Government refuses Tribal title, the Tembus would like 
certificates of occupation ... ,28 
The commission asked if certificates of occupation were refused, whether 
Malassi's people would accept individual title. His reply was that they 
would, provided no man got less land than he was currently cultivating. 
(An ominous foreshadowing of the fate of many peasants when the Act was 
carried out . ) Asked if the peasants would be satisfied with eight morgen, 
Malassi said that they would want more. 
A headman identified only as Kelem (sic) was asked what his 
people's views were about titles, and he replied 'They wish to live as 
they have lived before. ,2.9 This response, often word for word, was so 
common that it must have been pre-arranged among some of the witnesses. 
25 AVP A1-' 93 P 21-
26 AVP A1- '93 P 14. 
27 AVP Ala - ' 93 P 4. 
28 AVP A1-' 93 pp 23-24. 
29 AVP A1-'93 P 45. 
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Nevertheless it represented the true sta te of black opinion in Glen Gre y 
more accurately than the commis s ion's report did, which said that a 
majority were in favour of individual tenure. The commission mayor may 
not have been disingenuous on that score. Clearly some of the Glen Grey 
people wanted titles; many may have been reluctant to displease the white 
commissioners by giving them an answer they clearly did not want; perhaps 
not all those opposed to individual tenure went to the sittings of the 
commission. 
In any event, the commission reported as follows . On point I of 
their instructions they found that the land was given to the Thembu by 
Governor Sir George Cathcart's proclamations of 22 November 1852 . ' From 
that date it is quite clear that the country was handed over to them and 
held by them on Tribal Tenure . ,30 In short Glen Grey was not Crown land, 
but belonged to the people living there. During the 1880 war many Glen 
Grey people rebelled and returned to the land after the war was was over . 
They were not then punished by confiscation, and it was too late now in 
1892 to tell loyals from rebel s . The commission regretted that they had 
been allowed to return, but recognised that there was nothing to be 
done . 31 
On point 2, they found the locations to be 248 476 morgen in 
extent, 20 000 morgen less than CC of Wodehouse had found; the difference 
is not explained. The soil in the valleys was more or less suitable for 
agri culture, and the grazing was good throughout . 
On point 3, the number of residents, they estimated about 10000 
adult males, and "great numbers at work in the Colony who have claims on 
the land " . 
On point 4, they found it would be impossible to reduce the 
number or extent of the locations , as the land was barely suff i cient as 
it was. A lot of fifty-five morgen of land for each family was 
recommended for agriculture and grazing purposes. 
On point 5, they made no report in the light of the findings on 
the fourth point. 
30 AVP A3- '92 P 2. 
31 AVP A3-'92 pp 2-3 . 
92 
On point 6, they recommended granting individual titles. They 
believed that a majority was in favour of the change, by 2 356 in favour 
to 1 312 against. (Quite how they arrived at these precise figures is not 
known.) They wrote 
We also believe that the issue of individual title will help 
materially to solve the labour difficulty, for it will prevent 
outsiders com~ng in as they do at present, and when a man's children 
grow up, they will be compelled to seek service, as the land will be 
insufficient for the support of more than one family32 
The commission passed on the information that the blacks wanted a clause 
in their titles preventing alienation without the governor's consent, but 
recommended that this should be only for three or four years . 33 Another 
matter which they felt should receive the government's attention 'is the 
introduction of a measure for a more easy and inexpensive mode of 
transfer of property belonging to natives. ,3' In the light of the 
Opposition's argument during the debate on the Act that for the size of 
the lots a full-blown survey would be too cumbersome and expensive (and 
the experience of the working of the Act) this recommendation should have 
been followed. It was not, which raises the question of whether Rhodes 
wanted the Glen Grey land policy to work at all. He may well have been 
indifferent to the prospects for the ultimate success of the land tenure 
provisions of his Act. 
In the House of Assembly in 1892, after the Glen Grey Commission 
report had appeared in June,35 Du Plessis asked if the government would 
introduce a Bill to issue individual title 'to the natives of Glen Grey." 
The SNA, Faure, replied that it would not be done in that session, but 
the government hoped to bring in legislation the following year to 
regulate tenure in Glen Grey nand elsewhere where the circumstances were 
similar.,36 Despite the hurried nature of the 1894 legislation, it is 
clear that the Bond and the Rhodes ministry had begun to think of 
individual tenure as a policy as early as 1891, as shown by the report of 
the CC of Wodehouse that year. 
32 Avp A3-'92 P 5. 
33 AVP A3-'92 P 6. 
3' AVP A3-'92 P 6. 
3S AVP A3-'92 P 1. 36 DHA 1892 P 330 col 1. 
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The speech from the throne at the opening of the 1893 
parliamentary session told members nYour attention will be invited to the 
subject of the settlement of the natives at Glen Grey' but did not go 
into detail. 37 On 23 June 1893 Innes, by now out of Rhodes's ministry, 
asked for a postponement of the government's motion on the Glen Grey 
question until the evidence of the Glen Grey Commission could be made 
available to Members. (The commission's report had been printed but not 
the evidence it had taken.) John Frost, the new secretary of native 
affairs in Rhodes's cabinet, agreed to the postponement. Nearly a month 
later Frost moved 
that in accordance with the recommendations of the report of the Glen 
Grey Commission ... steps be taken for granting individual title to 
land in the Glen Grey district to all who prove themselves entitled 
thereto; and that such titles shall .. . contain a special clause 
limiting the transfer of the land without the consent of Government 
for three years. 38 
Frost was anxious that his measure enjoy widespread support, and 
told the House that Innes had come to accept that individual titles were 
what the people wanted. He also said that the Glen Grey people 'were 
almost unanimously in favour of individual title',39 which he knew was 
not the case. 
Frost seems to have contemplated the complete proletarianisation 
of the black people of Glen Grey and any subsequently proclaimed 
districts. He described an existing pattern of migrant labour, and was 
not satisfied with it. In pointing out how the labour supply was in 
inverse proportion to the goodness of the agricultural season in the 
Transkeian Territories (a point demonstrated in the case of the Indwe 
mines as well) he unwittingly reveals the callous attitudes of the white 
colonist: 
So long as the location existed and individual responsibility was 
removed from the shoulders of the native, there would be difficulties 
connected with the labour markets. (Hear, hear . ) There would of 
course always be men who would settle on the land and remain there, 
and there would be others who as now would go away and work for a 
certain number of years. But at present a good year in Kaffirland 
meant scarcity of labour in the Colony, while a bad year meant 
37 DHA 1893 P 2 colI (16 June 1893). 
38 DHA 1893 pp 172-3 (20 July 1893). 
39 DHA 1893 P 173 col 1 . 
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abundance of labour. (Hear, hear.) His idea was that if the native 
had not the location to fall back upon, he would settle in the 
country and become merged with the population. 40 
The Opposition contribution to the debate was of mixed quality. 
Merriman's speech must have made rather difficult listening as he 
referred frequently to census figures. He rode his hobby-horse, the 
danger of the multiplication of the black population. Richard Solomon, 
MLA for Kimberley and an associate of Rhodes whom Rhodes later turned 
against,41 made some interesting remarks. 
He noted that the motion which Frost had introduced "extended a 
good deal farther than the mere question of Glen Grey" as the government 
would apply whatever tenure it devised in other areas as well. 42 He 
pointed out that the history of individual titles had not so far been a 
happy one [see ~11-~) and asked what was to be done with those who did 
not want such titles . They could not be forced to accept them, he said, 
and alluded to Sprigg's prediction in 1887 that if the people of Glen 
Grey were forced out there would be war, saying he feared the same would 
happen over forcibly imposed titles. He hotly disputed the commission's 
estimate of black opinion: 
the only ground put forth by the Secretary for Native Affairs in 
moving this resolution was that the native inhabitants of Glen Grey 
were in favour of it [indiviual title). He submitted that the natives 
wanted nothing of the sort; if the natives had been properly asked 
which they would prefer, individual title under which they would be 
free to alienate their land or certificates of occupation, he most 
emphatically declared that almost unanimously they would have said 
they would have preferred a certificate of occupation .... [Some 
natives) were clearly of op1n10n that if they did not take title the 
land would be taken from them. 43 
He foresaw that under individual tenure the transfer register would not 
be kept up to date, and that, title notwithstanding, there would be 
'0 DHA 1893 P 173 col!. 
'1 Robert Rotberg The founder: Cecil Rhodes and the pursuit of power 
Johannesburg: Southern, 1988. Page 608. 
42 DHA 1893 p 254 col!. Another point he made, 'which has not yet been 
cleared up, was why the matter was being dealt with by resolution rather 
than by a Bill. 
43 DHA 1893 P 254 cols 1-2. 
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squatting. 44 That was why he recommended the simpler system of "a: rough 
survey" and certificates of occupation, which he suggested could be 
converted "after a certain number of years" to individual titles, but 
still without the right to alienate. "Lead them on the road to 
civilisation slowly but surely . ,,45 After all, he said, "In Innnigrant 
[sic, Emigrant] Tembuland they had Europeans living upon certificates of 
occupation, and they had no right to alienate their land."46 
Solomon was against location land being seizable for debt, debt 
which he believed canteenkeepers and shopkeepers would encourage blacks 
to incur. The consequences of such seizure of land by creditors would be 
"white men in the location", a prospect from which he shrank: "The white 
men would imitate the vices of the natives and the natives of the white 
men.n~7 Such views on the effects of integration were shared by many, 
including Rhodes. 
Solomon'S concluding remarks show that he, like the Cape Times, 
believed that Rhodes was the prisoner of his own back-benchers, i.e . the 
Bond. "If the Premier and Treasurer had to decide this question for 
themselves, and without reference to the back benches, they would say 
that these people were not prepared for individual title."48 
The Cape Hansard reports are not complete, verbatim accounts of 
what was said in the House. They are couched in indirect speech and are 
sometimes compressed. It seems that the short-hand writers had little 
knowledge of Dutch, as the reports of speeches by Afrikaners are often 
brief, sometimes no more than "Messrs. Van der Walt and De Waal continued 
the debate. ,,49 On this occasion in 1893 the report reveals only that 
44 See Russell Ally The development of the system of individual tenure 
for Africans. with special reference to the Glen Grey Act. c 1894 to 1922 
M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1985. Pages 208-226. 
45 DHA 1893 P 255 col 1. 
46 DHA 1893 P 255 col 2. The people referred to were poor whites . 
47 DHA 1893 P 255 call. Solomon did not have only the interests of 
whites at heart. He also said 'individual title ... would have the effect 
of introducing Europeans, to the certain degradation of natives." (DHA 
8193 P 255 col 2. Emphasis added.) 
48 DHA 1893 P 255 col 2. The treasurer, Sir Gordon Sprigg, replied 
immediately 'I would not.' Sprigg was believed to be in favour of land 
under the Glen Grey Act being alienable in the usual way. (See DHA 1894 P 
436 col 2, 6 August 1894, remark by Merriman.) For the Cape Times view of 
the Bond as 'the power behind the throne' see Cape Times editorial, 7 
August 1894, p 4. 
49 DHA 1894 P 391 col 2 . 
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'Mr . M. du Plessis strongly supported the motion. , 50 The next speaker 
was Innes, who said that he would like to propose an amendment, but at a 
later date. Accordingly, he moved the adjournment of the debate, which 
was agreed to. 51 (That was on 4 August.) The Innes amendment was that a 
Bill be introduced, rather than a resolution. 52 On 5 September, with 
parliamentary time running out, a number of motions were struck off the 
order paper, Innes's included. 53 It is not known why Frost introduced a 
resolution rather' than a Bill in the first place, nor is it clear why no 
definite action was taken in 1893 as contemplated. Perhaps Rhodes wanted 
his own Bill, rather than one that might have flowed from Innes's 
resolution. 
Another mystery is why the size of the Glen Grey lots should 
have been reduced from the commission's recommendation of 55 morgen to 
the Act's stipulated four morgen. A 55 morgen lot would have been a small 
farm and worth a white commercial farmer's purchase. A four morgen lot 
was much less attractive to a white potential buyer . If we assume that 
Rhodes did want to keep the locations intact as labour reserves, then the 
four morgen lot might have been a way of keeping whites out. Rhodes said 
If they were to submit to him the proposition of amalgamating the 
diamond-mines or buying out the owners of seventy allotments on one 
of the farms, he would say give him the amalgamation of the diamond-
mines or the Northern question, but do not submit to him the task of 
buying out seventy owners and making one farm. 54 
which seems to be~r out the contention that whites would have been 
discouraged by the smallness of ' the lots . On the other hand, far more 
people would have been rendered landless, and thereby proletarianised, 
had the 55 morgen provision been enacted. It seems that the 'migrant 
labour' ~ 'complete proletarianisation' debate cannot be satisfactorily 
50 DHA 1893 P 255 col 2. 
51 ibid. 
52 It read: 'That in the opinion of this House it is desirable that 
legislation should be introduced with regard to Glen Grey, and other 
Crown lands, to secure to individual Natives the right of separate 
occupation of defined portions of land thereon, to regulate the disposal 
during life, and the devolution after death, of such defined portions, to 
prevent over-crowding by squatters, to define commonage rights, and to 
provide for the regulation and good government of the locations.' James 
Rose Innes Autobiography edited by B,A . Tindall. Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1949. Page 104. 
53 DHA 1893 P 378 col 2 . See also Innes Autobiography p 104. 
54 DHA 1894 P 368 colI. 
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concluded one way or the other . It may be that Rhodes looked forward to 
an eventual complete proletarianisation, but expected that there would 
continue to be migrancy for some time to come. 
(ii) Rhodes's political position in the 1890s 
It is the contention of this thesis that the Glen Grey Act was a measure 
intended for the benefit of the farmers of the Western Province. However, 
the Act was introduced by Cecil Rhodes, so his political position has to 
be considered. It is evident that he was in a strong but not an 
unassailable position in the Cape Colony. The support of the Bond was not 
unconditional, and the criticism of the Opposition could not always be 
appeased. Rhodes's interests outside the Cape made him aware of the 
importance of placating metropolitan opinion. 
Sir Thomas Fuller wrote in his memoir of Rhodes that Rhodes's 
government was kept in office by the Afrikaner Bond; he also said that 
the same was true of any Cape government i n the twenty-three years he was 
in parliament. 55 Davenport bears out the claim that Hofmeyr and the Bond 
put Rhodes in office. 56 The Sprigg government of 1887-90 was kept in 
power by the Bond and fell when it lost the Bond's support over a 
grandiose railway Bill. 57 In the cabinet crisis that followed, the 
governor offered the premiership, logically enough, to J. W. Sauer, the 
leader of the Opposition. Sauer declined to form a ministry because he 
did not enjoy the support of the Bond, and recommended Rhodes, who did . 
It is clear then that Rhodes governed with the support of the 
Bond. He shrewdly bought off his most damaging opponents hy including 
them in his cabinet: James Rose Innes, John X. Merriman and J. W. Sauer 
were some of the most talented MLAs in the House and not obviously 
sympathetic to Rhodes's politics -- although Merriman and Sauer were 
personal friends of his. Sprigg became the disconsolate leader of the 
Opposition. 
55 Fuller Reminiscence pp 165-6. 
56 T,R.H. Davenport The Afrikaner Bond: the history of a South African 
political party 1880-1911 Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pages 
132, 139-40. 
57 Rotberg Founder pp 340-2; Davenport Afrikaner pp 131-2. 
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That was the position in 1890 when Rhodes was sweeping all 
before him. That was the year that his pioneer column reached Fort 
Salisbury; he had amalgamated the diamond fields into his own De Beers 
Consolidated Mines two year before; he was jOint-managing director of 
Goldfields of South Africa; and in addition to this he was a wealthy man 
with a wide range of other business interests, among them investments in 
pro-Bond newspapers. By 1894 things had changed somewhat. The 
commissioner of crown lands and public works, Sir James Sivewright, had 
awarded a very lucrative contract for the catering on the Cape Government 
Railways to a business associate. one J. D. Logan, without a tender. 
Since this was a monopoly contract, and for a lengthy term of years (some 
sources say fifteen, others twenty), the corrupt nature of the 
transaction was obvious. Innes as attorney-general had not been 
consulted; when he learned the truth he was amazed. He, Merriman and 
Sauer threatened to resign in protest against such jobbery. 
Rhodes played a canny game, insisting that they delay their 
resignations. Then, when he was prepared, Rhodes himself resigned, and 
reconstructed his cabinet, excluding both Sivewright, on the one hand, 
and Merriman, Sauer and Innes on the other. Sir Gordon Sprigg, the former 
leader of the Opposition, came in as treasurer. The wind had been taken 
out of the sails of the liberal trio. Rhodes was able to present himself, 
. not as a man who had winked at corruption, but as a premier whose 
colleagues had fallen out among themselves, and whom he had, reluctantly, 
to abandon. The 'Three Musketeers' as they were called had not made their 
objections to the Logan contract public, out of loyalty to Rhodes. Rhodes 
had managed to make them look like petty squabblers instead of men of 
principle. 
After this change in the ministry, Rhodes tried to buy off the 
Opposition. He offered Innes a judicial appointment, wanted to send 
Merriman to London as the agent-general of the colony, and had tried to 
persuade Sauer to remain in his cabinet. Sauer declined. While there was 
now more debating talent on the Opposition benches, Rhodes's position was 
not materially threatened. 
In the early part of 1894 there was a general election. The Bond 
won 35 of the 76 seats in the House of Assembly,58 not a majority in 
58 Davenport Afrikaner p 309. 
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itself, but with support from Rhodes's personal adherents the ministry 
had a comfortable majority. The Opposition did not oppose on every issue; 
Innes estimated the hard co re of the Opposition at no more than fifteen 
member s. 59 
Rhodes's "c onstituency" then was the Afrikaner Bond, i.e. the 
agricultural interest of the colony. He had to be seen to be doing what 
they wanted. There was of course give and take. Rhodes was not wholly 
reliant on the Bond, and his every action did not have to have their 
approval, but in general the Bond was his power-base. 
It has been pointed out that the first inquiries into the Glen 
Grey district were carried out at the request of the Bond. The interest 
of the Bond congresses in making Glen Grey land available for white 
purchase has been noted. But this was not all that Rhodes did for his 
supporters. He maintained the protective tariff on agricultural produce. 
He offered them land in Rhodesia. In 1893 he set up a ministry of 
agriculture at their request. He appointed the Labour Commission of 1893-
4 to see to the labour needs of the agricultural interest in particular. 
The Glen Grey Act was another instalment of policy intended to benefit 
the farmers. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that Rhodes sometimes gave his 
supporter what they needed rather than what they wanted. He was not 
simply a cynical politician buying support. He had ideas about the 
economic development of Southern Africa, and believed that agriculture 
had to be fostered to achieve that development. Secondary industry was 
not yet a realistic proposition . For that reason he brought in the Scab 
Act in 1894, despite the opposition of some of his own supporters. 
The Scab Act was intended to suppress the scab insect, which 
gave sheep a disease that reduced the value of the Cape's wool clip. Th 
Act was very unpopular with certain farmers, and many of the Bond MLAs 
voted against it at successive divisions. They succeeded in having the 
Bill much watered down. Their opposition to the measure was based on a 
59 ' ••• There are nine or ten members who will always go solid with us. By 
'us' I mean Merriman and myself. That is a moderate computation and 
includes only those about whom there is no doubt.' James Rose Innes Sir 
James Rose Innes: selected correspondence (1884-1902) Edited by Harrison 
M. Wright. Cape Town: the Van Riebeeck Society, 1972. Page Ill. 
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reluctance to being regulated by the state, even when there were greater 
profits to be made. Religious belief also played a part: some of the 
farmers genuinely believed that the scab insect was a plague sent by God, 
and that to attempt its eradication was an act of impiety. Finally, 
ignorance was a factor: some backwoodsmen really did not know that the 
scab problem was soluble . 
The Glen Grey Act was a measure that gave Rhodes's supporters 
some of what they wanted. It offered them labour, both from Glen Grey 
itself and from the other districts to which it might be applied. But it 
did not give them land, a fact that made some of them threaten to 
withdraw their support from Rhodes. (Rhodes was able to deflect that 
challenge, but it must have given him some concern.) The possibility of 
land for whites at a later date was preserved in the Glen Grey Act, which 
may have helped to mollify the reluctant Bond. 
The Glen Grey Act was devised with Cape interests in mind. 
Rhodes's political position required that he give the Bond a considerable 
part of what they wanted, and as has been shown in chapter three, one of 
the things that they dearly wanted was labour. 
Rhodes himself had drawn attention to the power of the 
agricultural interest in parliament. In 1893 he had introduced a Bill to 
create a new cabinet portfolio, that of secretary of agriculture. This 
was something the Bond wanted, and by giving it to them he was rewarding 
them for their support. Whether having a separate minister of agriculture 
would be useful to the farmers was a moot point; Merriman said "if 
agriculturists thought they were going to get any good out of a Minister 
they were mistaken. ,GO Whether actual advantage flowed from the 
appointment of such a minister is not relevant here. What matters is that 
the influence of the Bond was clearly demonstrated by the appointment. 
Rhodes said 
it was evident the feeling of the country was in favour of this 
additional Minister. They must take the representative institutions, 
the Afrikander Bond and the Farmers' Congress, as representing the 
o·pinion of farmers, and they were 1n favour of the proposition. Gl 
60 DHA 1893 P 116 colI. 
61 DHA 1893 P 115 coIL 
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... some human being in the country should be responsible for the 
politics of the land upon which the prosperity of the country greatly 
depended. 62 
Perhaps most significant of all, the premier remarked that "The wine 
industry again demanded attention. He found that twenty-six members in 
the House represented wine districts. n63 Twenty-six members (in a House 
of seventy-six) representing a single interest is a powerful bloc, be i ng 
30% of the total. This does not take into account the other farming 
interests represented in the House of Assembly. 
It must also be borne in mind that Rhodes was intending to 
travel to London later in the year to negotiate for the administration of 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate. As he had remarked in 1893 when the post 
of secretary of native affairs was combined with that of prime minister 
"there was a considerable section of the population, not only here but at 
Home, who watched the course of policy with reference to the natives " .64 
It would stand him in good stead to have a piece of "native' policy 
enacted that would appear just and progressive. That would reassure the 
Colonial Office and the British humanitarians that he was to be trusted 
with the administration of Bechuanaland, which he wanted to obtain for 
the Chartered Company.65 It is interesting in this regard that Rhodes's 
speech in the second reading debate was seen at the time as considerably 
more enlightened than the Act itself. Sauer said 'there was a very 
considerable difference between the speech of his han. friend and the 
Bill.,66 William Hay, MLA for Victoria East, said he 'was going to vote 
for the second reading of the Prime Minister's speech (laughter) not for 
his Bil l, because that was not in accord with the speech.,67 
Another consideration that historians have emphasised is 
62 DHA 1893 P 217 col 1-
63 DHA 1893 P 115 col 2. 
64 DHA 1893 P 218 cols 1-2. 
65 Lord Ripon, the secretary of state for the colonies in the Liberal 
government of 1892-5, wrote to the prime minister, Lord Rosebery, as 
follows: "I told Rhodes when I last saw him [in late 1894] that I did not 
think that the moment for giving the Protect. to his Co. had yet arrived, 
and while I admitted that it must ultimately go to them, I declined to 
give any pledge as to t he date of the change .... I think that we want 
somewhat more experience of the way in which the Co. manages the natives 
under its administration .... ' Anthony Denholm Lord Ripon 1827-1909: a 
political biography London: Croom Helm, c. 1982. Pages 213-4. 
66 DHA 1894 P 380 col 1. 
67 DHA 1894 P 383 col 2. 
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Rhodes's desire f or the federation of the southern African states and 
colonies, which could better be achieved with a Cape "native " policy more 
in line with that of the other states: hence the assault on the non-
racia l franchise contained in the Act. 68 Rhodes had made known his 
desire for f edera tion , and his opinion of the Cape franchise, a s early as 
1887 when Sprigg's Registration of Parliamentary Voters Act was being 
debated. D. P. Faure, a contemporary of Rhodes and minister of the Free 
Protestant Church of Cape Town, and sometime editor of the Volksblad, 
recorded his opinion in his memoirs: 
and as to Mr . Rhodes, I lost all confidence in him as a politician 
when he declared in the House of Assembly, in 1887, that if 
Confedera t ion wa s ever to become an accomplished fact, the Cape 
should as s imilate its Native Policy to that of the Transvaal, for the 
latter would never consent to confederate with a Colony in which 
Natives had the right to vote. 69 
Local Cape politics and broader southern African considerations 
played their part in the enactment of the Glen Grey Bill, but the 
Transvaal gold mines were not a direct concern. 
(iii) Rhodes's haste over the Glen Grey Bill 
Numerous writers have pointed out that Rhodes was in a hurry over the 
Glen Grey Bill and was impatient of opposition. 70 Lewsen notes that he 
had been "inordinately patient" with the Bond over the Scab Act earlier 
in the session, but now showed the 'arbitrary, dictatorial side of his 
nature by refusing to permit full discussion of the highly important Glen 
Grey Bill " and by rushing the committee stage through the House in one 
day.7l His resolve to have the Bill enacted speedily seems to have 
68 John Marlowe Cec il Rhodes: the anatomy of empire London: Elek, 1972 . 
Page 196 . 
69 D. P. Faure My life and times Cape Town: Juta, 1907. Page 101. 
70 Innes Autobiography pp 105-6; S. J. Jenkins The administration of 
Cecil John Rhodes as prime minister of the Cape Colony (1890-1896) M.A . 
thesis, University of Cape Town, 1951. Page 101; Lewsen Merriman p 170; 
Brian Roberts Cecil Rhodes : flawed Colossus London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1987. Page 193; Rotberg Founder p 473 . 
71 Lewsen Merriman p 170. In fact the Bill was in committee on two days, 
Friday 3 and Monday 6 August. The latter was the famous all-night 
sitting, which ended at 7.15 a.m . on Tuesday 7. (See . DHA 1894 pp 423 col 
2, 425 col 2, 432 colI , 444 colI.) 
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hardened at the end of July 1894 . On Thursday 26 July, while envisaging 
that the Bill might not pass through all its stages in that session, he 
announced that if the se cond reading had been completed he would apply 
parts of the Bill by proclamation to Fingoland. 72 By Monday 30 July he 
had decided that the Bill had to be enacted before the end of the 
session. This emerged when Innes said that he intended to suggest that 
'the Bill lie before the country for a year. .. 7] Rhodes replied that" the 
question could not wait. It was the intention of the Government to keep 
the House sitting until the Bill was passed.,7. 
While Rhodes was always impatient, his methods of trying to 
dispose of opposition seem to have changed from the conciliatory to the 
dictatorial. The transition is difficult to understand except on the 
hypothesis that the Bond had brought pressure to bear on him. His 
attitude changed in regard to the question of the district councils and 
that of compensation for the loss of liquor licences . 
Speaking t owards the .end of the second reading debate, Rhodes 
indicated that he would agree to Innes's proposal that the approval of 
the district council as well as that of the governor be required for 
title-holder's under the Glen Grey system to be allowed to sell their 
land. 75 The premier also said that he would leave the House to decide 
whether or not compensation should be paid for the liquor licences that 
the district council would have the power to terminate. 'It would be for 
the House to consider whether these people should be compensated at all, 
and he had merely shown them that if they desired to pay compensation 
the r e were funds available for that purpose. ,76 The following day, just 
before the House went into committee on the Bill, Rhodes said that the 
government would accept Sauer's proposal that the district council be 
elected rather than appointed; that the government 'would offer no 
objection' to the opposition pressing its point that no compensation 
should be paid for cancelled liquor licences; and that he himself had no 
objection to the approval of the council being required for the 
alienation of lots. 
72 OHA 1894 P 363 col 2. 73 OHA 1894 P 392 col 2 (Monday 30 July 1894). ,. ibid. 
75 OHA 1894 P 419 col 2 (Thursday 2 August 1894). 
76 OHA 1894 pp 419-420. 
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"He f ound, however, that this wou l d lead to considerable dis cu s sion 
and opposition . His de s ire wa s to see the Bi l l pass through and 
bec ome l aw. Therefore he expre ss ed the hope that the Opposition would 
not pre s s that point . .. . [I]t woul d l ead to discussion and then he 
could not hope for the pa s sa ge o f t he Bill . " 
Jenkins holds that there had been a c aucus meeting in the interval a t 
which Rhodes had been forced t o move away from allowing any extra 
protection for Glen Grey land, and he c ites a speech made by Innes and 
reported in the Cape Times the foll owing year . '8 A comment of Sauer in 
the House corroborates Jenkin s 's view: 
Mr SAUER said he was obliged to say that was one of the most 
extraordinary statements ever made by a Minister. It simply meant the 
hon . gentleman had received his o rde rs and taken them -- they were 
marching orders ... . He [Rhodes] t old the House he wanted no 
discussion. If they were to come there and simply register what had 
been done in a caucus or in the lobby, then for God's sake let them 
go home . (Hear, hear.) It was an insult to that House to tell them to 
come and pass a measure "to sit in judgment on Africa" without any 
discussion ~ 79 
Sauer believed, probably correctly, that Rhodes was doing what the Bond 
wanted him to do and had no choi ce in the matter. It seems a reas ona bl e 
inferenc e that the Bond caucus told Rhodes that they would oppose the 
proposal t o give the distri c t c ouncil the right to forbid the sale of 
land, because this stipulation would diminish the possibility of whites 
being able to buy land in Glen Grey itself or in any district to which 
the Ac t was applied. If this is in fa c t so, Rhodes was clearly in an 
embarrassing position as he had to withdraw what he had conceded to the 
opposition in regard to the c onsent of the district council. Prolonged 
discussion would expose more clearly that he had reneged on his 
undertaking, and this was probably one reason why Rhodes sought to thwart 
dis c ussion and shorten debate. 
Rhodes's dilemma over the issue of whether or not Glen Grey land 
should be available for purchase by whites went beyond dealing with the 
opposition of dissident MLAs in the House of Assembly. The Glen Grey Act 
would require the assent of the sec retary of state for the colonies of 
the Libe ral government, Lord Ripon. That government, precariously pla ced 
77 DHA 1894 P 424 colI (Friday 3 August) . 
78 Jenkin s Administration p 100 n 115. The reference is to the Cape Times 
29 January 1895 p 7 "Politi c s a t Mowbray". 
~ DHA 18 94 P 424 cols 1-2. 
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in the British parliament, would not wish to offend humanitarian 
supporters. Rhodes needed to show them that there would be no danger to 
black possession of land in areas which came under the Act. At the same 
time he needed to convince his Bond supporters that the door to white 
acquisition of land in Glen Grey was not quite closed . His solution was 
to leave it to the governor to decide whether or not such land could be 
sold to whites. It was known and accepted among Cape politicians that in 
time to come a cabinet might advise the governor to permit such sales. 8o 
At the same time the need for the governor's consent could be represented 
as a safeguard for black possession of land, a point which Rhodes re-
inforced by emphasising his personal opposition to white purchase in Glen 
Grey areas. 
The Glen Grey Bill received the governor's assent on 15 August 
1894. The next day W. H. Milton. the secretary to the prime minister, 
wrote to the undersecretary for agriculture and to the under colonial 
secretary81 that the prime minister wanted the Act to come into force at 
once and "immediate steps taken for survey.n82 A letter of 20 August to 
the chief magistrate of Tembuland and the Transkei shows that Cape Town 
and Umtata had been in touch on the 16th by telegram on the subject of 
establishing district councils in Tsomo, Nqamakwe, Butterworth and 
Idutywa [i . e. Fingoland].83 It is true that the practical difficulties 
of carrying out a survey made the whole process a lengthy one: but Rhodes 
nevertheless set things in train as soon as he could. 
District councils were set up in Fingoland in terms of the Act 
80 Cape Times editorials of 13 July 1894 P 4; 16 July 1894 P 4; 28 July 
1894 P 2. See also DHA 1894 P 380 colI (" ... last session the Treasurer-
General [Sir Gordon Sprigg] stated that what he wanted was that there 
should be no conditions attached to the land at all as regards 
alienation.) and 468 colI (" ... so long as the present Premier advised 
the Governor there was no fear that these land would pass out of the 
hands of the natives. But political changes might happen . .. and if they 
had a Premi~r like the member for East Griqualand [Sir James Sivewright]. 
it was quite possible that the opposite view would be taken.) 
81 The "under colonial secretary" was the permanent official at the head 
of the Cape's Colonial Office, or ministry of the interior. The depart-
ment's minister was known as the "colonial secretary". To avoid 
confusion, the British minister for colonies has been referred to 
through-out as the "secretary of state for the colonies". 
82 CA PMO 381 16 August 1894. 
83 CA PMO 381 20 August 1894. 
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(even before there was one in Glen Grey itself84 ) by Proclamation 352 of 
4 October 1894 . The land tenure provisions were not applied yet: it was 
intended to wait until the district councils recommended individual 
tenure . 85 
(iv) The opposition to the Bill: 
the Cape 'l i berals' in and out of parliament 
It is a truism to say that liberalism is a word that resists precise 
definition. In different times and places it has had different meanings, 
and even liberals who were contemporaries of one another have had 
different ideas of what liberalism was. An eighteenth century liberal 
such as Adam Smith would find little in common with a modern liberal in 
the United States ; the liberals there today are the party of "Big 
Government", not the night-watchman state. Modern free-marketeers in the 
western world have taken to calling themselves libertarians to 
distinguish themselves from liberals . At the present time dissident 
members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are referred to as 
liberals. W. E. Gladstone, the greatest Liberal prime minister of the 
United Kingdom, was a different kind of liberal from John Stuart Mill, 
the best known philosopher of nineteenth century British liberalism. 
Marxist writers often use liberal as a term of abuse, synonymous with 
bourgeois, and see liberalism as a merely bourgeois ideology. 
Given such intellectual difficulties of definition, it is 
proposed here to cut the Gordian knot. In the present context "liberals" 
are those who were known at the time as "the friends of the native ll • 
When writing about liberals at the Cape one has to deal with 
some controversy over the "Cape liberal tradition". The Cape had certain 
liberal institutions, most notably a non-racial franchise . But the 
liberals of the Cape were, certainly by the time of responsible 
84 W.J.G. Mears A study in native administration. The Transkeian 
Territories 1894-1943 D.Litt. thesis, University of South Africa, 1947 . 
Page 38. 
85 DHA 1894 P 363 col 2 " . .. he should apply most of these clauses to 
Fingoland. He would not give the natives individual title until the 
District Council recommended . .. " 
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government in 1872, in a minority. From the first there was a repressive 
movement among the colonial legislators against black persons. Therefore 
to speak of the nCape liberal tradition" is a mistake, unless one 
concedes that it was a minority tradition. 86 Certainly it is an error to 
denigrate the Cape liberal tradition as Bundy and Lacey do by pointing to 
the illiberal legislation enacted there and saying that therefore 
liberalism is really just another form of oppression. B7 Those 
responsible for illiberal legislation would not have described themselves 
as friends of the natives. They would have (and did) distinguish 
themselves from MLAs like Saul Solomon and James Rose Innes. The present 
thesis describes the fight of the liberals (however confused, paternalist 
or ambivalent they may have been) against an important piece of anti-
black legislation. 
There is also the problem of terminology. Professor Edgar 
Brookes may have been the first to use the expression 'Cape liberal 
tradition" in the 1920s; certainly Professor Alfred Hoernle used the term 
in the 1930s. But there was little mention made of liberals or liberalism 
at the Cape even as late as 1894. James Rose Innes uses the term liberal 
in his memoirs, but did not use it in the debate on the Glen Grey Act, 
and neither did the government. John X. Merriman had apparently used the 
term when proposing the founding of a Liberal Party in 1886,BB but the 
proposal had come to nothing. It was only in 1904 that Merriman founded 
the Cape Liberal Association. 
B6 See for example Olive Schreiner and S. C. Cronwright-Schreiner The 
political situation London: Unwin, 1896. Pages 86-87. 'Small but united, 
there was a Progressive Party of which no advanced European people need 
have been ashamed. From the days of Pringle and Fairbairn to the days of 
Sir George Grey and Saul Solomon, not only was South Africa not wanting 
in liberal and advanced individuals, but these men had their influential 
following . " (Emphasis added.) Lewsen emphasises the small number of 
liberals in parliament during the second Rhodes ministry in Merriman p 
169. James Rose Innes refers to "the little knot of Liberals who composed 
the official Opposition" in the session of 1896 in his Autobiography p 
138. 
87 "[T]he institution of individual tenure would offer to 'barbarians' 
those very habits of industry and civilization long praised by the 
liberal tradition". Colin Bundy The rise and fall of the South African 
peasantry London: Heinemann, 1979. Page 135. (See also pp 78-9.) "Rhodes 
in the 'liberal Cape' had pushed through his far-reaching 'Bill for 
Africa' with its provisions for segregating Africans in demarcated 
reserves and its added proviso of uneconomic individual allotments.' 
Marian Lacey Working for boroko: the origins of a coercive labour system 
in South Africa Johannesburg: Ravan, 1981. Page 16. 
BB Lewsen Merriman p 129. 
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Nevertheless the term liberal is a useful one, and has been used 
by such historians as Lewsen, Davenport, Wright and Rotberg. 89 Lewsen 
has pointed out the shortcomings, ambiguities and paternalism of Cape 
liberalism in general. 9o In particular she has noted that James Rose 
Innes was more consistently libera1 91 than was John X. Merriman, whose 
views moderated over the years. Merriman had, in 1869. on his second day 
in parliament proposed an unsucce~ul amendment to make flogging a 
punishment under the Masters and Servants Act. 92 In 1876 he criticised 
the historian J . A. Froude, then touring South Africa to drum up support 
for Carnarvon's federation scheme, for saying that South African 
"natives" should be treated as the aboriginal people of Canada and 
Australia were, which John X. said meant to "improve them off the face of 
the Earthl 1".93 By 1894 his views had changed to the extent that his 
speech on the Glen Grey Bill wiped out his previous ambivalence on racial 
matters. 94 
Cape liberalism was never a coherent body of opinion. Merriman 
is known today as a liberal, but not because of his application of 
stringent economy in public finance, which would have been a good reason 
to regard him as a liberal. Jan Smuts teased Merriman with being a Tory 
when Merrimam suggested that Smuts's policy of "manhood suffrage" for 
whites was a mistake because "the poor white will be as venal as any 
Native. ,,95 The essential core of Cape liberalism was a defence of the 
non-racial franchise. It is that defence of the non-racial franchise more 
than anything else which marks out the liberals as "friends of the 
native", which is why the two expressions are used synonymously in the 
present work. The MLAs who are identified in this thesis as liberals are 
William Bisset Berry, William Hay, Charles Hutton, James Rose Innes, John 
89 See the bibliography. 
90 Phyllis Lewsen "The Cape liberal tradition -- myth or reality?" Race 
XIII(l) July 1971 pp 65-80. "Cape liberalism in its terminal phase" in D. 
C. Hindson (ed.) Working papers in Southern African studies, volume III, 
Johannesburg: Ravan, 1983. Pages 33-50. 
91 Lewsen Merriman p 149. 
92 ibid P 26. 
93 ibid P 55. 
" ibid P 17l. 
95 Jan Smuts Selections from the Smuts papers volume two, June 1902-May 
1910. Edited by W. K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel. Cambridge: the 
University Press, 1966. Pages 241-2. See also p 526 where Smuts, 
expecting Merriman to object to "equal voters' areas and automatic 
redistribution", made the same teasing charge: "such an old-fashioned 
Tory. II 
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X. Merriman, John Charles Molteno, and Herbert Travers Tamplin. Joseph 
Millerd Orpen might have fallen into this category, but he voted for the 
third reading of the Act. 
(v) The debate on the Act 
The Cape Times of Wednesday 11 July 1894 made the following wry comment 
in its political column: 
The Grey Cat is to come out of the bag on Friday. Mr. Rhodes will ask 
leave on that day to introduce a Bill to provide for the disposal of 
lands and the administration of affairs in Glen Grey and other 
proclaimed dist r icts. That administration of affairs is a blanket 
that can be stretched to cover almost anything. 96 
The Cape Times was r eferring to the Glen Grey l egislation promised in the 
speech from the throne at the opening of the parliamentary session of 
1894, which was at l ast about to appear.97 That speech had been made on 
17 May, nearly two months earlier. Since the members of parliament were 
only paid an attendance allowance for ninety days, the sessions were 
seldom more than three months long. Here was an important Bill, on which 
considerable debate could be expected, being introduced nearly two months 
into a three month session. The point is not only that the Bill was being 
discussed late in the session, with the budget (a crucial and time-
consuming procedure) stil l to be delivered, but also that the Bill was 
being made avai l abl e to the legislators for the firs t time only now. 
The Cape Times was not at this stage highly supportive of 
Rhodes. The imperialist Edmund Garrett did not become editor until mid-
1895. 98 A string of critical editorials followed its comment of 11 July. 
The lateness of the Glen Grey Bill's introduction was at first remarked 
upon99 and later severely criticised. IOO The editorial opposition to 
the Act grew over time, but from the very first the paper pointed out 
96 "Notes in the House" p 5. In fact the Glen Grey Bill was introduced a 
day earlier, on Thursday 12 August 1894. 
97 DHA 1894 P 4 colI. 
98 Edmund Garrett The Garrett Papers edited by Gerald Shaw. Cape Town: 
the Van Riebeeck Society, 1984. Pages 15-18. 
99 Cape Times 13 July 1894 editorial p 4. 
100 Cape Times 3 August 1894 editorial p 4. 
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that alienation of land in Glen Geey being peemitted subject to the 
goveenoe's consent could lead to that land being taken ovee by white 
speculators. lOI The Cape Times was quick to provide a summary of the 
measuee lOZ and criticism of it. The Bill had only been in print foe a 
day when the newpapee said of the laboue tax as it applied to lot-
holdees: 'We have heard of a tax on absentees; but a tax on staying at 
home is a novelty ... ,,103 The idea of taxing the idle was not much 
resented, even by those opposed to Rhodes, but taxing landed peoprietoes, 
be they never so humble, was anathema to the Victorians. 
The week aftee the Bill made its first appearance, the Cape 
Times published a longer and more detailed criticism. The editor refereed 
to a remark that Rhodes had apparently made with respect to blacks in the 
Cape Colony: 'No liquor, no vote.,104 What Rhodes meant by this was 
what Die Afrikaanse Patriot [see p 134] meant too: prohibiting the sale 
of Uwhite man's liquorn to blacks Itwas to deny recognition of 
adulthood,105 and therefore to deny entitlement to the vote. There was 
a great deal of opinion in favour of some restriction to protect blacks 
from the serious harmful effects of liquor, particularly distilled 
liquor. Those in favour of restrictions often also supported the Cape's 
non-racial franchise. James Rose Innes, a leading liberal, had proposed 
just such a restriction in the Liquor Law Amendment Bill in committee in 
the House on Wednesday 11 July.106 
On the other side of the question were those who wanted a colour 
bar franchise. These tended to be also attached to the considerable 
liquor interest in the colony. To these people, many of whom were 
eepresented by the Afrikaner Bond, it seemed that the liberals wanted to 
101 13 July 1894 editorial p 4. 
102 13 July 1894 "The Glen Grey Bill' P 4. This summary appeared on the 
same day as the Bill was published in the Government Gazette. 
103 14 July 1894 editorial. 
104 Cape Times Monday 16 July 1894 editorial p 4. The paper provides no 
reference to the occasion of Rhodes first making this utterance, and the 
present writer has been unable to trace it, but the remark was fairly 
well known in the Cape at the time. 
105 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: a modern history (Johannesburg: 
Macmillan, third edition, 1987.) Page 120. 
106 Cape Times 12 July 1894 'House of Assembly' p 7. Rhodes had asked him 
to withdraw his motion until he saw 'what was in the Native Bill, There 
weee clauses eelating to liquoe.' Those clauses included eequieing the 
district council to pay compensation for any liquor licences they might 
cancel. 
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have their cake and eat it : they wanted to pr otect their native voters 
fr om drink, but they also wanted those voters to remain enfranchised. The 
re pres s ionists , 107 argument was not i ll ogical. A man who needed to be 
prot ec ted from liquor by special legislation (because he could not make a 
ra t ional choice in the matter of liquor for himself) could not in al l 
respects be regarded as an adult. Why then should he be entitled to vote? 
And why should the predominantly Afrikaans liquor interest be penalised 
firstly by having its market restricted by such differential laws and 
secondly by the enfranchisement of a class of persons known to be 
antagonistic to Afrikaners? The Bond argued that no liquor should mean no 
vote, and Rhodes had aphoristically expressed their feelings. 
The Cape Times further criticis ed the Bill for its 
disenfranchising effect l08 and especially for the legal fiction by 
which it was achieved - - treating land held on individual tenure in terms 
of the Act as if it were communally held . 100 The paper was doubtful 
whether the local option provisions would be effective in stamping out 
liquor, with government nominees on the licens ing court. The Cape Times 
was in favour of compensation being paid for cancelled liquor licences 
generally, but said that it was unfair to require blacks to pay such 
compensation when no one else had t o. The leading article concluded by 
saying that the Bill did not so much provide for 'No liquor, no vote' as 
"No vote, and liquor at discretion." 
When the Cape Times adverted to the liquor question again in a 
later issue the editorial noted that blacks had often said that they did 
not want the "curse of liquor" spread among them. 110 In 1893 William 
Hay had presented to the House a petition 'from a meeting of 1,518 
natives, at which a resolution was pas s ed that the Government should be 
107 Liberals referred to their opponent s as 'repressionists '. The non-
liberals used 'negrophilist" as a term of abuse, of the more enlightened 
liberals at least. The more conse r va tive liberals escaped that parti cular 
epithet. 
108 Cape Times Monday 16 July 1894 editorial p 4 . 
109 Land held on communal tenure had cea sed to count as a qualification 
for the franchise since Sir Gordon Sprigg 's Registration of Vote rs Act , 
1887. The purpose of removing communal land from qualification was to 
disenfranchise the 'blanket Kaffir", i. e. those blacks who had not become 
assimilated to European culture. Many white voters feared that since so 
many unacculturated blacks had been included in the colony by the 
annexation of the Transkei they would be outnumbered ('swamped') by the 
flBlanket vote." 
110 Cape Times 28 July 1894 editorial p 2. 
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requested to stop the sale of brandy to natives."lll Examples of 
similar petitipns to parliament from black people could be easily found. 
How representative they were, what the social class of those who held 
such views was, and how these attitudes related to education and 
Christianity have not been considered here. All that can be said in the 
present work is that a not insignificant number of Cape blacks were 
opposed to liquor; the opposition to selling liquor to blacks did not 
come from white paternalists alone. 
On the subject of the temperance movement among whites no 
detailed investigation has been attempted here. It seems clear however 
that there was a fairly significant temperance movement among whites. A 
"united temperance demonstration" was held in Cape Town on 9 August 1894. 
Among the organisations present were the Salvation Army, the Young 
Women's Temperance Union, the Good Templars, the True Templars,112 the 
Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Rechabites . 113 The singing 
was led by the YMCA string band, and the meeting was addressed by Miss 
Jessie Ackerman, apparently an American temperance enthusiast . Chairing 
the meeting was one Alexander Wilmot, MLC for the South-East Province, 
who said that the appointment of the 1890 Liquor Commission and the 
passing of James Rose Innes's Liquor Amendment Act, which gave local 
option, were two of the movement's greatest achievements. 114 
Turning to other aspects of the Bill, we find that the Cape 
Times saw it as a labour measure which flowed from the Labour Commission 
of 1893-4. This, as well as the paper's unease about Rhodes's second 
reading debate speech not being in harmony with his Bill, can be seen in 
the following quote: 
111 DHA 1893 P 101 col 2. 
112 One of these was a black organisation. Ngcongco describes John Tengo 
Jabavu encouraging black Templars to register as voters. Leonard Ngcongco 
Imvo Zabantsundu and Cape :native" policy 1884-1902 M.A . thesis, 
University of South Africa, 1974. Page 82 . 
113 The Rechabites were named after a group of Israelites who for 
religious reasons clung tenaciously to a nomadic way of life even after 
most of their countrymen had settled in Canaan. The Rechabites pledged 
not to drink wine, own vineyards, till the soil, or build houses. They 
lived in tents as their ancestors had done. William J. McDonald, et al. 
(eds.) The new catholic encyclopedia Washington, D.C.: the Catholic 
University of America, 1967, reprinted 1981. Vol 12, p 127. 
114 Cape Times 6 August 1894 "The News of the Day" p 5; and 10 August 1894 
"Temperance Meeting" p 5. 
113 
If there are points at which the Glen Grey Bill seems to be neither 
in complete touch with the recommendations of the Labour Commission. 
nor even adapted to the end avowed by Mr . Rhodes himself, it is at 
least entitled to the credit of a resolute attempt to deal with a 
question which has been too long left to the shaping of chance and 
circumstances . 115 
It is possible that the editor was simply following Rhodes's lead in 
ascribing the origins of the Act to the recommendations of the 
commission, as Rhodes had said that the Bill contained ten 
recommendations of the Labour Commission. 116 There were fewer 
similarities between the Glen Grey Act and the commission's report than 
Rhodes claimed. The prime minister's apparent disingenuousness may have 
been an attempt to give his measure the greater prestige that would 
accrue from association with the considered findings of the Labour 
Cormnission. 117 
Whether the Bill was inspired by the commission or not, it is 
clear that contemporaries associated "native' affairs with the labour 
question. The Cape Times went on to note a close connection between the 
Bill and the labour needs of the Western Cape farmers in particular (and 
to demonstrate some unease about the number of blacks in the Western 
Province) : 
For if the Labour reservoirs of the Transkeian territories are to be 
freely tapped for the use of Western agriculture, it would be only 
prudent to provide a continuous . . . reinforcement of the industrious 
white element, lest the ethnic chart of the country should become 
more darkly hued than is good for us. us 
The paper's editor was not alone in his view of the labour implications 
of the Act. Richard Rose Innes, brother of James and editor of the Cape 
Mercury at King Williamstown, thought so too. He wrote a pamphlet on the 
Act in which he said that 
Mr. Rhodes was kept in power by the support of the Bond members who 
voted solid for the measure ... on account of the 'labour tax' which 
ItS Cape Times 28 July 1894 editorial p 2. 
116 DHA 1894 pp 368 col 2 and 381 col 2. 
117 Commissions had a certain reputation for sound judgement in the 
colony, although the Cape Times found the Labour Commission's report a 
less useful document than the Barry Commission Report on Native Laws and 
Customs of 1883. (Cape Times 18 July 1894 p 2). 
liS 28 July 1894 editorial p 2. 
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was a prov~s~on after their own heart, and one which they fondly 
believed would drive the Native from his locations, westwards. The 
brandy-making farmers crying aloud for cheap labour rose in a body 
and blessed the Bill .... 119 
Richard Rose Innes was, unlike his brother, an enthusiastic supporter of 
the Bill, as a reading of his pamphlet will confirm. 
It was possible for a supporter of the Bill, such as R. W. Rose 
Innes, to agree with a fierce opponent of it, such as J. J. Kelly, that 
one of its objects was labour for the Western Cape farming interest. 
Kelly was a law agent in the Queenstown district who represented several 
Glen Grey people in their law suits for more land under the Act. He wrote 
a series of letters to the Queenstown Free Press and the Cape Times. He 
wrote on 6 August 1894 as follows: 
The Bill may secure labour to the western farmer, who as Sir Henry 
Stockenstrom in his speech on the Labour Commission Report says, 
forcers) liquor on natives as wages. It may secure herds to the sheep 
farmers of the [K)arroo, and may be the means of lowering the cost of 
labour in the Kimberley mines, but more surely it will ruin the 
natives of the district. 'W 
Although Kelly includes mining in his criticism of the Act, the likely 
beneficiaries he mentions are all Cape Colony interests. 
Another contemporary observer was Dr Jane Waterston. She was the 
first South African woman to qualify as a doctor and was interested in 
missionary work. Waters ton was present in the public gallery during the 
whole of the all-night sitting on the Bill.'2' Her account is very 
emotional, but she too believed that Rhodes's policy was for the benefit 
of the farming interest: "we are given over to the Devil and the 
Bond. It 122 
The above views all emphasise the importance of the Western Cape 
119 R. W. Rose-Innes, The Glen Grey Act and the Native Question Lovedale: 
the Mission Press, 1903. Page 13. 
120 J.J Kelly Act 25. of 1894. as aoolied and its probable conseguences 
for the natives of the district of Glen Grey (No publication details --
Cory Library Ms 17102.) Page 6. 
121 Cape Times 8 August 1894 "Notes in the House'. 
122 Jane Waterston The letters of Jane Elizabeth Waterston edited by Lucy 
Bean and Elizabeth van Heyningen. Cape Town: the Van Riebeeck Society, 
1983. Page 233. 
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agricultural interest. Olive Schreiner and her husband S. C. Cronwright 
Schreiner were two contemporaries who took a somewhat different view. 
They collaborated on a paper on the South African political situation in 
July and August 1895, which Olive mentioned in a letter of 27 July 1895 
to Edward Carpenter, an English socialist, as follows: 
Cron and I are preparing a paper he is to read in the Town on 'the 
political situation'. Of course, it's anti-Rhodes and anti-
capitalist. The Political Association are going to reprint it, and 
distribute it allover the country. 
The editor of Schreiner's letters has made the following comment on the 
above extract: 
The paper, which Cron read in Kimberly Town Hall on 20 August 1895, 
argued that 'Rhodes was using the Bond in the Capitalist interest and 
keeping it together mainly by retrogressive legislation on the Native 
Question, that he was deceiving that powerful organization and would 
throw it aside as soon as it had served his purpose.,IZ3 
For the Schreiners, the capitalist interest meant the mining interest. 
The couple provided a contemporary anticipation of the kind of argument 
that Cooper was to put forward in 1979: mining capital was hegemonic in 
that its interests were promoted above, but not to the complete exclusion 
of, other capitalist interests. 
The weight of contemporary evidence, however, suggests that the 
Schreiners' emphasis on the mining interest is misleading. The primary 
concern of Rhodes and his supporters in enacting the Glen Grey measure 
was the labour needs of the Western Cape. Even if one ignores the 
emphasis in much contemporary opinion on the expected westward flow of 
labour from Glen Grey, the fact remains that the Glen Grey Act had to 
pass the Cape House of Assembly. It simply could not have obtained the 
support of a majority in that House, dominated as it was by the Afrikaner 
Bond, concerned as it had been over the colony's labour supply for 
several years, if there had been any expectation that the Act would push 
labour out of the colony. 
123 Olive Schreiner Olive Schreiner: Letters 1871-99 edited by Richard 
Rive. Cape Town: David Philip, 1987. Page 255 for letter and note . 
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* * * * * 
The passage of the Bill through parliament is of interest for two 
reasons . Fi rstly it was introduced lat e in the session, for reasons that 
are not clear but may have to do with a delay in drafting, or may have to 
do with Rhodes's desire to curtail debate: the less said by the 
Opposition, the more likely that Rhodes's description of the Bill would 
be the one accepted by the public, in the colony and in Britain. 
Secondly, it did not pass as smoothly as Rhodes would have liked, which 
shows that Rhodes's association with the Bond, while crucial, was also 
vulnerable. 
The Bill was read a first time on Thursday 12 July (rather than 
Friday 13 as the Cape Times had expected) and it was published in a 
supplement to the Government Gazette the next day. On 26 July the second 
reading debate was commenced, which was continued on 30 July and 2 
August. On the 2nd Rhodes said that he would meet certain of the 
Opposition's requests over the Bill.124 Thus re-assured, the House 
voted for the measure by 62 votes to three. Merriman Innes and Sauer were 
among that majority. Those voting against were Hay and Tamplin, the 
members for Victoria East, and John Charles Molteno (Jun.), MLA for 
Tembuland . 125 Victoria East had a considerable number of black voters 
by 1894 . Tembuland was at the time a single-member constituency, but by 
virtue of its geographical location an important barometer of black 
opinion. These three men were voting in accordance with the views of the 
black voters of the Cape Colony. 
During the second reading debate Rhodes claimed that the Glen 
Grey Bill was lIa native Bill for Africa. " 126 Merriman criticised him 
for his grandiose pretensions and also for what he termed the 
' sketchiness" of the Bill which Rhodes was rushing through parliament : 
124 District council as well as the governor must approve sale of land; 
Rhodes would not insist on the district council paying compensation f or 
cance lled liquor licences, he would leave it to the House to decide . (DHA 
1894 P 419 col 2). Rhodes: 'There was an almost unanimous feeling that 
with a certain few amendments this was a good Bill, and a right Bill to 
pass. (DHA 1894 P 420 col 1). 
125 DHA 1894 P 420 col 2 (Thursday 2 Augyst) For the members' 
constituencies, see Ralph Kilpin The romance of a colonial parliament 
London : Longmans, 1930. Annexure E. 
126 DHA 1894 P 361 col 2. 
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The Prime Minist er said i t was a Bill f or Africa . That seemed to h im 
to be t he very embodimen t of the radical member of the House of 
Commons who took a scamper through India. and then proposed to bring 
in a Bill by which he wa s going t o settle the whole of our Indian 
possessions. It seemed to him that the Prime Minister had made a 
scamper through the Transkei, he had gained a few ideas. put them in 
a Bill, and thought he was going to settle Africa.!27 
The Opposition dire c ted their attack against three things in 
particular: against legislation by proclamation; against a Bill being 
rushed through without adequate dis cussion ; and against a majority be ing 
ensured by cauc uses and agreements in the lobbies instead of by 
persuasive argument on the floor of the House. Sauer drew attention to 
the first clause of the Bill in which 
the Prime Minister proposed to legislate by proclamation, This was an 
entirely new principle as far as the colony was concerned, and he 
thought it was a dangerous power, and one which he thought the House 
would not be prepared t o grant . By the first clause the Hon. the 
Prime Minister could even legislate by proclamation in some portions 
of the Western Province ... [where] conditions were entirely 
dissimilar ... he had never known that in this colony legislation 
could take place except by both Houses of Parliament. He would be 
sorry to see so new and dangerous a principle sanctioned by the 
House. 128 
Charles Hutton, the liberal MLA for Fort Beaufort, said that legislation 
by proclamation was an "infringement of the principle of representative 
Government. ,0129 Sauer spoke again, suggesting that if the Act were to 
be applied outside Glen Grey, it should be by resolution of both Houses. 
Rhodes proposed as an alternative that the proclamation should be tabled 
in both Houses for a month before coming into force, and that the 
proclamation be published in the Government Gazette for a month before 
being tabled.!30 Merriman suggested that tabling was objectionable, but 
admitted that he had been responsible for adopting the procedure himself. 
"As to legislation by proclamation the only example they had was not an 
encouraging one. It was the Pea ce Preservation Act, and had been by no 
means a happy example. ,d3! Rhodes's alternative of laying the 
127 DHA 1894 P 385 col 1. 
128 DHA 1894 pp 380-1. 
129 DHA 1894 P 426 col 1. 
130 DHA 1894 P 427 col 2. 
13 1 DHA 1894 P 427 col 2 . The Peace Preservation Act of 1878 had led to 
the Gun War with the Sotho of 1880. 
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proclamation on the tables of both Houses prevailed132 , but the dangers 
of giving arbitrary power to the executive had been made clear, 
On the issue of haste, Innes sugges ted that the Bill 'Lie before 
the count ry for a year., 133 Henry Beard , one of the members for Cape 
Town, said t hat without any hostility to the measure he thought the 
'sound constitutional principles of fully debating a subject in the 
House" 134 should not be abandoned. Later he spoke more forcefully: 
He wanted to point out that .. . they might be legislating contrary to 
the views of the natives and the result might be very unfortunate. 
The question could not be exaggerated in its importance, and yet the 
present attempt at solution was to be thrust down their throats at 
the fag end of the session135 
By implication such a proceeding was an affront to the dignity of 
parliament. It is also significant that Beard was aware that they 'might' 
be passing a law which blacks would reject, while not knowing much about 
black opinion . Such a vague uneasiness about the state of 'native' 
opinion is typical of the well-meaning but ill-informed colonist. 
Merriman said that there was a lack of interest in the Bil l 
because it had been settled in the caucus. ' That seemed to him to strike 
at the root of Parliamentary government. 00136 What Merriman referred to 
as a lack of interest was the curious silence of government M.P.s. 
Herbert Tamplin, a liberal M.P. for Victoria West, expostulated 'Was 
there logi c in one side of the House being dumb while members on the 
other side were expected to apologise for speaking on the subject?,137 
Sauer said , "It was an insult to the House to tell them to come and pass a 
measure 'to sit in judgment on Africa ' without any discussion. n138 
Henry Beard expressed surprise that government members who had spoken on 
every sub ject which had been debated up to that point in the session 
were now dumb dogs. It was not reasonable to expect that a gentleman 
like the member for East Griqualand [Sir James Sivewrightj had 
132 The Glen Grey Act, Act 25 of 1894, section 1. To be found in : Cape of 
Good Hope. Statutes, 1894-1898 pp 59-79. 
133 DHA 1894 P 392 col 2 . 
134 DHA 1894 P 416 colI. 
135 DHA 1894 P 434 col 2 . 
136 DHA 1894 P 384 col 2. 
137 DHA 1894 P 416 col 2. 
138 DHA 1894 P 424 col!. 
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nothing to sayan a matter of such importance. 
Sir J. SIVEWRIGHT: He entirely agrees with the Government. 
Mr BEARD said in that case it was the duty of the hon . member to 
support the Government with his arguments as well as with his vote 
D9 
Innes said 'he thought it was very much to be regretted that so important 
a measure as this should be debated only on one side of the House."14D 
He went on to say that caucuses, while necessary at times, 
had been developed of late to an enormous extent, and this session 
they had seen caucuses carried to an extent which was calculated to 
fill those who wished to see free debate on the floor of the House 
with alarm. They saw matters settled out of doors, discussions 
carried on out of doors, and when they came into the House a Bill was 
thrown on the floor of the House and left to be debated from one 
point of view only, without any opportunity ... to reply to anything 
that might be urged on the other side. 14I 
The Cape Times returned to the attack with a leading article 
criticising Rhodes for allowing his backbenchers to waste time with 
trivial speeches earlier in the session. Parliamentary time had been 
wasted, according to the editor, by rambling speeches on "the humming of 
the village bee, or the whine of the captive dog, or the abuse of a 
quarrelsome neighbour . ' But when the Glen Grey Bill came up for 
discussion the "babbling was suddenly restrained n and "a splendid lesson 
was given in parliamentary discipline. not without some detriment to the 
decencies of parliamentary debate. ,0142 Rhodes spoke almost alone for 
the Government side, and the discussion was dominated by the opposition. 
The Government won most of the divisions in the committee stage, and the 
division at the third reading, by sheer force of numbers, not by reasoned 
persuasion. 143 The Times said it was 'monstrous" to pretend that 
Rhodes, who could perform this feat of discipline, was blameless for the 
earlier "confusion and anarchy."l44 
But Rhodes's ability to compel his followers to be silent did 
not mean that he had complete control over the Bond. There are references 
139 DHA 1894 P 434 col 2. 
140 DHA 1894 P 408 col 2. 
141 DHA 1894 P 409 col 2. 
142 Cape Times 3 August 1894 editorial p 4. 
143 "Was there logic in one side of the House being dumb while members on 
the other side were expected to apologise for speaking on the subject?" 
(DHA 1894 P 416 col 2) See also p 408 col 2; p 424 col 1 and p 434 col 2. 
144 Cape Times 3 August 1894 editorial p 4. 
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in the Debates in the House of Assembly and the Cape Times to an 
unsuccesful and short-lived attempt by elements in the Bond to oust 
Rhodes from the premiership and replace him with W. P. Schreiner. The 
Cape Times of 4 August (reporting the events of Friday 3) wrote that 
parliament had been asked "to register the decree of a party' and that 
had caused some anger in the House . This was a reference to Rhodes's 
sudden change of course from agreeing on Thursday 2 August to accept 
certain Opposition amendments to refusing to do so on Friday 3 . Innes 
believed that this sudden change of tack could only be explained by a 
caucus meeting of the Bond (held in the interim) pressuring Rhodes to 
retract his promise, particularly over the protection of Glen Grey land 
from purchase by whites. 145 
Rhodes's refusal to comply with his undertaking caused the anger 
in the House mentioned by the Cape Times; but that anger changed to 
sympathy for Rhodes when it became known -- or at least rumoured that 
a faction within the Bond had tried to oust him: 'a wave of sympathetic 
feeling towards the Premier appeared to have set in. He had been scurvily 
dealt with in the house of his friends; so at least it was said.,146 In 
a separate column the Cape Times carried a slightly fuller but still not 
completely satisfying accoun.t as follows: 
We are informed that the extraordinary cabal, to the existence of 
which Mr. Merriman drew attention in the House of Assembly yesterday 
afternoon, was created with the object of securing a reversion of the 
Premiership to Mr. Schreiner. The moving spirit of the conspiracy is 
said to have been Sir James Sivewright, with whom were associated 
most of the extreme Bond members in the House of Assembly. Venturing 
outside those sacred limits to secure support for the project, the 
moving spirits suffered a rebuff, and the scheme became blown. 147 
Little more emerges from the Cape Hansard. Merriman was the only speaker 
to raise the subject, although the reaction of other MLAs shows that they 
knew what he meant. 
145 
146 
147 
Something had taken place that morning. The Prime Minister had found 
there was a conspiracy of people who were anxious to oust him, and 
they were going to take this Bill in hand, and they were going to pin 
the Prime Minister's nose down to the grindstone .... His foes were 
CaI1e Times 29 January 1895 'Politics at Mowbray' p 7. 
CaI1e Times 4 August 1894 P 4. 
CaI1e Times 4 August 1894 "The News of the Day' p 5. (The news item has 
been reproduced in full.) 
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those of his own house. (Opposition hear, hears.) Who was stabbing 
him? Brutus! Brutus! in the back. (Opposition cheers.) 
Innes in his memoirs describes this as a pointed reference to 
Sivewright. 148 What cannot be discerned is how close to success the 
attempt to oust Rhodes had been. It blew over so fast that the Cape Times 
may have been exaggerating its importance. What the dissident Bond 
members wanted may have been not to oust Rhodes but to bring him into 
line. 
The Monday 6 August edition of the Cape Times referred to the 
plot again, but only to vindicate Schreiner. He was not involved in the 
manoeuvre, and would merely have been the faction's candidate for prime 
minister if they had been succetful. The Times again clearly blamed 
Sivewright .149 
It was on the night of Monday 6 August that the House had its 
famous all-night sitting on the Bill. The Opposition's sympathy for 
Rhodes, aroused by the attempt to oust him, evaporated in the face of his 
continued intransigence. What the Cape Times's parliamentary 
correspondent referred to as the entente cordiale between the prime 
minister and the Opposition was gone. Rhodes had consulted with 'the 
power behind the throne,ISo and refused to budge. 
Snide references to the Bond as 'the power behind the throne" 
indicate that the Cape Times adhered to British constitutional ideas. The 
Bond, as the strongest party in the House of Assembly, was in an 
anomalous position under a responsible government constitution because it 
refused to take office as a party. (Although individual Bondsmen did take 
office from time to time.) 
Rhodes felt he had to offer some kind of defence to the charge 
that he had cooked up the Act in the caucus (and perhaps also try to show 
that he, and not the Bond, was in charge) but his remarks only made 
matters worse. 
With reference to the remarks which had been made about the 
148 Innes Autobiography p 106. 
149 Cape Times Munday 6 August 1894 "Notes in the House" p 5. 
ISO Cape Times 7 August 1894 "Notes in the House" p 5. 
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composition of the Bill, that was due to himself and his private 
secretary without reference to any caucus or party, and afterwards 
submitted to his supporters who accepted it. 1SI 
If Hofmeyr's biographer is correct about Rhodes pacifying restive Bond 
members by showing them a draft of the Bill in Hofmeyr's own handwriting, 
then Rhodes was lying here . But there was more immediate embarrassment 
for Rhodes. Innes spoke directly after Rhodes: 
it was rather hard on his hon. friend the Attorney-General [Henry 
Juta] that the Prime Minister should ostentatiously come and say that 
the Bill was his own composition, and that of his private secretary, 
implying that the chief law officer of the Crown was not consulted in 
the drafting of the principal Bill of the session. 
Mr. RHODES: He was subsequently. 
Mr. INNES: Ohl subsequently. (Laughter.) He was sorry for his hon. 
friend the Attorney-General. (Laughter.) 
Mr. JUTA: I don't see why. 
Mr. INNES: My han. friend is the only man in the House who does not 
see why I (Laughter.) IS2 
The private secretary referred to was Milton, a man Rhodes. trusted, and 
whom he made administrator of Mashonaland after Jameson in 1B9B, Milton 
had been the principal finance officer in the Colonial Secretary's Office 
until Rhodes re-arranged the Prime Minister's Office in April 1B94, 
centralising the control of the machinery of government more effectively 
in his own hands. IS3 Milton was in the gallery during the all-night 
sitting, as an official unable of course to speak in the debate, although 
his presence was noted by the Opposition and remarked upon. The Cape 
Times correspondent describes him "sitting the while in the gallery 
exposed to the shafts from below but helpless to reply, a mute but not 
inglorious, indeed quite disagreeably glorious, Milton.,IS4 Clearly the 
Times was expressing its dislike of anothe·r power behind the throne. 
lSI DHA 1B94 P 432 col 2 (Monday 6 August) . 
IS2 DHA 1894 P 432 col 2. 
153 P. Venter Thesis on Cape administration, 1B06-1910 [No title page] 
Microfilm, Cory Library, Rhodes University. 19491 Pages 53-4. See also 
Philip Jourdan Cecil Rhodes: his private life by his private secretary 
London: John Lane, 1921. Page 22. Jourdan was the chief clerk of the 
Prime Minister'S Office. Jourdan writes 'This [Prime Minister's] 
Department, I may mention, was established as the medium through which 
Ministers were to send all communications to the Governor and High 
Commissioner as well as to the the neighbouring Colonies.' 
154 7 August lB94 'Notes in the House" p 5, See Thomas Grey "Elegy written 
in a country churchyard'. While the Cape Times said that he was mentioned 
more than once, Hansard reports only Merriman'S single reference to the 
prime minister's secretary. 
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Merriman was unable to resist some satire: 
The Prime Minister had said that the Bill was the composition of 
himself and his private secretary. Well they might dismiss the 
Parliament (laughter) and the Prime Minister and his private 
secretary might represent the Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope. 
(Laughter.) The hon, gentleman was fond of Latin. He would say to 
him. Sic vola. sic jubeoj stet pro ratione voluntas. (Laughter . ) That 
was a quotation from the "Delectus" -- that mine of lore --
(laughter) and without any false quantities. (Laughter . )155 
The Cape Times editorial of Tuesday 7 criticised Rhodes for not 
working with, and for being "insolent n towards, the Opposition.1 56 
Under the circumstances, the editor wrote, the Opposition's obstructive 
behaviour was understandable. That was probably a reference to the 
following exchange: 
Mr. MERRIMAN complained of the attitude taken up by the Prime 
Minister. The Opposition had met the hon. gentleman in a very fair 
· way. 
Mr. RHODES: What's the time? 
Mr. MERRIMAN: I do not understand. What do you mean by 'time'? The 
date is the 6th August. 
Mr. RHODES: It is obstruction. (Laughter.) 
Mr. MERRIMAN: Obstruction! Does the hon. gentleman call it 
obstruction to discuss the matter? ... 157 
More genuinely obstructive tactics were tried later . At 12.45 a.m. on 
Tuesday 7, J. C. Molteno (Jun.) began talking on a particular clause and 
during a 45 minute speech was repeatedly reminded by the chairman that he 
had to confine himself to the subject matter of the clause. 158 
Sometime towards 2 a.m. another Molteno, James Tennant Molteno 
(his memoirs are quoted in chapter one) Merriman's colleague for the 
Namaqualand constituency, spoke for 40 minutes on a motion he had 
proposed that the chairman leave the chair. At 2.05 a.m. Sivewright said 
155 DHA 1894 P 433 colI. The correct words are 'Hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit 
pro ratione voluntas" , meaning IIThis is still my wish, my conunand; 
Warrant enough that I will it." It comes from sixth Satire of Juvenal, 
line 223. See Juvenal: The sixteen satires Translated by Peter Green. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967. The Delectus has not been identified. Since 
the word implies a selection, it may have been a dictionary of Latin 
quotations. (I am grateful to Mr Andrew Cook for his kind help . ) 
156 Cape Times 7 August 1894 editorial p 4. 
157 DHA 1894 P 433 col 2. 
158 DHA 1894 P 441 col 2. 
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nyou are making a poor show . It is simple obstruction. You know it 
well.,159 At 2.20 the chairman again a sked Molteno to confine his 
remarks to the subject of the motion . Molteno withdrew his motion at 2.30 
and substantive discussion of the details of the Bill continued. 
The members ploughed gamely on. Some of them stretched out on 
the benches of the House and fell asleep. Some sustained themselves with 
beef tea from the parliamentary kitchen -- which was offered only to 
members of the Government sidet Quite a few appeared to enjoy the novelty 
of the experience. 160 
The committee stage of the Bill was finally concluded 'amidst 
cheers' at 7.15 a.m . on Tuesday 7 August. Only minor changes had been 
made. Some desirable changes had not been made as might have been hoped: 
the district council was not to be elective; its permission was not 
required for Glen Grey land to be sold; and it still had to pay 
compensation for any liquor licences it cancelled. 161 (Although that 
requirement was shortly to be deleted from the Bill.)162 
Investigation into matters relevant to the consideration of the 
Bill by the Cape parliament shows strong. almost exclusive. emphasis on 
Cape concerns. viz. Cape interests and the conflicting views of Cape 
politicians on what was seemly political conduct. The Cape legislature 
was apparently insulated from the predicaments of the Transvaal mining 
industry by its preoccupation with its own concerns. 
159 DHA 1894 P 442 col 2. 
160 Cape Times 8 August 1894 'The News of the Day' for the comic detail 
about the sitting. 
161 Cape Times 8 August 1894 p 4. See also DBA 1894 pp 432-444 for 
amendments made in committee of the whole House. 
125 
Chapter Five 
.-
The mentalite of the settlers of the 
Cape Colony 
as revealed by the debate on the Glen Grey Act 
126 
The elected parliament of the Cape colony was a crucial place where 
interests were articulated. where constitutional principles that had been 
developed in Britain were respected, and House of Commons procedure 
followed . Though none of the colonial legislatures could claim to be 
sovereign. they had considerable powers. In investigating the Glen Grey 
Act, it seemed worthwhile to give some attention to the values that the 
MLAs expressed in the course of the debate on that Act, and on other 
occasions. 
The members of the Cape parliament represented settler opinion 
in their colony, but they also shared in a wider mentalit~, that of the 
Victorian world. They were enthusiastic about the empire, and well-
informed about events in the wor l d at large. It is interesting that 
analogies were drawn to those parts of the empire where the British 
governed either against the wishes of the elected representatives 
(Ireland) or without such representation (India). For example, when 
Rhodes referred casua l ly to the situation in Ireland, the House 
understood the allusion: 
[T]he ~sses against the classes, the former claiming what they 
termed their rights, or to put it in plain language, those who had 
not took from those who had. If they could not get it by what they 
might term Irish legislation (laughter) they would get it by physical 
force. His han. friend had said he was a Home Ruler (hear, hear) but 
that was another aspect of the question with which the Government was 
not then called upon to deal. (Laughter.)l 
Awareness of current conditions did not stop at Britain. Nor 
were they confined to political questions. Rhodes claimed to be informed 
of agricultural conditions elsewhere in Africa, and other members were 
able to contest his opinions on the subject. In Rhodes's opinion cheap 
labour made for succesful agriculture; he also believed that African 
workers who were paid even less than labour in the Cape had an equivalent 
standard of living. 
He [Rhodes] had observed that the country that grew the most grain to 
export paid 2d. a day for labour. In Nyassaland where they produced 
good coffee the wages were 4s. a month .... [O]ur labour supply was on 
the basis of at least 2s.6d. per diem, as against 2d. per diem in 
other parts of the world. He was now speaking of those countries that 
went in for corn-growing. He had seen how those people lived; the 
1 DHA 1894 P 362 col 1. 
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food of the Egyptians was no worse than that of our Kafirs .... 2 
J.W. Sauer, MLA for Aliwal North, disagreed, saying that the prime 
minister could not claim that cheap labour made possible the export of 
grain in large quantities from Egypt and India. "[N]o grain was exported 
from Egypt, and as regarded India, the conditions were different from 
those obtaining in any other country." Sauer ascribed the export of 
Indian grain to its being transported by rail at a very low charge, which 
he regretted was not the case in the Colony. Apart from the reference to 
railways, he said that in Australia workers were paid 5s. or 6s. a day 
(about twice as much as at the Cape) but Australian grain could undersell 
local grain at Cape Town. "It was not, therefore, merely a question of 
cheap labour, but that there were other considerations which accounted 
for it.' He did not suggest what these were.' The point is not whether 
Rhode s or Sauer was right, but that both were able to put the Cape's 
situation into a comparative colonial perspective. 
Merriman's enthusiasm for empire, as well as his wide reading, 
is brought out by his remarks about India: 
Take India for example, and we have a more difficult task than the 
British Government in India, because there they succeeded to a well-
organised Government. They had all the threads of revenue and every-
thing else their predecessors, the [Mughal] emperors, had got in 
order for them .... How did the British deal in India? Their 
administration has been the work not of an Act of Parliament, not of 
a great Act which was going to settle the whole of India at one 
stroke; but of an infinite series of laborious patient men, who 
toiled without any newspaper or Parliamentary representation, but who 
went far away and did their work, and their names are perhaps 
forgotten now, and built up a system which is probably one of the 
greatest glories of the English race. (Cheers.)' 
Merriman's remarks and their enthusistic reception show how popular 
imperialism was, and how well regarded were the men of the Indian Civil 
Service. We notice also that the virtue of hard work is praised, a very 
Victorian value, and administration (something practical) was more highly 
valued than legislation (something seemingly theoretical). 
The general approbation for British virtues, or what the Cape 
2 ORA 1894 P 363 col 1. 
3 ORA 1894 P 380 cols 1-2. 
, ORA 1894 P 391 col 1. 
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legislators thought the British virtues were, may be summed up by the 
remark of Charles Hutton, . the liberal member for Fort Beaufort, when he 
found that the government members were refusing to pay attention to his 
speech: 
He thought it very unfair that when a most important matter deeply 
concerning his constituency was before the House members of the 
Government deliberately turned their backs on him and refused to 
listen .... No ' one was paying the slightest attention .... Well, if 
they threw down the challenge they must expect him to pick it up, 
that was all he could say. He had something of the Briton in him 
(hear, hear) and if he thoroughly understood that a challenge was 
thrown down by the Government to him he had something of the bulldog 
in him and would try to hold his own. (Cheers.)5 
The question of the political relations between black and white 
was an important one for the Cape colonists, probably the important 
question. In the eyes of some it was too important a matter to be left to 
party politics. What this really meant was that whites should present a 
united front. Bound up with this notion was the idea that blacks could 
legitimately be excluded from politics. While they talked piously about 
keeping this or that matter 'non-political', it did not occur to them 
that they were acting politically by trying to keep such things off the 
agenda, as it were. 
The "native question' as it was called was bound up with the 
"labour question'. In colonial societies this was usually the case. While 
the notion that 'the coloured classes are destined to be the labouring 
classes' was common to both sides of the House, there were nevertheless 
real differences of opinion between government and opposition. Perhaps 
the essential difference was between those who felt confident about the 
future of whites in Africa, despite the disparity of numbers between 
white and black, and and those who were fearful of the future. 
Whites were by no means uniformly confident of their continued 
supremacy. It is common to think of the Victorians as complacent 
imperialists, buoyed up by the idea of their own innate superiority as 
expressed in social Darwinism. 6 There were also those who were not 
complacent. Charles Pearson, for example, believed that 'We [whitesj 
5 DHA 1894 pp 434-5. 
6 Christine Bolt Victorian attitudes to race London: Routledge, 1971. See 
especially pp 26-8. 
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shall awake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even 
thrust aside I by people whom we look down upon as servile". 7 
The confident tone was expressed by the prime minister. He 
mentioned the anxiety felt by many whites in the colony but said that he 
"took a different view. It He expressed confidence in the superior position 
of the white race and believed that the blacks could be kept in a 
subordinate position. He drew a contrast with Europe and America where, 
because the working classes were white, they had to be treated better 
than blacks were . 
.. . when he saw the troubles that were going to occur with the 
English people in their own country with regard to the social and 
labour questions, really sometimes he felt rather glad that the 
labour question was in this country in connection with the native 
question, for, he said, at any rate they would not have happening 
here what had lately happened i n Chicago where, on account of some 
questions of the management of a Pullman car, the whole of the labour 
parties broke out, and utterly wrecked the city . 
... he did not feel that the effect of having one million of natives 
in that country [the Cape] was a reason for any serious anxiety. 
Properly directed and properly looked after, he thought the nat ives 
would be a great source of assistance and wealth. 8 
Blacks, in short, could be expl oited economically and dominated 
politically and that was satisfactory to Rhodes. We cannot now know 
whether Rhodes was a racialist, who believed that whites simply were 
superior to blacks and destined to remain so; or whether he believed that 
the differences between white and black were ones of culture and outlook, 
not inherent in race. He seems to have expressed both views at different 
times . He made a famous remark to the effect that he believed in 'equal 
right for all civilised men south of the Zambezi'. That was said in the 
context of the Cape general election of 1898, when he was hoping to 
return to office with the help of the black vote, having lost the 
Afrikaner vote because of the Jameson Raid. Even then, he first said 
'Equal rights for all white men', only later correcting it to 'civilised 
men' . What he said in 1894 was: 
... so long as they accepted the native as he was they would be all 
) Charles Pearson National life and character, cited in Benjamin Kidd 
Social evolution London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1895. Page 337. 
8 DHA 1894 P 362 coli. 
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~ight. But when they depa~ ted f~om that po sition, and put him on an 
equality wi t h themselves they would go a s t~ay. What the futu~e would 
be in a hundred years time he did not know, but he was fully 
acquainted with the present position . The member fo~ Fort Beaufo~t 
was continually driving at that point, wanting to make the natives as 
themselves. It was not a tenable position . " 
He had based all his replies on the unde~s tanding that, in so fa~ as 
brains, the natives were different. Rightly or wrongly, he had been 
brought up to think that those people were diffe~ent . He did not 
despise them -- far f~om it; but they were, he thought, built 
differently. 10 
Later in the course of the same debate Rhodes suggested in passing that 
there were stages of barbarism and that blacks could be the equals of 
whites. 
If they passed a good Bill here in connection with the second stage 
of the natives -- that was, when they we~e emerging from pure 
barbarism , as compared with the third stage, when they were, apart 
from colour, apparently the same as the whites - - the legislation 
might be followed [elsewhe~e in Africa].ll 
It is possible that Rhodes was not clear in his own mind what he thought 
about blacks, or it may have been that he was t~ying to conciliate the 
opposition in parliament and disarm his humanitarian c~itics in England 
by professing some idea of possible equality. 
The liberals in parliament were often referred to as 'the 
friends of the natives ' or contemptuously as ' negrophilists,,12 These men 
shared certain views, but did not always hew to a common party line. 
Their diffe~ences among themselves are as illuminating as their 
diffe~ences with the government. 
While Rhodes referred to blacks as "barbarians "13 or "savages 
just emerging from barba~ism,l' he showed no fea~ of them. (Even Tengo 
9 DHA 1894 P 364 col 2. 
10 DHA 1894 P 369 colI. 
11 DHA 1894 P 418 colI. 
12 ' The wo~d, 'neg~ophilist', seems to have long been a term of contempt. " 
W.E . Gladstone Solomon, Saul Solomon: 'The Member for Cape Town' Cape 
Town: Oxford University P~ess, 1948, p 13. 
13 'If ... white men came and lived and brought up thei~ children in the 
midst of those locations , su~~ounded by ba~ba~ians , he dared not speak of 
the futu~e . ' DHA 1894 P 368 colI . 
l' DHA 1894 P 368 colI. 
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Jabavu was to Rhodes "this barbarian or this gentleman who had just 
emerged from barbarism".15) By contrast Merriman feared the black 
people . 
John X. looked a t two issues: the emergence of an elite of 
educated blacks, and the inc rease in the black population . While not 
wanting to deny this bla ck elite its rightful place, Merriman was nervous 
of what its emergence portended : 
He did not sneer at Tengo Jabavu as the Han. the Prime Minister did. 
On the contrary, he looked upon him as indicating one of the greatest 
dangers to the whites of this country. If they had 10,000 Tengo 
Jabavus here where would the whites be then? Tengo Jabavu was a most 
talented man. His articles did him credit. They were very much better 
than most of the articles he read in the press of the Colony 
generally .... The whites were deteriorating in this country, and 
these [black] people were rising in the social scale . Where were the 
whites going to be unless they treated them justly and firmly? 
The han. member then referred to what he termed the eminently 
alarming increase of the native population in the Border 
districts. 16 
Merriman wanted to keep the numbers of blacks in the Western Province 
10w. 17 This was in sharp contrast with the opinion of David De Waal, MLA 
for Piquetberg, a Bondsman, who wanted more blacks in the West as 
labourers. 18 Merriman feared that this would drive "the Europeans clean 
out of the country.,,19 
He noted that "the natives were improving and demanding equal 
social rights . ... Those people would improve themselves and they had got 
15 DHA 1894 P 369 col 1. 
16 DHA 1894 P 385 col 2. 
17 It has been shown in chapter three that as early as 1879 Merriman and 
Saul Solomon had expressed fears about the future of whites in the Cape. 
Merriman's fears may have persisted into later years. In the 1920s he 
bought two books, written by one Lothrop Stoddard, which gave gloomy 
warnings about the future of the white race in general. (Lothrop Stoddard 
The rising tide of colour against white world-supremacy New York: 
Scribner's, 1920; The revolt against civilization: the menace of the 
under-man London : Chapman and Hall, 1922.) Copies of both of these, with 
Merriman's signature and the date on the fly-leaves, are in the Rhodes 
University library. 
18 DHA 1894 P 386 call . De Waal was one of those Bondsmen who, unlike 
Hofmeyr and the great majority of the party, did not repudiate Rhodes 
after the Jameson Raid . He also accompanied Rhodes to Rhodesia and wrote 
a book about his experiences published in English as With Rhodes in 
Mashonaland . (See De Waal's entry in the DSAB vol 2). 
19 DHA 1894 P 386 call. 
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to face the position. They could not improve things by driving them off 
the locations . w2o Merriman mentioned two oppressive measures against 
blacks that had recently been proposed in parliament. One would have 
forbidden them to walk on the pavements in East London, and the other 
would have prevented black children going t o school. He dismi ssed both of 
them as far c i cal. As noted above, while Merriman feared both the 
numerical superiority of blacks and the threat posed by the black elite, 
he did not want to deny that elite its place in society, or· to oppress 
the non-elite; hence his opposition to such discriminatory measures. 
Merriman looked at the few blacks who had become acculturated to 
the European way of life and saw them as the wave of the future. Rhodes 
looked at the many who were not acculturated and wanted to keep them that 
way. 
James Rose Innes, MLA for the Cape Division, did not see the 
general rate of increase of the black population as a problem. He said: 
They should take the figures for the whole country and the Transkei, 
and they would then find that the rate of increase of the natives 
during the period 1875-90 was not very much in excess of the rate of 
increase of the European population. 21 
He did think that the numbers of blacks on private locations might have 
increased. Innes pointed out that if there ~ a danger from the black 
population, it was a mi s take not to increase European inunigration . The 
agricultural interest was opposed to white immigration: what they wanted 
was black labour, and not whites who might be come competitors. 'What 
astonished him was the position taken up by the hon. member for Colesberg 
(Mr. Van der Walt), was the horror with which he appeared to look upon 
upon white immigration. (Laughter.) , 22 
Numbers aside, there was the problem of inducing blacks to work 
for whites. There was much disagreement as to whether the blacks were 
inclined to work or not. Certainly a racist view that blacks, and 
particularly black men, were lazy was wide spread among the colonists. The 
notion that higher wages might make people more inclined to work for them 
20 DHA 1894 P 386 col 1. 
21 DHA 1894 P 414 col 2 . 
22 DHA 1894 P 415 coli. 
133 
had not occurred to many colonists . Rhodes himself was not consistent on 
the point of black industry: "All he could say was that while a good many 
did go out to work, the statistics showed that about one-fifth of the 
males did nothing. With this class of Kafir mashers he wanted to 
deal.,23 A little later he remarked: 'The statement has been made that 
already these natives went out to work. On careful examination he found 
that such was not the case, and that there were large masses who never 
did any work at all.'24 
Another speaker, Dr Bisset Berry, MLA for Queenstown, 
contradicted the view that blacks were inherently lazy, and made a point 
not often seen by the colonists: higher wages would solve the labour 
shortage. Berry 
found on reference to the Census returns that in the Colony there 
were 81,000 adult labourers employed as farm servants, herdsmen, 
shepherds, and town hands, while 49,000 were employed in the 
Kimberley district alone. What right had the Prime Minister ... to 
say that a gentle stimulus was required to send these boys out to 
· work? The only stimulus required was fair treatment and fair wages 
25 
Berry next made a casually Draconian suggestion: 'A better solution of 
the difficulty would be to prohibit any but owners of huts from living in 
native reserves and retain the hut tax.' (Emphasis added.) This contrasts 
sharply with his earlier generous sentiments. 
Merriman said it 'was contrary to the whole evidence of the 
Labour Commission to say that they were unwilling to go out and work." 
Even if they were lazy, he went on, there were many Europeans in the 
country who would not work. 
To the Victorian mind labour was dignified; it was forced labour 
that was objectionable. Rhodes reacted more than once to the charge that 
the labour tax was tantamount to slavery, saying that the overall tax 
burden would be less under the Act tnan it had been before. He calculated 
as follows: 
23 DHA 1894 P 418 col 1. 
24 DHA 1894 P 419 col 2. 
25 DHA 1894 P 384 col 1-2. It is interesting to note that a man who was 
sympathetic to blacks could use the demeaning term 'boys" for adult black 
men. 
ISs. 
5s. 
lOs. 
£1.10s. 
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quitrent for a four morgen lot 
district rate 
labour tax 
total 
A man who had two huts would have been paying £2 in hut tax and stamp 
duty before the Act. 2• But individual tenure did away with hut tax, so 
the new position would be that ten shillings less had to be paid. [See pp 
147-8] 
By arguing in this way Rhodes was, however, avoiding the issue. 
The question was not so much the overall sum demanded by the government 
(and even here he was disingenuous because he left out of account the £5 
payable to cover the cost of the survey) but the objectionable fact t hat 
men were compelled by law either to pay a tax or to work outside the 
district. Such work could only have been for white employers, for whom 
many of the Glen Grey people had no deire to work. 
In this regard it is interesting to notice the COl'onial Office 
endorsement of the white colonial view. Fiddes noted that 'To speak of 
the labour provisions (as the Petitioners do) as qualified slavery is 
absurd. Three months labour per annum for 12 years won't hurt any of them 
... 'u Fairfield noted that 'Slavery consists in confiscating the fruits 
of a man's labour rather than in stimulating him to labour.,28 The 
Colonial Office was anxious to agree with Rhodes, because they had to be 
able to deal with the white colonists. Fairfield later put a more 
generous construction on Rhodes's motivation: 
If the Division Lists in the Papers are looked at it will be clear 
what a terrible phalanx of Boers Mr Rhodes has at his back, and it is 
no wonder therefore that he had to throw a sop to Cerberus in the 
shape of the labour tax. 29 
At the Cape, Sauer was more critical. He accepted the idea that 
'idle young men,30 should go out to work, but objected to lot-holders 
facing the same compulsion. Rhodes had earlier argued that if a lot-
holder grew only mealies, that would take up about four weeks of his time 
2. DHA 1894 P 366 coIl. 
21 PRO CO 48 524 f 130 - 1. 
28 PRO CO 48 524 f l30. 
29 PRO CO 48 524 f 132. )0 DHA 1894 P 382 coIl. 
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per year. and that there was no rea son for such a man not to go out to 
work for three months. 
Mr SAUER ... The Premier said a native could sow his mealie patch 
within a few weeks. Mealies required far more attention than that. 
Mr RHODES: There are his children. 
Mr SAUER: But a man may have no children. 
Mr RHODES: There are the women. 
Mr SAUER said a man might not have a wife, but at any rate he hoped 
that the father of the native population [Rhodes] was not going to 
say that the native women should be made to work. 31 
From this exchange it emerges clearly that Rhodes did not think of blacks 
as individuals who might object to being compelled to work for others, 
but merely as the "native problem" , beings who, because they were black, 
it was justified to coerce. Sauer's ironic reference to Rhodes as the 
father of the native population probably arose from Rhodes's remark the 
previous year in the debate on the Minister of Agriculture Bill (which 
attached the native affairs portfolio to the prime minister'S office) 
that 'some Minister should be the father of the natives, for the majority 
of these were merely children".32 Rhodes never lived that down. William 
Hay said 
he was a plucky man who would set himself up as the father of a 
native child (laughter) but when they found a man willing to become 
the father of a million native s , as the Prime Minister was, he was a 
bold man indeed (Laughter.)33 
Rhodes was anxious to portray himself as well-disposed towards blacks, 
whatever the reality may have been: 
It happened that at the rearrangement of the Cabinet he was give 
charge of the natives .... It also happened that in another direction 
this side of the Zambesi he was responsible for another half-million, 
and he believed another half-million beyond the Zambesi. So it might 
be said that through the instrumentality of Responsible Government, 
and also by another position which he held, he was responsible for 
about two millions of human beings .... 34 
31 DHA 1894 P 382 colI. 
32 DHA 1893 P 217 col 2. 
33 DHA 1893 pp 220-1. 
34 DHA 1894 P 362 cols 1-2 . 
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* * * * * 
"The liquor question" was another issue that exercised the minds of the 
colonists. It was bound up with the issues of race and labour. Many 
wanted to protect blacks from alcohol, and especially from distilled 
liquor. In some cases this was a genuine philanthropic urge. To others it 
was a matter of not wanting their labour force to be disabled by drink. 
Some employers did not find that drink among workers was a problem --
blacks who were addicted to liquor were more likely to return to work for 
them so that they could earn the money to buy more liquor. And there were 
also the grape farmers, distillers and canteen keepers to think of, in 
whose interests it was to sell as much liquor as possible. (The farmers 
of course were also employers of labour and might not have wanted their 
workers to be incapacitated by alcohol -- but these were probably a 
minority given the ubiquity of the "tot" system.) Finally it must be 
borne in mind that it was not respectable to be in favour of liquor, 
especially liquor for blacks. So some may have been inclined not to make 
their true opinions known. 
In his statement of the four principles underlying his Act, 
Rhodes included a commitment to stamping out the "evil" or "pest" of 
liquor among blacks. "[T]hey had placed canteens in their midst, and 
naturally a man who had nothing to do and was idle turned to the canteen 
say 
"35 The prime minister "knew the Curse of liquor. "36 He went on to 
Personally at the Diamond-fields he had assisted in making 10,000 of 
these poor children hard-working and sober. They were now in 
compounds healthy and happy. In their former condition the place had 
been a hell upon earth. Therefore his heart was thoroughly with the 
idea of removing liquor from the natives. But if licences were taken 
away and no compensation given it would be unfair. 37 
He suggested that compensation be paid out of the district's tax revenue. 
In this way "they would be able to pay the compensation and not feel the 
35 DHA 1894 P 362 col 2. 
36 DHA 1894 P 367 col 1. 
37 DHA 1894 P 367 col 1. 
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want of it. (hear, hear. ),,38 Rhodes never adequately explained why he 
wanted compensation to be paid in Glen Grey . Probably it was meant to be 
a concession to the liquor interest, as represented by the Afrikaner 
Bond. 
There were further ramifications to the liquor question: some, 
like William Hay, MLA for Victoria East, advocat~d the prohibition of 
liquor for blacks. 39 This was intended to protect them from the harmful 
effects of alcohol, and has been identified as part of the liberal 
programme. 40 But the view of a Bond-supporting newspaper like Di 
Afrikaanse Patriot was that this was inconsistent with other liberal 
ideas. 
[A]s an 'n Naturel di drank moet on thou warde net soos an 'n kind, 
wat nag ni weet wat ver hom goed of kwaad is ni, dan is 'n Naturel 
oek ni werd am di stemreg te he ni .... Waarom moet 'n persoon in di 
een geval 5005 'n eenvoudige kind behandel worde; maar in di ander 
geval kan hy 5005 'n grootman ver homself handel. Di Jingoes en 
negervrinde weet waarom. 41 
Di Patriot was right about one thing: the two positions were inconsistent 
with each other; but it was mistaken in lumping together the Jingoes and 
the negrophilists. The Jingoes in 1894 were represented by the 
Progressive Party of Thomas Fuller; the tlfriends of the natives" were for 
the most part in the much smaller Innes camp. 
The view of Di Patriot may be summed up as 'no liquor, no vote". 
Rhodes used that phrase in connection with his proposal to give the 
people of Glen Grey powers of local government while excluding them from 
wider politics. 42 Sauer said at an early stage 
It was not a Bill laying down the principle 'No liquor, no vote,' but 
it really meant "No vote, no liquor," because under this Bill they 
38 DHA 1894 P 367 col 2. 
39 See Hay' 5 entry in the DSAB vol 4. 
40 T.R.H. Davenport South Africa: a modern history Johannesburg: 
Macmillan, 3rd ed., 1987. Page 120. 
41 Di Afrikaanse Patriot 26 July 1894 'Di Glen Grey Kwessie.' [I]f drink 
must be withheld from a Nat{ve, just as from a child who does not yet 
know what is good or bad for him, then a Native is also not worthy of the 
franchise .... Why must a person in one case be treated like a simple 
child, but in the other case he can deal for himself like an adult. The 
Jingoes and the negrophilists know why. 
u DHA 1894 P 363 col 1. 
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would destroy local option and set up a Board constituted entirely by 
the governor which could issue as many licences as they chose 
irrespectively [sic] entirely of the state of public opinion on the 
subject . 43 
He went on to say that the prime minister's speech was at variance with 
his Bill, because in his speech Rhodes had declared that "the people 
would have the right to drive liquor out of thei= midst.,44 In the 
event, the 64th clause of the Bill, providing for compensation, was not 
included in the Act, so Rhodes did not have his way in that regard. 
There was widespread support for giving the people of Gl en Grey 
'local option" as Rhodes proposed. This meant the right to refuse to 
grant new liquor licences, or to renew existing ones. What was obnoxious 
to many was that compensation had to be paid to licensees under the Glen 
Grey Bill, but not under the ordinary liquor legislation. The 
compensation clause was eventually removed. Another and more subtle point 
against the local option provision was that it was not true local option 
as understood in the Colony proper. In Glen Grey a mere nominee council 
would have the power of decision over liquor licences, a council that 
could, it was feared, be influenced by the resident magistrate. In the 
colony that power was held by a majority of any local community. 
Sauer said that he did not object to class legislation (i.e. 
laws that applied differently to different races) 'if the legislation was 
in accordance with the condition of the class referred to, and as far as 
possible to promote their interests.' But the Glen Grey Bill was class 
legislation in the wrong direction: compensation was not paid for the 
cancellation of a liquor licence in England or in the Colony and 'the 
principle of compensation was a very bad one.,45 Innes expressed his 
opposition to the Glen Grey people being burdened with the cost of 
compensation. 46 
It was not only the liberals who were opposed to compensation. 
Colonel Schermbrucker, the member for King William's Town and a director 
of the Indwe Company, said that he 'did not go to the length of providing 
compensation, but he thought they ought to give a certain notice to the 
43 DHA 1894 P 381 col 2. 
44 DHA 1894 P 381 col 2. 
45 DHA 1894 P 381 coIl. 
46 DHA 1894 P 412 coIl. 
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holder of the licence which was t o be taken away. ,4' Joseph Orpen. the 
member for Wodehouse. described by Merriman as 'a great friend of· the 
natives H • although he sat on the government side,48 was "rather 
strongly"" against the compensation c lause. When debating whether the 
Glen Grey lots should be attachable for debt Rhodes said 
With regard to the proposal that when a man got into debt he should 
not be exposed to the risk of having his land taken from him, he had 
thought the matter carefully out. and he had come to the conclusion 
that if they allowed a man to snap his fingers at his creditors it 
would be grossly unfair . He said that if a man got into debt for 
liquor or anything else --
Col. SCHERMBRUCKER: No, not for liquor. 
Mr. RHODES said he would say then f or goods of various kinds. He 
considered that such a man should be compelled to pay his debts. and 
it was surely in the interest of the native community that a ne'er-
do-well should be turned out of the location. 50 
Schermbrucker's interjection shows that concern about liquor crossed 
party lines. 
* * * * * 
On the question whether the Glen Grey Act was intended to produce migrant 
labour or completely to proletarianise the black people to whom it was 
applied, the evidence is not entirely clear. On the one hand Rhodes spoke 
of the blacks earning their living by labour as the people of Europe did; 
on the other he spoke of them having a place to return t o in Glen Grey 
after they had finished working. It is important, however, to note two 
things: (i) the Glen Grey Act was a preliminary measure . (Rhodes had said 
it would " take years to carry out.,51) It required only three months 
labour a year, after all . Rhodes was not pushing on too fast. (ii) Rhodes 
did not talk in terms which suggest ' a partial subsistence base' in the 
locations. These were to be homes, rather than farms, for the migrants . 
47 DHA 1894 P 392 col 2. 
48 DHA 1894 P 434 col 1. 
49 DHA 1894 P 379 col 2. 50 DHA 1894 P 466 col 2 . 51 DHA 1894 P 366 col 1 
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Some of his remarks may be useful here: 
They wanted to keep that four morgen intact -- to make it a reserve. 
where the children who went out to work could come back to. They, 
therefore, must keep that land belonging to one man, and they had 
introduced the law of primogeniture, not because of any feeling for 
the eldest son, but because it was the only way they could work and 
keep the head of the household over each 10t. 52 
They must recognise that certain parts of the country must be kept 
the home of the natives. He did not say that everyone must have a 
piece of land there, but it must be a place where the people could go 
back after working. 53 
Rhodes was opposed to private 10cations. 54 He proposed to 
ftcreate in their stead proper native centres, under proper control and 
furnished with a labour bureau. , 55 Unregulated locations on private 
farms were difficult of access and were "reserves for stolen stock." 
(This was a common view.) Later Rhodes said 
. Referring to private location matters, he would say if they made 
those reserves they would be able to deal with the locations of 
private farmers. They would simply say those locations should not 
exist. 56 
Sauer. in a rather opaque remark, pointed out that there was no machinery 
in the Glen Grey Bill to deal with locations, and until they were dealt 
with there would be no satisfactory solution to the labour problem. 
Exactly what he meant is not clear; perhaps that such locations should be 
regulated; perhaps that they should be dissolved; perhaps something else 
altogether. 
* * * * * 
These then were some of the attitudes which made up the world-view of the 
l2 D~ 1894 P 364 col 2. l3 DHA 1894 P 418 col 2. l4 D~ 1894 P 366 col 2 and 418 col 2. l5 D~ 1894 P 366 cols 1-2. l6 D~ 1894 P 418 col 2. 
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Cape legislators. The unresolved and perhaps unresolvable contradiction 
for the Cape MLAs was that they were seeking to uphold the dignity of 
parliament at a time when they were undermining the asserted claim of 
parliament to respect: that it represented the community for which it 
legislated. 
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Chapter Six 
Contemporary reaction to the Glen Grey Act, 
and 
conclusion 
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The reac tion to the Glen Grey Act of three important classes of people 
will be considered here: the Africans of the Cape Colony and their local 
white supporters, the British humanitarians, and the personnel of the 
Colonial Office . 
Black opinion in the Cape was against the Glen Grey Act from the 
start. One way this opinion was expressed was through Imvo Zabantsundu, 
one of the first South African newspapers to be edited by a black man 
(John Tengo Jabavu) for a black readership. 
In discussing Tengo Jabavu's political career in a thesis on 
Imvo Zabantsundu and Cape "native" policy Leonard Ngcongco gives the 
strong impression that Jabavu's main concern over the Glen Grey Act was 
the land issue . While Imvo objected to the disenfranchising sections of 
the Act, and actually welcomed the provisions about local government, it 
constantly returned to the land issue. 1 
Imvo had been alive to the Glen Grey land question for years. In 
1889 it had opposed Joubert's motion to force the blacks out of Glen 
Grey . In 1892 the paper warned of "avaricious Dutch farmers" in 
Wodehouse, Albert and Queenstown who wanted to force blacks out of their 
land to claim it for themselves. 2 In 1893 it expressed concern about the 
Rhodes ministry dealing with Glen Grey "with a light heart", saying that 
the government should be guided by the Barry Commission3 of 1883 rather 
than the Glen Grey Commission of 1892. 4 Jabavu was one of the educated 
black elite and so he was in favour of individual tenure, but opposed its 
being brought about by legislative coercion as the commission of 1892 had 
recommended. He favoured its gradual introduction as the people felt 
themselves to be ready for it, as the Barry Commission had proposed. 
Jabavu was firmly opposed to African-owned land, in Glen Grey or anywhere 
else, being available to white purchasers,5 whom he called 
"landsharks ".6 
I Leonard Ngcongco Imvo Zabantsundu and Cape "native" policy 1884-1902 M. 
A. thesis, University of South Africa, 1974 . Page 95. 
2 Imvo 12 May 1892, cited in Dorothy Ruth Edgecombe The influence of the 
Aborigines Protection Society on British policy towards black African and 
Cape coloured affairs in South Africa. 1886-1910 Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Cambridge, 1976. Page 90, n 3. 
3 AVP G4-'83 . 
4 Ngcongco Imvo p 119 (Imvo 2 August 1894) 
5 ibid pp 114, 119, 120 (Imvo 26 July, 2 and 13 August 1893). 
6 Edgecombe Influence p 97 (Imvo 29 August 1894). 
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Jabavu reperted meetings at which the Bill was discussed. Two. 
impertant meetings were held at the end of July, at which it was decided 
that ether such meetings sheuld be held to despatch petitiens. and in the 
meantime that the prime minister should be Haddressed" to prevent the 
Bill being dealt with in a hurry.7 
Jabavu's editorial of 15 August 1894 en 'The Future ef the Bill" 
argued that the geverner sheuld not sign the Bill but reserve it fer the 
significatien of the queen's pleasure (as had been dene in the same 
sessien with the Bill annexing Pendeland) because the Glen Grey measure 
was incensistent with Britain's treaty ebligatiens in regard to. African 
land. s The practical effect ef such a step as reserving the Bill weuld 
be that the British cabinet weuld decide the fate ef the measure, and the 
queen weuld act en their advice. At the very least the implementatien ef 
the Act in the celeny weuld be delayed. 
Jabavu seems to. have relied heavily en this netien ef treaty 
ebligatien. He referred in his editerial ef 29 August to. an imperial Blue 
Beek9 centaining treaties between Britain and the tribes ef the Eastern 
Cape 
securing the lands they new inhabit to. these peo.ple. Thus there are 
Treaties affecting land settlements with Kama, the Peddie Finges 
[sic). Ngangelizwe and many ether native tribes, Glen Grey 
inclusive .... After the descriptien ef beundaries the fellewing 
phrase invariably eccurs: 'Which territery shall be held by the said 
Chiefs and tribe, their heirs and successers, in perpetuity, never to. 
be reclaimed by. er en behalf ef, Her said Majesty. except in case ef 
hostility committed or a war provoked." &c., &c., &c. lO 
Jabavu went en to. say that the Act vie1ated these treaties by allewing 
this land to. be alienated. and that the geverner had the duty under the 
Letters Patent censtituting his effice net to. assent in the queen's name 
to. any Bill incensistent with a treaty. 
7 ibid P 126 (Imve 1 August 1894). 
S Fer the editerial see Themas Karis and Gwendelen M. Carter (eds) Frem 
protest to. challenge: a decumentary histery ef African pelitics in Seuth 
Africa 1882-1964 velume ene Pretest and hepe 1882-1934 Stanferd 
University: Heever Institutien Press, c. 1972 . Page 17. 
, Blue Beek 42 ef 1884, issued in cempliance with a reselutien ef the 
Heuse ef Lo.rds ef June 1883 fer 'Cepies er Extracts ef any Engagements 
subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen and any States er Native Tribes 
in Seuth Africa'. 
10 Imve 29 August 1894 "Censtitutienal Agitatien'. 
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Jabavu made his point about the land in a letter to Lord Ripon, 
the secretary of state for the colonies. He referred to "the alienation 
of the lands of the Natives -- land given or secured them by solemn 
Treaty engagements between Her Majesty and the people" ,11 and said that 
it was the people's intention to approach parliament in the next session 
on the question of the alienation of land under the Act. 
Jabavu's urgent argument in favour of the rights of blacks to 
hold their land undisturbed emphasises the central importance of land in 
his view, over and above the franchise. The threat to African-owned land 
posed by white land grabbers in the Eastern Cape should not be minimised. 
The policy of the Afrikaner Bond before its amalgamation with the Boeren 
Beschermings Vereeniging in 1882 had been 'the colonization by Whites 
[sic] of Transkeian territories and the expropriation of black peasants 
within the Cape Colony so that their lands could be thrown open for white 
farmers. ,12 White squatters had moved illegally into Engcobo and 
northern Emigrant Thembuland in the Transkei after the war of 1880. 13 
Determined, but ultimately unsuccesful, efforts were made in 1885 and 
1886 to persuade the Glen Grey people to leave their lands. 14 Attention 
has already been drawn to the parliamentary motions of 1889 and later 
with respect to the Glen Grey land question. Land, then, was undoubtedly 
a crucial issue. 
A similar emphasis on land is evident in speeches in parliament. 
Joseph Mil1erd Orpen said 'in order to meet the wishes of the population, 
not only should no land be sold without the consent of the Governor, but 
it must not be sold without the consent of the people themselves.,ls 
Orpen went on to say 
that the Glen Grey district was much overcrowded. He believed that 
the Government would have to remove from that district a number of 
the natives who were crowding into it and provide for them 
11 PRO CO 48 524 pp 710-11 (Jabavu to Ripon 10 September 1894). 
12 Elsie J.C. Wagenaar A history of the Thembu and their relationship 
with the Cape, 1850-1900 Ph.D. thesis, Rhodes University, 1988. Page 193. 
13 Wagenaar History p 193. 
14 ibid pp 200-6 and James Rose Innes Sir James Rose Innes: selected 
correspondence (1884-1902) Edited by Harrison M. Wright. Cape Town: the 
Van Riebeeck Society, 1972. Pages 32-5. 
15 DHA 1894 P 379 col 2. 
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elsewhere. 16 
Sauer said 
there were many matters of far more importance to the natives than 
their getting votes. If the House gave the natives a good land 
settlement ... they would do do something of far greater importance 
'" than the question of the Kafir having a ·lote. 17 
Pierce Ryan, MLA for Malmesbury, 'believed there should be no alienation 
of land from the natives. nlB James Rose Innes observed in his memoirs 
that he had voted against the third reading of the Bill because an 
amendment (requiring the consent of the district council as well as that 
of the governor for the alienation of lots) had been rejected. If some 
one became prime .minister who had no objection to blacks selling their 
land, the governor's approval would have been no protection. At the time 
he wrote his memoirs, Innes's worst fears about the effects of the Act 
had not been realised because the land was not taken from the people. 19 
They had been protected from the imminent threat of white land grabbing. 
The Imvo editorial of 15 August 1894 mentioned above was a part 
of the tactics adopted by the July meetings. Attached to the editorial 
was the text of a petition already sent from "certain natives of King 
Williamstown,20 asking that the Bill be reserved for the signification 
of Her Majesty's pleasure . By publishing the standard form of a petition 
Jabavu had made it possible for Imvo readers anywhere to get up 
identically worded petitions that were concise and literate. This led to 
the Colonial Office receiving '18 or 19' petitions by 3 December 1894. 21 
Unfortunately these failed to impress the Colonial Office, especially as 
none of the petitions had come from Glen Grey itself, a point emphasised 
by Edward Fairfield, a senior official and the one most directly 
16 DHA 1894 P 379 col 2. Orpen may have meant that more land should be 
given to blacks, or he may simply have meant 'provide for them elsewhere 
in the native territories'. In any event nothing . came of his suggestion, 
which he did not press very hard. 
17 DHA 1894 P 380 col 2. 
18 DHA 1894 P 384 col 2 . 
19 Innes Autobiography p 106. 
20 PRO CO 48 524 P 135 (Cameron to Ripon 29 August 1894). 
21 PRO CO 48 524 P 134. 
147 
concerned with the matter. 22 A petition did come from Glen Grey,23 but 
as Fairfield was unaware of it, it had probably not arrived by the time 
he wrote his comments. Some thirty-five petitions against the Act were 
forwarded by the governor of the Cape to the Colonial Office between 29 
August 1894 and 16 January 1895. 24 
Imvo reprinted editorials from other newspapers against the 
Bill: the Cape Times opined that protection against alienation of land 
should be written into the law,25 and the Christian Express was opposed 
to cheap labour being obtained by an Act of parliament 26 . Ngcongco 
points out that the Cape Mercury, edited by Richard Rose Innes, said that 
the measure was intended to provide labour for Bond farmers. 27 Imvo 
expressed its satisfaction with the trend of press opinion in the colony 
against the Act or parts of it28 and made some further objections to the 
Bill: too much power was to be delegated from parliament to the 
executive; the labour tax approached slavery; and "Imvo felt certain that 
some of the provisions could not fall short of 'disorganizing Native 
Society".29 This point about 'disorganizing Native Society' seems to be 
a forerunner of Cooper's ideas in the twentieth century that the Act was 
intended to disrupt black society with a view to proletarianising its 
members completely. [See pp 33-36] 
Jabavu maintained his criticism despite the abuse of the 
powerful. Rhodes mentioned Jabavu in parliament, saying that there 
was no greater mistake made in South Africa than supposing that the 
22 PRO CO 48 524 P 134 (Fairfield wrote on 3 December that 'The Glen Grey 
natives seem loyally in favour of the Principles of the Bill.") and p 137 
(General Sir William Cameron had-written on 29 August that 'up to the 
present, no petition or remonstrance has been received from the natives 
of Glen Grey.') 
23 Edgecombe Influence p 98 n 1. 
24 PRO CO 48 524 P 128. (Petitions from King Williamstown and Port 
Elizabeth.) Edgecombe Influence p 98 n 1 lists a further 33 places from 
which petitions were received. I failed to ascertain a total figure when 
consulting the documents at the PRO, and so have assumed that no more 
than one petition came from each of the places mentioned by Edgecombe . 
Those 33 places, plus the ones fron King Williamstown and East London 
give a total of 35. 
25 Ngcongco Imvo p 127 (no date given). 
26 ibid p 184 (Imvo 9 April 1895). 
27 ibid P 129 Cape Mercury (2 August 1894). R. W. Rose Innes made the 
same point in his later pamphlet on the Glen Grey Act. 
28 Ngcongco Imvo p 128 (Imvo 25 July 1892). 
29 ibid (Imvo 18 July 1894). 
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editor of the native organ had the full confidence of the natives, 
and represented their views. (Hear, hear.) ... The criticism passed 
on the Bill by this barbarian or this gentleman who had just emerged 
from barbarism was ignorant and not worth consideration. 3D 
Here we see something typical of certain white attitudes: a refusal to 
believe that their black subjects were discontented. That not all whites 
shared the views of Rhodes and those members who murmured their approval 
of his remark can be seen from what Hay and Merriman said about the 
editor of Imvo. Hay 
protested against the way in which the Hon. the Prime Minister had 
referred to Tengo Jabavu, and said he thought the Prime Minister 
would by and by see that he had done an injustice to a man who 
deserved better. The time was coming when there would be more 
Jabavus. These people would educate themselves. Men like Jabavu would 
come to the front. By and by they would find in Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland native newspapers carried on by native editors. 31 
Merriman's remarks have been quoted at pp 129-31. 
Jabavu's reply to Rhodes's gibe was to point out that Rhodes had 
been content to treat Imvo as representative of black opinion when it had 
suited him in the past. Jabavu wrote that he saw nothing to be gained 
from arguing about 
the advantages derived from [sic] the speaker from the fact of having 
emerged from barbarism earlier than the editor of this journal, so 
long as it is a matter of history that it is the misfortune of both, 
and the fault of neither, that the forefathers of the one smeared 
themselves with a blue dye, while those of the other preferred red 
30 DHA 1894 P 369 col 1. Ngcongco Imvo p 129 has a slightly different 
version of Rhodes's words. Obtained from Vindex p 389 they read as 
follows: "[T]here was never a greater mistake made than by people who 
think that the native editor of Invo [sic], the native paper, has the 
confidence of the native people. And so the criticism and abuse which 
have been poured upon this Bill by this barbarian, who has just partly 
emerged from barbarism, are not to be taken any notice of." 
Rotberg Founder p 714 n 17 says "As texts, the Vindex and the Debates 
differ in phraseology, the Debates being in the third person and Vindex 
in first person. Verschoyle (Vindex) took his materials from the 
stenographic reports of the reporters and from their published articles. 
Even though the Debates are the official record, Vindex may be--it is 
impossible to know--the more accurate if not the more lively record of 
Rhodes' words in parliament." 
31 DHA 1894 P 383 col 2. It may be worth mentioning that Herbert Tamplin 
and Dr Berry wrote a note of apology to Jabavu for the way he had been 
referred to in the House of Assembly. (DHA 1894 P 488 col 2.) 
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In April the following year Imvo returned to the Glen Grey 
question, printing the text of a petition from the Anglican bishop of St 
John's in the Transkei against the labour tax. The bishop criticised the 
tax on the grounds that no representations from blacks had been 
considered because of the haste in which parliament had passed the 
measure. Also, the increase in tax was sudden and extreme3) (rising from 
ten to thirty shillings); the system of exemption from the labour tax on 
production of an employer's certificate was open to abuse; since only 
labour under white employers qualified black inhabitants for exemption 
from the tax, blacks were in danger of being reduced to a condition of 
serfdom. 34 Finally he concluded that by giving the tribes a common 
grievance, the provision was likely to encourage rebellion. 35 Jabavu 
endorsed the sentiments of the bishop's petition. 
On the labour question it should be noted that Jabavu was not 
op~osed to blacks working for whites. He congratulated one L. G. H. 
Tainton on his appointment as government labour agent for the Transkei, 
and commiserated with him on beginning his career under the shadow of the 
Glen Grey Act. 36 In 1896 the gold mining companies decided to reduce 
wages with effect from the following year: Jabavu protested that such a 
step would discourage Africans from going out to work. Clearly Jabavu 
believed, as white Victorians did, in the dignity of labour. He saw 
nothing wrong in a black man exchanging his labour for fair wages. 
What this chapter has dealt with so far has been the opinion of 
the educated black elite. The reactions of people more directly affected 
by the Glen Grey policy will now be considered. 
Ally argues that when the Glen Grey Commission investigated 
32 Ngcongco Imvo p 130 (Imvo 1 Aug 1894). 
33 Rising in the bishop's view from ten to thirty shillings a year. The 
Act provided for lOs. labour tax, ISs. quitrent and 5s. local rates, for 
a total of thirty shillings. Previously there had been a lOs. hut tax. 
Rhodes had claimed that most black men had more than one wife, thus more 
than one hut and would pay less under the Glen Grey Act than before. 
34 The bishop was not quite correct. With the magistrate's permission 
labour for another resident of Glen Grey would provide exemption from the 
labour tax. 
35 Ngcongco Imvo p 183 (Imvo 2 April 1895). 
36 ibid p 184 (Imvo 2 May 1895). 
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affairs in the district it manufactured a majority opinion in favour of 
individual tenure by threatening the people with the possibility of 
losing their land if they did not take titles. 3) Even the commission had 
to acknowledge that there was still a strong minority opposed to the 
impending new tenure. 
Ally distinguishes the resistance to the Act in Glen Grey from 
the resistance in Fingoland. In Glen Grey itself, where the Act was 
brought into operation in all its aspects simultaneously, the land issue 
was immediately important, and opposition to the council less 
significant. By contrast, in Fingoland the change in tenure was delayed 
until some years after the council system had been inaugurated. For 
example in Butterworth, the first district of Fingoland in which 
individual tenure was introduced, the preliminary survey was begun only 
in October 1898. 38 Hence the resistance in Fingoland was to begin with 
mainly aimed at the council system. 
As far as can be ascertained from the secondary sources 
available, it seems that, as the Colonial Office noted,39 there was no 
petition from Glen Grey itself against the Bill between the date of its 
publication and its implementation. Why this should have been so is not 
clear. The detailed researches in recent years of Ally40 and Wagenaar4l 
can shed no light on the matter. The petition which Edgecombe refers to 
came later, although it is impossible to tell from her footnote in 
exactly which despatch it was contained. 
* * * * * 
Black criticism of he Glen Grey Act was supported by humanitarians in 
Britain . The Aborigines' Protection Society (APS) corresponded with the 
Colonial Office over the Glen Grey Act. This humanitarian association was 
an offshoot of the campaign for the abolition of slavery in the British 
3) Russell Ally The development of the system of individual tenure for 
Africans, with special reference to the Glen Grey Act, c 1894-1922 M.A. 
thesis, Rhodes University, 1985 . Pp 113-117. 
38 Ally Development 124. 
39 PRO CO 48 524 P 134 . 
40 Ally Development. 
~l Wagenaar History. 
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Empire. Emancipation had been achieved in 1833, but it had become 
apparent to those who had been prominent in the struggle for abolition 
that former slaves and other subject peoples in the empire were still in 
need of protection, and the Aborigines' Protection Society was set up in 
1837. '2 
The APS, although nominally non-partisan, had far more Liberal 
than Conservative MFs prepared to ask question in the House on its 
behalf. It could reasonably expect more consideration from a Liberal than 
a Conservative government, particularly a Liberal government with as 
small a majority as the administration of 1892-95. But the APS was not 
very popular at the Colonial Office, despite the fact that the ministry 
was a Liberal one, and despite Buxton's family connections with the anti-
slavery movement. (Buxton was the parliamentary secretary to Lord Ripon, 
the secretary of state for the colonies.) 
The royal assent had already been given to the Glen Grey Act 
when the APS, at Jabavu's prompting, took up the matter with the British 
government. H. R. Fox Bourne, the secretary to the APS, was aware of the 
reluctance of the Colonial Office to disallow Acts of colonial 
legislatures operating under responsible government. Nevertheless the 
imperial government still had the right to veto such measures within two 
years of their enactment, and Fox Bourne hoped that some mitigation of 
the effects of the law might be achieved through the imperial factor . He 
sought also to rely on the apparent discretion of the governor in regard 
to the sale of Glen Grey allotments, and wrote to Ripon on the subject . 
The Colonial Office reserved its final consideration of the 
first petitions against the Act, and the APS remonstrance, until Rhodes 
was in London. 43 It was often the practice of the Colonial Office to 
postpone decisions if they knew that some one whose opinion they wanted 
was coming from the colonies. 44 
42 Charles Swaisland "The Aborigines' Protection Society" Anti-Slavery 
Reporter series vii 13(3) 1987 P 84. 
43 PRO CO 48 524. The petitions had been registered in the Colonial 
Office on 17 September 1894 (p 127) and a junior official had prepared a 
minute for Fairfield on 27 September (p 131). Fairfield gave it his 
attention on 3 December (p 134) when he regretted leaving the matter so 
long (p 131). Buxton made his comments, which were conclusive, on 8 
December after talking to Rhodes (ppI34-5). 
44 I am grateful to Miss Brenda Nicholls of the Department of History, 
Rhodes University, for this information . 
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The objections of the APS to the Glen Grey Act were set out in a 
letter of 4 October 1894. Individual tenure was criticised as 'an 
innovation likely to be much less advantageous to any but a few ... than 
the communal arrangement based on long established and widespread native 
institutions.' The possibility that the land could be sold to outsiders 
was raised as a point against the Act. The labour tax was criticised as a 
'harsh and unwarrantable interference with the liberty of the subject' 
notwithstanding that it might be 'expedient in the interests of the white 
population of the Colony.' In making this point Fox Bourne made the 
common error of assuming that the tax would not fallon men who held 
land. No one seems to have corrected him. The council was criticised for 
being entirely appointive, which vitiated the potential good effects of 
local self-government. The possibility of the Act being extended widely 
by proclamation also alarmed the society. In conclusion they expressed 
the hope that the powers of the governor under the Act would be used to 
prevent its extension and mitigate its enforcement. 45 
The Colonial Office's reply was surprisingly brusque. Fairfield 
wrote that 
Lord Ripon does not consider that any useful purpose would be served 
by discussing in detail the various arguments and assumptiuns of fact 
set out in your letter, but, with reference to ... the risk of native 
allotments being alienated to persons who are not natives, he would 
refer you to the speech made by Mr Rhodes on 26th July in moving the 
second reading of the Bill.46 
It seems that the Colonial Office did not take the APS seriously -- at 
least over this issue. Fairfield minuted that 'a rather feather-headed 
enthusiasm for primitive conununism" on Fox Bourne's part was owing to his 
being 'a bran-new [sic) Daily Chronicle man' while the previous secretary 
had been 'an old-fashioned Daily News man.,47 He suggested that the APS 
committee was unaware of the sentiments that Fox Bourne was nputting into 
their mouths". 
In a more serious vein, Fairfield advanced the rather specious 
argument that it was a mistake on the APS's part for them to describe 
individual tenure as an "innovation" because it had been part of "Cape 
45 Aborigines' Friend January 1895 pp 442-3. 
46 ibid pp 443-4. 
47 PRO CO 48 524 P 720. 
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law for 15 years,,48 through the Native Locations Act of 1879. It was 
Fairfield who was in error: the 1879 Act had been applied on a small 
scale. Individual tenure for blacks was known to Cape law and had been 
applied in some cases since the 1850s. but in practice it was very little 
used. In Glen Grey itself it already applied to some of the land of the 
mission stations, but that was a small portion of the whole district. 
The minute that Fairfield wrote on the subject of the APS's 
letter was longer than the reply he sent to the society. He was 
particularly critical of its change of front over the issue of tenure: 
from being in favour of individual tenure in 1878, to being opposed to it 
in 1894. 49 The Colonial office was content to rely on Rhodes's 
assurances as expressed in public in his parliamentary speeches, and in 
private in his conversations with Fairfield and Buxton. Rhodes's speech 
being more enlightened than his Bill had served his purpose well. 
The society did not let matters rest, but interviewed Rhodes on 
his visit to London. The delegation objected particularly to the 
interference with the communal tenure of land and the labour tax. The 
effect of the individual titles 
gave an advantage to some of the natives and forced the remainder to 
be wanderers from their ancestral homes. In addition the latter were 
obliged to seek employment outside the district or render themselves 
liable to fine [sic] and imprisonment. 50 
The delegation recommended that a land commission be appointed by the 
Cape parliament to report on the working of the Act to the Cape and the 
imperial parliaments. 
Rhodes replied smoothly that the idea was to secure the land to 
the blacks through individual tenure, and that no government would allow 
whites to buy Glen Grey land. He mentioned local option over liquor, and 
that the revenue raised locally would be spent locally. He said that in 
regard to labour he wanted "to do something for the natives to get them 
to see the advantages of labour and learn the dignity of work." Three 
48 PRO CO 48 524 P 720. 
49 PRO CO 48 524 P 719. 
50 The Aborigines' Friend 4(11) New Series January 1895 p 447. 
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months of employment a year for twelve years, or three consecutive years 
of employment ended the obligation to pay the labour tax. Explicit 
prohibition against white purchase was impossible because that would be 
class legislation, Rhodes said. 51 
* * * * * 
The Colonial Office's support for Rhodes rather than his critics is 
evident in its reaction to the points made by Tengo Jabavu. The labour 
tax was described in Jabavu's standard form petition as ~at best a 
qualified slavery', a charge which clearly agitated the Colonial office 
staff, but which they rejected. [See p 138] It seems that they were more 
concerned to reject the imputation of slavery than they were to remedy 
the abuse complained of. 
The question of treaty obligations, which Jabavu had emphasised, 
received short shrift at the Colonial Office. Fairfield looked up the 
Blue Book in question52 and found that Jabavu's point about the 
reservation of land in the treaties was prima facie correct. He observed 
nevertheless that 'The great [7] number of these treaties must be 
considered to have been abrogated by the Kaffir Wars of 1847 and 1850 and 
the annexation of British Kaffraria as a Crown Colony. ,53 He went on to 
quote from Theal's South Africa a description of Sir Harry Smith's 
terminating of the trea,ty system. Fairfield clealy relished the absurdity 
of the episode as he recalled that Smith, having summoned a number of 
chiefs to King Williamstown in 1848 for the purpose of announcing the 
annexation of British Kaffraria, addressed them as follows: 
'Look at the waggon,' he said "and hear me give the word fire I " The 
51 Sauer had remarked 'that [Glen Grey] Bill, they could not but see, was 
class legislation, but to that he did not object.'(DHA 1894 p 382 col 2). 
Innes said 'They could not logically express any fear of class 
legislation, because the whole Bill was class legislation, and the 
proposed labour tax was very stringent class legislation, so that there 
could be no objection to the making of the strictest provisions with 
regard to the alienation of land.' (DHA 1894 P 411 cols 1-2). 
52 PRO CO 48 524 P 132. Fairfield quoted the phrase from the treaties and 
made a marginal note 'See for example bottom of p 25 of H[ouse] of 
L[ords] Papers of 1884" . 
53 PRO CO 48 524 pp 132-3 . 
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train was lit, and the waggon went skyward in a thousand pieces. 
'That is what I will do to you,' he continued 'if you do not behave 
yourselves.' Taking a piece of paper in his hand 'Do you see this' 
said he, tearing it and throwing the pieces to the winds. "There go 
the Treaties," he exclaimed. "Do you hear? No more Treatiesl"54 
Fairfield continued - ludicrous as this was it substantially represented 
the policy of HMG.' He made another marginal note: 'Po S. I found 
afterwards that he had abrogated the Treaties by a formal proclamation 
which is in an old Blue Book , .55 
The Colonial Office was not sympathetic towards Jabavu 
personally. Fairfield thought that the '18 or 19' petitions received 
'only represent a certain amount of missionary and catechist opposition 
engineered by Mr Tengo Jabavu,56. The Office also showed a distressing 
tendency to draw the wrong conclusions, not maliciously but from 
insufficient knowledge: Fairfield gave no weight to Jabavu's submissions 
because he 'noticed in the Report and Evidence of the Glen Grey 
Commission that the Glen Grey people had repudiated the writer's claim to 
be their agent.,57 This was true, but needs some explanation. A letter 
signed by 22 of the headmen of Glen Grey had been sent to the under-
secretary of native affairs in April 1892, which letter said that a 
delegation to Cape Town, of which Jabavu was part, did not represent 
them. 58 That delegation had gone to Cape Town to ask for the issue of 
individual titles in Glen Grey, but was opposed to individual tenure 
being compulsory . The repudiation came from those who did not want 
individual title at all. 59 If Fairfield had read the whole of the 
evidence given to the Glen Grey Commission, and not just the outline of 
the commission's proceedings, he would not have made such a mistake. 60 
But even if the Colonial Office had had more sympathy for Jabavu 
~ PRO CO 48 524 P 133 . 
55 ibid 
56 PRO CO 48 524 P 134 . 
57 PRO CO 48 524 pp 709-10. 
58 AVP A1-' 93 P 3 . 
59 AVP A1-'93 pp 23-4. There may have been some class differences between 
Jabavu and the people who repudiated him and his delegation. As a 'school 
native " , Jabavu may have been on the side of the more substantial peasant 
producers, and in favour of blacks being allowed to accumulate more than 
one lot. 
60 To be fair to the man it must be said that reading even part of the 
Glen Grey Commission report was remarkably diligent of him, considering 
the quantity of work that the Colonial Office had to do. 
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it would probably not have disallowed the Act, firstly because the 
relevant treaties had been abrogated, and secondly because the change of 
tenure would not in itsel f deprive blacks of their land . 
What was crucial in the end was the Colonial Office's reliance 
on Rhodes. Buxton was obviously re-assured by a conversation that he had 
had on the subject with Rhodes while the latter was in London, and 
minuted 
I am clear in my own mind, that (apart from any question as to 
the expedience or otherwise of disallowing such an act as this passed 
by a self governing colony) the Act in itself is a good one and 
should not be disallowed. 
It appears to be a generous and bold attempt to deal, and deal 
humanely, with the native labour question . 
Mr Rhodes was very emphatic -- in regard to the possibility of 
allowing the natives to sell their allotments to the whites -- that 
such an action w[oul]d not be under any circumstances allowed -- & 
that it would be entirely contrary to his native pOlicy.6l 
Rhodes had clearly satisfied Buxton that African land waS safe. The power 
of disallowance was not exercised. In London only Rhodes's opinion 
carried much weight; other voices were hardly heard. 
Another example of Rhodes's influence over the Colonial Office 
is to be found when the South African temperance lobby expressed concern 
to the Colonial Office in 8194 that Rhodes might allow liquor into 
Khama's country. Ripon assured them that 
... Mr. Rhodes has indeed written to the Department to contradict 
certain rumours which have gained currency on his attitude to the 
subject, stating in the most positive terms, that he is totally 
opposed to the introduction of liquor into Khama's country .... Her 
Majesty's Government are well assured that as far as Mr. Rhodes may 
influence events in the Protectorate as Promoter of Railway 
communication, Manager of Industrial Enterprises, or otherwise, his 
actions and influence will be hostile to the Drink Traffic. 62 
Clearly the Colonial Office was satisfied that once Rhodes had given his 
word all would be well. 
61 PRO CO 48 524 pp 134-5. 
62 Natal Archives. Colonial Secretary's Office volume 1418 minute paper 
GIO of 1895, enclosing inter alia a copy of Ripon to Loch, South Africa 
No. 308, of 14 December 1894 . I am grateful to Miss Brenda Nicholls for 
making a detailed note of this exchange and bringing it to my attention. 
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Conclusion 
This discussion of the reception of the Act rounds out the account of how 
it was passed. It will be seen that contempora~ies of the Act, while 
aware of it as a measure intended to secure labour, did not concentrate 
exclusively on this facet of it; reserving the land to the people of the 
district was also a major concern. There were those who wanted to 
preserve the land to the blacks as a means of making that land into 
'reservoirs of labour'; Rhodes and Richard Rose-Innes were among them. 
There were those who wanted to reserve the land for a mixture of motives: 
some humanitarian, and some desirous of labour. Those identified as Cape 
liberals had both kinds of concern in mind. Finally there were those who 
wanted to take the land from the people: A section of the Bond wanted to 
do this in the interests of white agriculture. 
The labour question did not dominate the Colonial Office 
discussion, and certainly there was little or no reference to the needs 
of the gold mining industry in the Transvaal. Although Rhodes was 
approached in 1892 on the question of securing Cape labour for the 
Transvaal mines,6J he was not seen in the Colonial Office as primarily a 
gold mining magnate. In any event, Rhodes's position as premier of the 
. Cape Colony made it far more likely that labour for Cape employers was at 
stake. The Bill was accepted by the Colonial Office because it was a 
measure of the Cape parliament, resolutely advocated by the prime 
minister, who was strongly (but not unanimously) supported in parliament 
where the Afrikaner Bond, the party of the Cape farmers, was dominant. 64 
Criticism of the Glen Grey measure, whether by the black or the 
white people of the colony, or by people in Britain, did not dissuade its 
6J Lionel Phillips wrote from Johannesburg on 13 August 1892 to Alfred 
Beit in London as follows: "While in Cape Town I am going to enquire into 
feasibility of importing Colonial labour." Lionel Phillips All that 
glittered: selected correspondence of Lionel Phillips 1890-1924 Edited by 
Maryna Fraser and Alan Jeeves. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
Page 59. 
64 Hermann Giliomee "Western Cape farmers and the beginnings of Afrikaner 
nationalism, 1870-1915' Journal of Southern African Studies 14(1) October 
1987 pp 38-63. 
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supporters or prevent it from becoming law. It was the subsequent popular 
resistance that had an effect on policy. The resistance of the people on 
the ground made the labour tax unworkable, and raised doubts in official 
minds about the advisability of individual tenure. which was extended 
very gradually under the Glen Grey Act, and was finally abandoned as 
government policy in the 19205. 65 Rhodes 's 'Bill for Africa' was much 
less of a success than he had hoped. 
65 Ally Development pp 191-261. 
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